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Abstract 
Humeanism is often taken to be a prime example of metaphysics which has failed to 
be sufficient attention to contemporary science. I argue that these claims have been 
made too hastily: there are moves available to Humeans which bring the account 
closer to scientific practice while still preserving the spirit of the view. The thesis 
comprises two parts. In the first half, I deal with the Best System Account of laws, 
and consider how it ought to treat initial conditions. From there, I turn to the 
question of whether Humean laws can explain events. This has recently been a topic 
of renewed interest in the literature and I disentangle the various claims 
philosophers have made on behalf of Humeanism. From these, I identify three 
promising responses to the argument that Humean explanations are circular. In the 
second half of the thesis, I consider how the Humean approach to laws can be 
extended to cover symmetry principles when the latter are understood as laws of 
laws. In response to a problem concerning properties and language, I suggest that 
the account go language-relative. The result of this is a regularity-based approach 
that can incorporate both laws and their symmetries into a single unified framework. 
Finally, I draw upon some examples from biology to indicate how the account can 
deal with the special sciences. 
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Introduction 
As philosophy is essentially a meta-activity, there can be philosophies 
of just about anything, and science is no exception … It [philosophy of 
science] has enjoyed a boom in the last 50 years or so, partly because 
it gives philosophers the unfamiliar sensation that what they are 
doing is of some relevance to something.1 
 
This thesis works at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. 
The area is something of a minefield: specialists from both of these areas of 
philosophy have been guilty of drawing battle lines around their respective subjects 
and declaring the middle ground to be a no man’s land. On the one hand, we find 
philosophers of science taking metaphysicians to task over a lack of scientific 
engagement. They accuse metaphysicians of indulging in debates that are sterile or 
empty, of ignoring parts of science clearly relevant to their projects and, on those 
occasions where metaphysicians remember to throw in a scientific reference, of 
using only radically simplified ‘domestications’ of science. In their influential critique, 
Ladyman and Ross draw a clear lesson from these failings, claiming that 
‘contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some 
extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the 
enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued’.2 There are 
echoes of Hume here, and his insistence that such works of sophistry and illusion 
ought to be cast into the flames. 
In the face of such criticisms, some metaphysicians have dug their heels in and 
doubled down on what they have already been doing. This sentiment is nicely 
brought out – although not entirely endorsed – by Conee and Sider: 
The revised view is that metaphysics is about the most explanatorily basic 
necessities and possibilities. Metaphysics is about what could be and what 
must be. Except incidentally, metaphysics is not about explanatorily 
ultimate aspects of reality that are actual. Metaphysics is about some actual 
                                                     
1 Hankinson (1985) p. 40. 
2 Ladyman and Ross (2007) vii. 
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things, only because whatever is necessary has got to be actual and 
whatever is possible might happen to be actual.3 
Metaphysics, on this view, really has separated itself from the practice of science. 
But this is a justified separation, since the two subjects are concerned with different 
areas. It is no surprise that metaphysicians pay little attention to the findings of 
science, since their concerns are far broader than those of science (which is 
concerned merely with what is actual). 
I am not alone in thinking that the space between metaphysics and the philosophy 
of science is not so much a terrifying gulf as rather fertile land. In Callender’s pleasing 
slogan, ‘metaphysics is best when informed by good science, and science is best 
when informed by good metaphysics’.4 French and McKenzie take a broadly similar 
view: for them, metaphysics serves as a toolbox for philosophers of physics seeking 
to understand fundamental physics.5 Of course, committed metaphysicians will 
object to this characterisation and its suggestion that metaphysics only gains value 
through its utility to philosophers working on the real issues! Perhaps they might 
even reverse the metaphor: philosophy of science has a use beyond merely 
explaining the findings of science when it serves as a muse to metaphysicians 
studying what could be the case. Ultimately, the metaphor is not important. The 
view I advocate in this thesis is that there is no sharp distinction between the areas 
of metaphysics and the philosophy of science, but rather that there is considerable 
overlap (the literature engaging with theories of time and space is a clear example 
of this). From that perspective, thinking of oneself as a philosopher of science 
plundering metaphysics, or vice versa, is simply unhelpful. Members of both 
disciplines have a shared interest in what there is and what it is like; the primary 
difference in the work is its engagement with empirical data. 
While I have taken to calling this thesis a work of metaphysics informed by the 
philosophy of science, it might just as easily be thought of as philosophy of science 
from a metaphysical angle. There is little in the name here. What it aims to do is 
                                                     
3 Conee and Sider (2005) p. 236. 
4 Callender (2011) p. 48. 
5 French and McKenzie (2012). 
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tackle issues relating to laws in a way that is both metaphysically and scientifically 
informed. I take giving an account of laws to be one of the aforementioned areas of 
overlap and so this is a good opportunity to show how these different kinds of 
considerations can be incorporated into a single view. Of course, the available 
literature on laws is far too large to attempt to do justice to every interpretation.6 
For this reason, I have chosen to focus on Humeanism and what it has to say about 
lawhood. This is in part due to my philosophical leanings: while I may not be an 
uncompromising adherent, I am certainly strongly sympathetic. But it is also partly 
due to an interesting tension within the account. Humeans, much like Hume, tend 
to be respectful of science. Thus, we find a suspicion of there being metaphysically 
inexplicable entities doing any work; there are no idle metaphysical wheels and 
there is nothing going on behind the scenes. What you see (via science) is what you 
get. Yet Humeans are often first in the firing line when philosophers of science get 
restless. Sometimes the charge is that they have failed to realise that the world is 
not classical. Other times it is that they cannot adequately capture the practices and 
proclamations of scientists. Either way, Humeanism is supposed to serve as an 
example of how not to do metaphysics. 
There are two main aims in this thesis. The narrower aim is to reconcile Humeanism 
with the relevant philosophy of science. Through examining some of the apparent 
conflicts with scientific practice, I will draw out what I take to be the most promising 
options available for scientifically inclined Humeans to proceed. This feeds into the 
broader aim: to contribute towards a more productive engagement between 
metaphysics and the philosophy of science. The thesis is intended as an example of 
the benefits that result from doing the ‘right’ kind of metaphysics. 
The thesis has two main parts. The first half is concerned with the usual Humean 
account of laws and is spread over two chapters. In chapter one, I begin with some 
scene-setting. Humean accounts of law are seldom held entirely separate from other 
metaphysical commitments. At the very least it would be surprising if the laws had 
nothing to do with non-Humean entities like fundamental dispositions should those 
                                                     
6 An accessible overview is provided by Demarest (2015). 
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entities be available for use! For this reason, it is worth locating the account within 
the wider Humean framework which includes, most notably, the doctrine of Humean 
Supervenience. Given the considerations above, that’s a somewhat controversial 
doctrine to appeal to – not for nothing is it held up as a prime example of 
scientifically disinterested metaphysics! While the matter is not nearly as black and 
white as is often presented, I restrict myself to only indicating how Humeans have 
attempted to develop it rather than diving into which development is best (this is for 
the very simple reason that I think a full defence of a suitably modified Humean 
Supervenience doctrine requires a thesis in itself). With a broad overview of the 
mosaic in place, I turn to the reduction of laws to regularities and the Best System 
Account. This leads into the interesting question of what to do about initial 
conditions: the original account says very little about this aspect of scientific practice 
and I use the opportunity to examine the modifications we might make to give them 
their proper place. 
In chapter two, I tackle a long-standing objection to regularity accounts of laws. The 
basic idea is straightforward: if the laws are just patterns in the underlying mosaic, 
how can they explain the mosaic? As the explanation of phenomena by laws is a role 
assigned to them by scientists, this is another example of the way in which Humeans 
are supposed to have failed to properly observe scientific practice. But while the 
question can be stated simply, getting a good philosophical argument out of it is less 
easy. I am influenced here by Marc Lange’s recent writings on this topic and his 
placing of a principle of transitivity as the central issue. Perhaps because this 
objection is not often laid out in detail, some responses to it have fallen short. After 
examining these and showing that they merely motivate a stronger circularity 
argument, I argue that there are three viable replies Humeans can make. At this 
point, selection of a reply becomes a matter of looking at one’s prior commitments 
and then weighing the associated costs. While I favour one response, as I believe 
that it sheds some light on how Humeans ought to be thinking of explanations, I 
recognise that not all Humeans need agree with this. The important thing as far as 
the thesis is concerned is that the regularity account is not dead in the water. Despite 
the popularity of the claim that Humeans cannot make sense of scientific 
explanations, there are options available here. 
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The second half of the thesis, consisting of chapters three and four, looks beyond 
the familiar Best System Account. Chapter three introduces symmetry principles and 
indicates how these are connected to laws in modern physics. There is something of 
a lacuna here in most discussions of Humean laws. While symmetries play a 
distinguished role in scientific theorising and are often viewed as a kind of constraint 
on the form that the laws can take, metaphysicians have said little about how these 
are related to the Best System Account. Marc Lange’s work is drawn upon again, and 
I pursue his suggestion that we conceive of symmetry principles as metalaws, or laws 
of laws. Viewed in this way, the existence of symmetries motivates a move to a 
second-order Best System Account that captures the patterns in the patterns in the 
mosaic. This provides an opportunity to discuss their role in areas that laws are often 
appealed to, such as counterfactual reasoning. Despite a promising start, however, I 
show that there remains a problem for this extension of the Humean account. The 
Best System Account is tied to a particular choice of vocabulary, one that does not 
mesh well with the systematisation of metalaws. 
Chapter four lays out what I take to be the best response to this language problem. 
A similar issue arises for Humeans seeking to capture the laws of the special sciences, 
and I suggest that the solution is the same in both cases. If Humeans are willing to 
adopt a permissive stance towards the language of the best system, then the Better 
Best System Account can be extended in the way suggested in chapter three to allow 
for both nonfundamental laws and metalaws. Once the position has been laid out, I 
then put it to work. Its first use is to respond to the complaint from the philosophy 
of science that symmetries represent exactly the kind of constraints or necessary 
connections that Humeans are unable to stomach. Not so, I reply, for under the 
account that has been developed they are no more problematic necessities than the 
usual laws are. Reading off metaphysical conclusions from science is more difficult 
than that. The second use is directed towards the special sciences, using biology as 
my example. I claim that the account helps Humeans to say what marks out the laws 
of biology as different from those of physics by translating talk of universality into 
talk of higher-order regularities that hold over the laws. I also suggest that there 
looks to be rough biological equivalents to the symmetry principles of physics, with 
a principle of natural selection being the most obvious example. I conclude that, with 
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suitable modifications, the Humean account of laws can both cleave more closely to 
scientific practice and resolve some metaphysical issues regarding how best to 
understand those practices. 
This thesis is situated within a large area of philosophical work and there are 
inevitably interesting issues that I do not discuss. Some of these are indicated in the 
text and typically remain unexplored on account of being tangential to the main 
thrust of the chapter in which they are located. I have not attempted to do justice to 
the full range of Humean positions here, although I have tried to indicate the options 
open to different accounts. It will quickly become apparent how much influence the 
work of David Lewis has had on this thesis. As such, the Humeanism that I am 
considering is very often a Lewisian Humeanism. I make little apology for this. While 
there are many ways in which one could part ways with Lewis while remaining 
recognisably Humean, his work has had such a large impact on this area of 
philosophy that it is difficult to engage in a discussion of the regularity account of 
laws without paying tribute. As Humeanism’s most famous modern defender, he has 
both set down the closest thing we have to a canonical account and in many ways 
determined the agenda for the ensuing debates. 
A more fundamental question that I do not tackle is what justifies or motivates a 
Humean philosophy in the first place. There are, of course, almost platitudinous 
things that could be said here. I might express a desire to do without the sort of 
metaphysics that looks mysterious to Humean eyes, like the notion of governance in 
connection with laws. Alternatively, I might appeal to Occam’s razor and protest that 
there is no need to introduce non-Humean entities to give an account of the world. 
But I suspect that those who ask ‘Why be Humean?’ will remain unsatisfied.7 (If one 
is sceptical of the success of the Humean project, then neither of these claims look 
to amount to much.) Aside from considerations of parsimony and empiricist 
leanings, I think that the main reason for adopting Humeanism is in its aesthetic 
value. In Quinean fashion, Humeans are often lovers of desert landscapes and find 
attractive the idea of accomplishing much with very little. It is appropriate, given the 
                                                     
7 As does Maudlin (2007a), who takes this as the title of his second chapter in a plea for 
enlightenment. 
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aim of this thesis, that we find a similar preference in physicists. One need only recall 
Einstein’s famous disdain for ugly equations or search for books on physics whose 
titles mention beauty to find evidence of this. If what I suspect about the basic 
Humean motivation is true, then Humeans are in good company. 
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Chapter 1 Humeanism 
 
To properly discuss the Humean approach to laws, it is necessary to first set out 
exactly what we will be taking its claims to be. That is the purpose of this chapter: to 
lay the foundation for the later modifications and extensions. I begin with some 
background to the view by placing it within the wider ‘Humean package’, the most 
widely adopted statement of which is Lewis’. One does not need to adopt every 
Humean view to regard laws in a Humean way, but the wider project is important 
nonetheless. After discussing Humean Supervenience, I turn to the regularity view 
of laws. While I am primarily concerned with setting out the canonical account, this 
is not done in an uncritical way. There are aspects of the view that need further work, 
such as how best to understand the theoretical virtues it appeals to. After providing 
some preliminary thoughts on this substantial project, I consider a substantive 
modification to the Humean account suggested by Ned Hall, among others, to 
distinguish between the best system’s dynamic laws and initial conditions. I set out 
what changes might need to be made to do this, and then look at how this sort of 
split interacts with the usual standards by which a system is judged to be the best. 
 
1.1 Humean Supervenience 
The primary focus of this thesis is the Humean account of laws. Those who are 
Humean regarding laws are often Humean in other metaphysical matters too. It is 
worth, therefore, doing some scene-setting at the outset to give a more complete 
picture of both contemporary Humeanism and the sorts of claims that friends of 
Humean laws are sympathetic to. The obvious place to start is with Humean 
Supervenience, the central project that so much of David Lewis’ work was a defence 
of. The following statement of it is by now something of a classic: 
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of 
necessary connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a 
vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then 
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another. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local matters are mental.) 
We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal 
distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-
sized bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we 
have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need 
nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have 
an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without 
difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that.1 
Humean Supervenience is one way of spelling out the claim that truth supervenes 
on being. More specifically, it sets out a collection of fundamental entities which 
serve as a base that all other facts about the world supervene on. It is a physicalist 
position in that it is the world’s fundamental physical state that the truths are 
supervenient upon. This fundamental physical state is comprised of perfectly natural 
properties and relations. The properties are intrinsic and are supposed to serve the 
joint-carving role: possession of perfectly natural properties marks out genuine 
objective differences between things (as opposed to the sort of ‘similarity’ one gets 
when two objects possess especially disjunctive or grue-ish properties).2 To find 
what these fundamental properties are, we look to physics or perhaps some future 
development of that science. Physics might not be equipped to discover all of the 
perfectly natural properties that exist simpliciter, since there seems to be little way 
for actual physicists to study perfectly natural properties that are alien to our world. 
But Lewis endorses the empiricist claim that physics is the best way of finding those 
properties that are actual. Philosophers tend to use the term ‘mosaic’ in slightly 
different ways to one another. Some of this is due to inequivalent formulations of 
what they take Humean Supervenience to be. Some of this is due to how strictly true 
they take the thesis to be: those who take a more permissive stance will be happy to 
call a fundamental base the mosaic if it is appropriately Humean, even if it contains 
elements that Lewis’ original formulation did not. I will be adopting such a permissive 
approach in this thesis. I will be taking ‘mosaic’ to refer to the underlying 
fundamental base, so long as it does not contain anything that violates the spirit of 
                                                     
1 Lewis (1986a) ix-x. 
2 Although the claim that they are instantiated at points makes for trouble with vectors. See 
Butterfield (2006) for suggestions on how to modify the thesis. 
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the Humean campaign.3 Attempting to stick more strictly to the official line strikes 
me as a mistake. As will be discussed shortly, there are reasons to think the original 
account needs modification, and we even see acknowledgement from Lewis that 
some of the precise claims are really not all that important. 
We might expect Humean Supervenience to be a supervenience claim. If so, it would 
look something like the claim that for any two worlds (that are appropriately like our 
own), if their mosaics are the same then all their other facts are the same.4 The world 
is something like a television screen: we look at it and see sequences of picture – 
meaning composite objects and patterns of them. But underlying these pictures on 
the screen, there is just an arrangement of coloured pixels. One cannot have a 
change in the picture without there being a change in the pixels. Similarly, one 
cannot have a change in the large-scale patterns that we observe without there 
being a change in the fundamental properties. 
While this interpretation of Humean Supervenience is supported by various passages 
in the work Lewis has published on it, there are also some issues with it. First, 
Humean Supervenience is supposed to be a contingent thesis. This is its empiricist 
character coming to the fore: it is the job of science, and physics in particular, to 
determine whether Humean Supervenience is true at our world. It is not the stronger 
claim that there is something about the relevant metaphysics that prevents other 
worlds from having different supervenience facts. On the contrary, we are told that 
some worlds have emergent natural properties and so cannot have all of their truths 
supervene on a base like ours. So characterising its claims in terms of other possible 
worlds runs into immediate difficulty: supposing that some other world has a mosaic 
like our own but is not a world where Humean Supervenience holds (perhaps there 
are properties instantiated at it that are not perfectly natural but nevertheless are in 
no way connected to those that are), it will not have all the same contingent facts as 
                                                     
3 This is somewhat vague, since I am not attempting to specify what this spirit is. Vague, but 
not disastrously so since I take it that we can still get a grasp on what counts as Humean 
even without explicit definitions. 
4 Roughly, a world is like ours in this sense if it has no alien perfectly natural properties. 
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ours. That said, perhaps there are ways around this; we are only working with a 
rough definition after all.  
A more serious problem is that supervenience is not an asymmetric relation. Neither 
is it symmetric, for it is nonsymmetric. The fact that the As supervene on the Bs does 
not by itself rule out the Bs supervening on the As. We should be concerned by 
attempts to characterise the fundamental as a supervenience base, since the base in 
question might supervene on the nonfundamental stuff too. The surface area of a 
cube supervenes on its volume, but it would be odd to therefore claim that a cube’s 
area is somehow more fundamental than its volume. As the volume also supervenes 
on the area, we would end up committed to both the volume and the area being 
more fundamental than each other. This suggests that something stronger than 
supervenience is going on. The usual replacement candidates are the likes of 
reduction, dependence, ontological priority and grounding. This is not the place to 
undertake the substantial question of which notion fits the Humean project best. 
Instead, we shall have to be content with a rough and ready characterisation of the 
position and an acknowledgement that there is still important work to be done on 
exactly what the relationship is between the mosaic and the nonfundamental 
elements of the world. Fortunately, this is a promising affair as there exists a range 
of resources in the metaphysical literature available for plunder by the Humean. 
One might wonder why it is that Lewis did not adopt one of these other notions 
instead of the oddly weak supervenience. That’s not an easy question to answer 
given that he is not available to ask, and that this work is not intended to be an 
exegetical one. Some suggestion is given in a passage where he takes the 
supervenience claim to be broadly reductionist, but notes that it is ‘a stripped-down 
form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence’.5 That fits with 
the generally commonsensical approach Lewis took; it is unlikely he would have 
wanted to deny that tables and chairs really exist. But it is perhaps also overly 
cautious, since the usual fundamentality relations do not need to be interpreted in 
that way. Grounding, for example, is not typically associated with the elimination of 
                                                     
5 Lewis (1983) p. 358. 
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the grounded entities. I take contemporary Humeans to be thinking of something 
stronger than supervenience when they declare their allegiance to the cause, but 
there is still room for a weaker version of the account that sticks more closely to 
Lewis’ original writings. 
It is worth saying a few words about the elephant in the room: quantum physics. It 
is not unusual to find philosophers of science chastising Lewis and Humean 
Supervenience for a failure to pay enough attention to actual twentieth-century 
physics.6 This is a bit of an easy target for those who have anti-metaphysical leanings 
and an axe to grind. Lewis admitted outright that this picture of the world was 
inspired by classical physics, so it is little surprise that it is better suited to a classical 
world than a quantum one. If it were just the source of inspiration that was falling 
behind the real science, this might not be the worst problem to have.7 But the 
objection is much stronger than that: we are supposed to look to physics to discover 
whether Humean Supervenience is a true description of the world, and it turns out 
that physics has said ‘no’. So why care about a philosophical position that has been 
empirically refuted? Let us briefly rehearse the argument from quantum theory and 
then consider what Humeans might want to say in reply. I focus here only on 
quantum mechanics and ignore further developments like quantum field theory. 
That is not because those developments are completely unproblematic, but because 
the debate thus far has largely focused on quantum mechanics alone. 
While single particles present no particular issues for Humeans, systems of multiple 
interacting particles do. Or, at least, some do. Systems whose joint state can be 
represented in the form of product states create no issues. Product states assign a 
determinate value for some property to each of the particles in that system. As such, 
the composite state is separable: it can be reduced to a combination of the states of 
the individual particles. However, there are states that are not factorizable in this 
manner. The classic example is of two electrons prepared in the Singlet state. If we 
wish to make a spin measurement on one of the particles, we cannot be certain in 
                                                     
6 Maudlin (2007a) is a clear and forceful statement of this kind of anti-Humeanism. 
7 Given Einstein’s famous lack of comfort with some of the advances made by quantum 
physics, we might even have been willing to say that Lewis was in good company! 
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advance whether it will be measured as spin up or spin down with respect to the 
measurement direction. Instead, we must assign a 50% probability to each of the 
two possible outcomes. But once we have measured the spin value of one of the 
electrons, we can now be certain what the spin value of the second electron is in 
that direction: it will be the opposite of the first’s. The state of the particles is 
antisymmetric in this way. This statistical behaviour holds true for any direction of 
measurement, each electron has an even chance of being up or down with respect 
to that direction and the second electron will always have opposite spin to the first. 
The problem for Humeanism is that there is no pure single particle state that shows 
the same statistical behaviour as this. So the entangled state of the electrons cannot 
be factorised into product states.8 This suggests that the behaviour is emergent in 
the sense that it cannot be ‘broken down’ into properties ascribed to each electron 
individually. But Humean Supervenience appears to require that this happen: the 
mosaic is made up of local matters of particular fact. Hence there is an apparent 
conflict with modern physics. 
There are various ways the Humeans can respond to this challenge, although none 
comes without a cost. First, one might attempt to simply ignore the problem. As odd 
as it sounds, this head-in-the-sand approach was suggested by Lewis: 
Really, what I uphold is not so much the truth of Humean supervenience as 
the tenability of it. If physics itself were to teach me that it is false, I wouldn’t 
grieve. 
That might happen: maybe the lesson of Bell’s theorem is exactly that there 
are physical entities which are unlocalized, and which might therefore make 
a difference between worlds – worlds in the inner sphere – that match 
perfectly in their arrangements of local qualities. Maybe so. I’m ready to 
believe it. But I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from quantum 
physics as it now is. First I must see how it looks when it is purified of 
instrumentalist frivolity, and dares to say something not just about pointer 
readings but about the constitution of the world; and when it is purified of 
doublethinking deviant logic; and – most of all – when it is purified of 
supernatural tales about the power of the observant mind to make things 
                                                     
8 I have just been considering pure states here for ease of exposition. Impure states are 
generally not thought to provide any assistance to Humeans here. 
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jump. If, after all that, it still teaches nonlocality, I shall submit willingly to 
the best of authority.9 
Of course, the critics are quick to point out that all of this has already been done. 
There are interpretations of quantum mechanics that satisfy Lewis’ requirements 
but, in assigning some form of physical interpretation to the wave function, still 
violate the kind of separability required for Humean Supervenience to function. 
Some of these interpretations were available while Lewis was still working in that 
area! Writing later, Lewis repeated what he took to be the focus of this work: 
The point of defending Humean Supervenience is not to support 
reactionary physics, but rather to resist philosophical arguments that there 
are more things in heaven and hell than physics has dreamt of. Therefore if 
I defend the philosophical tenability of Humean Supervenience, that 
defence can doubtless be adapted to whatever better supervenience thesis 
may emerge from better physics.10 
So there is a sense in which the criticisms from the anti-Humean philosophers of 
science are misdirected. Lewis was never trying to provide a philosophical 
interpretation of our current science or to read off what it says about the way the 
world is. Using him as an example of a metaphysician who misinterprets physics is 
wrongheaded: one cannot misinterpret a subject that one is not trying to interpret 
in the first place. That said, there is still something to those objections. While 
defending physicalism is a noble endeavour, why conjoin that defence to a 
metaphysical account that looks to be false? It would be better if the defence were 
accompanied by a true account, or at least one that cleaved more closely to actual 
physics. Resisting philosophical arguments that we need necessary connections or 
nonlocal fundamental properties is all well and good, but if we are then required to 
add them in our ontology by physics, we might well wonder whether we have been 
wasting our time. 
If we take the challenge from physics more seriously, we might instead offer an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics that fits better with the motivation behind 
Humean Supervenience. One way to do this is to turn to the de Broglie-Bohm pilot 
                                                     
9 Lewis (1986a) xi, italics in original. We might note that the lesson Lewis associates with 
Bell’s theorem is normally taken to encapsulate the consequences of entanglement. 
10 Lewis (1994a) p. 474, italics in original. 
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wave interpretation. As is well known, Bohmian mechanics is a hidden variables 
interpretation of the quantum theory. On one way of setting up the view (leaving 
aside older presentations that involved a quantum potential), our ontology consists 
of a configuration of N particles with determinate positions and trajectories. The 
positions of the particles change over time according to a guidance equation, which 
relates the particle velocities to the wave function. The wave function evolves 
according to Schrödinger equation in the usual way. All of this evolution is 
deterministic, probabilities only enter the picture due to our epistemic ignorance. So 
far so classical one might think. But we should remember that the interpretation is 
still nonlocal as the guidance equation relates the velocity of each particle to the 
behaviour of every other particle in the system, no matter how distant. 
To see whether this ontology is appropriately Humean, we must consider the 
particles and wave function in some more detail. If the change in the particle 
positions is related to the wave function, is the wave function acting on the particles 
in some way? Conceiving of it as a field runs into immediate difficulty: the wave 
function is defined on a configuration space of 3N dimensions, and it is not 
altogether clear how a field living in such a space can interact with particles in regular 
space. One solution, pressed by Albert and Loewer, is to take the configuration space 
as the fundamental one.11 The ontology then would be the wave function conceived 
of as a field and a single world-particle for it to act on (we can normally represent 
the N particles in 3-space as a single particle in 3N space, but on the Albert-Loewer 
suggestion that is entirely backwards). Humean Supervenience is thus preserved, 
since the nonlocality drops out of the theory altogether. Each point in configuration 
space has a (local) property giving a value for the wave function at that point, and 
one of the points is further privileged by being occupied by the world-particle. The 
cost of this approach is twofold. First, since it involves taking what is usually 
considered to be a mathematical representation as physical reality, it comes into 
tension with scientific practice. Something needs to be said about why we can 
collapse the distinction between representation and reality in this case, but why the 
distinction is a good one in other areas. Second, there is the illusion problem: our 
                                                     
11 Albert (1996) and Loewer (1996). 
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usual experiences of a world with a fairly low number of dimensions is completely 
illusory since the world really has a very high number of them. Recovering our usual 
experiences from the exceedingly austere base is a significant challenge for the 
account. 
Alternatively, to solve the wave function-particle interaction problem, we might wish 
to reconsider how we interpret the wave function. If we no longer take it to be a 
physical entity of any kind in a Bell-inspired fashion, then we do not need to show 
how entities living in different spaces can interact. The most prominent suggestion 
here is to give the wave function a nomological interpretation.12 There are some 
differences between the various suggestions that fit into this mould. Miller, for 
example, explicitly appeals to Humean treatments of chance. What it is for there to 
be objective chances in the world on Lewis’ view is for our system of laws to talk in 
terms of chances. Roughly speaking and in a similar vein, what it is for there to be a 
wave function or entanglement is for our system of laws to talk in those terms. The 
risk, as Miller acknowledges, is instrumentalism: we are dangerously close to saying 
that what it is for there to be any X is for our laws to talk about Xs. The question then 
is where and how the line in the sand should be drawn. We might see Bhogal and 
Perry’s suggestion as a way to respond to this worry: they look to and modify the 
language of the best system of laws to provide some constraints on this. The next 
section of this chapter introduces laws more fully. It is also worth noting that there 
is a reason that Esfeld calls this account ‘physicalism without properties’. The 
physical entities in this sort of Bohmian ontology are very bare indeed. There are 
particles, they have positions and those positions change over time. That might well 
fit the letter of Humean Supervenience, but it does mean that there are considerably 
fewer perfectly natural properties than first thought. Properties like mass or spin are 
nonfundamental for Bohmians, since Bohmian particles do not have any such 
properties in an intrinsic way. This might not be an issue if we are only worried about 
ontology. But Humean Supervenience and natural properties are commonly put to a 
                                                     
12 Bhogal and Perry (2015), Callender (2015), Esfeld (2014), Miller (2014). 
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variety of metaphysical uses; it is not clear how many of these uses survive the 
austerity of the Bohmian interpretation. 
There is another option if we do not wish to ignore the problem but have doubts 
about how successful the Bohmian turn is. Confront the issue directly: the problem 
is that quantum mechanics looks to suggest a form of holism, where the whole fails 
to supervene on the features of the parts. This is commonly described as a relational 
holism, where the challenge is that there appear to be ‘entanglement relations’ that 
do not supervene on intrinsic properties of particles.13 Darby has suggested the 
seemingly straightforward solution of simply adding such relations to the mosaic.14 
The official Lewisian position is generally taken to be that the only perfectly natural 
relations are the spatiotemporal ones. This fits the mosaic metaphor: if the mosaic 
is an arrangement of fundamental properties, the spatiotemporal relations are how 
they are arranged. All other relations and patterns are formed from this 
arrangement. To change a mosaic, I need to either change the colour of the tile or 
where the tile is placed. I do not need to try to change other relational facts directly, 
since all of them are dependent upon the underlying arrangement. But as nicely as 
this fits the metaphor, we need to remember that it is just a metaphor. To draw 
philosophically substantive conclusions from a useful illustration would be to put the 
cart before the horse. After all, even if Humean supervenience is a completely true 
thesis, the metaphor will look strained! Different arrangements of tiles most 
naturally correspond to different spatial arrangements of properties. We could get 
time in by imagining this spatial arrangement changing over successive moments. 
But an important lesson to be drawn from relativity theory is that space and time are 
not so easily disentangled. A mosaic that differs from one moment to the next does 
not adequately capture the idea that the arrangement is to be spatiotemporal, as 
opposed to there being distinct spatial and temporal arrangements. We could 
instead think of the tile positions corresponding to both spatial and temporal 
locations, but then the result is a ‘mosaic’ that does not match the mosaics we are 
used to. The point of all of this is not that we should drop the mosaic metaphor 
                                                     
13 Teller (1986) and French (1989). 
14 Darby (2012) and Darby (2015). 
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entirely or that Humean supervenience is incompatible with there being a 
spacetime. Rather, it is merely the reminder that even attractive metaphors should 
not limit our philosophical options. 
In fact, Lewis himself was willing to consider the possibility of there being perfectly 
natural relations other than the spatiotemporal ones. Since he was officially neutral 
regarding whether there are fundamental entities that occupy the spacetime points, 
he left open the possibility that appropriate occupancy relations are also perfectly 
natural.15 Darby’s suggestion is that we treat entanglement in a similar way: physics 
has taught us that there is another kind of perfectly natural relation instantiated at 
our world. Far from refuting Humean Supervenience, modern physics has shed new 
light on how we should think of the mosaic, in exactly the way that it is supposed to 
do. The difficulty lies in showing that such relations are harmless by Humean lights. 
Given that the nature of entanglement relations is sometimes taken to be a 
motivation for ontic structural realism and its acceptance of objective modality in 
the world, this is less than straightforward.16 Issues of individuality are closely 
connected: if a particle’s individuality is closely connected to this relation (see 
chapter three for a brief overview), does that imply some sort of restriction on the 
free recombination required to generate the plurality of worlds envisaged by modal 
realism? 
While each approach to incorporating the findings of quantum mechanics within 
Humean Supervenience has difficulties to overcome, I see little reason to think that 
these difficulties cannot be overcome. A request for further development and 
elaboration of the ideas involved is quite different from a demonstration that the 
responses are fatally flawed. I end this section on an optimistic note: the broad thesis 
of Humean Supervenience can be sharpened in various ways, which way looks to be 
most attractive will likely depend on the price one is willing to pay to be Humean.  
 
                                                     
15 Lewis (1994a) p. 474. 
16 For example, French and Ladyman (2003) and French (2014). 
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1.2 Laws as regularities 
Now that we have set out the mosaic that is supposed to serve as a base for 
reductions of troublesome notions, let us turn to one of those reductions. Laws are 
a central topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Some of this is due to 
a desire to say something about what science is concerned with. Some of it is due to 
the uses that laws are often put to: they are commonly taken to be connected to 
causes, chances and counterfactuals. Shedding some light on the nature of the laws 
will hopefully help to illuminate these other areas. 
If one wishes to stick to the Humean denial of necessary connections, then 
something will need to be said about the traditional roles that laws are supposed to 
fill. Laws are normally thought to hold necessarily, to constrain what is possible and 
to govern the worldly goings-on. Of course, none of this can be taken at face value 
since these roles appear to require some form of unreduced modality. Humeanism 
about laws involves rejecting that sort of ordinary thinking, typically because it is 
thought to be unreflective or insufficiently explanatory. Governance of the 
phenomena makes sense if we think of the world as created and maintained by 
divine will. The laws might enforce God’s will upon the world, and it is in virtue of 
God’s nature that the world must oblige. Such theistic musings have little place in 
contemporary science, and Humeans can claim with some force that if something 
must govern in that way in order to be a law, then perhaps nothing truly answers to 
‘law’.17 
While many contemporary accounts do not make explicit appeal to God, they still 
attempt to hold on to the governing aspect. The Humean complaint then is that the 
governance has become mysterious. It made sense on the older theistic picture, but 
if God is not governing the world then what exactly is involved in this governance? 
The existence of a penal system suggests that we cannot use our legal laws as a basis 
for the governance in question! It does not help to point out that, strictly, laws are 
not the governors on this picture.18 Laws may be the content of the governance 
                                                     
17 See Beebee (2000) for discussion. 
18 Roberts (2008) pp. 46-47. 
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rather than the governors, but this distinction simply pushes the question back a 
step. Who or what is occupying the governor role? Not only do we need an answer 
to this question, we need for that answer to make the modal implications un-
mysterious. Whoever or whatever occupies that role must be the sort of occupier 
that makes clear the source of the constraining of possibilities commonly appealed 
to. 
The difficulty of this challenge pushes Humeans to adopt an alternative view of laws. 
Both sides agree that laws correspond to regularities in nature. Anti-Humeans add 
something extra to that, whereas Humeans take the regularities to be all that there 
is. In slogan form: the laws are descriptions of the world’s patterns. Rather than 
governing, laws merely describe the world’s history. We don’t need to appeal to 
anything metaphysically mysterious to understand their nature. 
Before we get into the details, let us pause for a clarificatory note. Our talk of laws 
of nature can be understood to refer to one of two things. The first kind of meaning 
is that laws are propositions, of the kind that can be written down upon a page (of 
course, the physical marks on the page themselves are not the law: for starters, they 
came into existence a short time ago whereas laws are not the kind of thing that can 
be intentionally created by human activity). The second is that the laws are whatever 
state of the world is responsible for making true the propositions in the first kind of 
meaning. It is arbitrary which meaning we adopt due to the tight connection 
between propositions and the aspects of the world that they refer to. As Lewis talks 
of laws as propositions, the most natural route for this thesis to take is to talk of laws 
in the same way. Laws, then, are propositions that express certain special regularities 
in the world. 
The claim that the laws are just the propositions expressing the world’s true 
regularities is known as the naïve regularity theory. As with many philosophical 
positions prefixed with ‘naïve’, this sort of account is commonly taken to be an abject 
failure. There is little contemporary support for the view, but it is worth discussing a 
couple of its problems so that the virtues of Lewis’ more popular development 
become apparent. The first problem is that it gets deeply counterintuitive results. 
Suppose that all the coins in my pocket are British. Then there is a regularity in the 
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world that is captured truthfully by the proposition ‘All coins in my pocket are 
British’. But it is absurd to think that we have just discovered a new law of nature, 
the Nobel prize is not so easily achieved. That all these coins happen to be of the 
same form of currency is a contingent fact, whereas laws are supposed to be 
necessary. Accidental everyday regularities are not suited to be laws, but the naïve 
account lacks the resources to prevent them from being lumped together with the 
genuine articles. Suppose that we let the naïve regularity theory have a language 
whose predicates match up with the sorts of things we expect to turn up in our laws 
– leave aside the question of exactly how to specify this language. So the regularities 
we are considering are regularities of, say, particle positions and properties 
appropriate to those particles. Then we get the second problem: the number of 
particles at our world turns out to be physically necessary. Even in the restricted 
language just gestured towards, we can still form sentences like ‘Everything that 
exists is one of n particles’. But then, according to the naïve theory, it is a law that 
our world has n particles. This seems to be the wrong result; the number of particles 
looks like an accidental fact.19 The lesson from all of this is not that the laws cannot 
express regularities, but that we need some additional resources if we are to pick 
out the right propositions. Not all propositions are created equally, some are much 
more important for our purposes. 
The naivety of this account is found in its permissiveness. Its core failing is that it lets 
any regularity-expressing true proposition count as a law. What regularity theorists 
need, then, is for their theory to be able to pick out some such propositions for 
special treatment. The best-known attempt is the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis Best System 
Account, or BSA. The rough idea is that there are many different ways of 
systematising the world’s nonmodal facts. Of these ways, one is the best. Theorems 
that turn up in this best systematisation get to be counted as laws. This provides a 
way to distinguish between the accidental and lawful regularities. Of course, that is 
just a rough overview, the interesting work is in the details. Let us look at them. Here 
is a canonical statement of the BSA: 
                                                     
19 The relationship between laws and initial conditions will be dealt with in more detail later. 
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Certainly not just any regularity is a law of nature. Some are accidental. So 
an adequate regularity analysis must be selective. Also, an adequate 
analysis must be collective. It must treat regularities not one at a time, but 
rather as candidates to enter into integrated systems. For a given regularity 
might hold either as a law or accidentally, depending on whether other 
regularities obtain that can fit together with it in a suitable system. (Thus I 
reject the idea that lawhood consists of ‘lawlikeness’ plus truth.) Following 
Mill and Ramsey, I take a suitable system to be one that has the virtues we 
aspire to in our own theory-building, and that has them to the greatest 
extent possible given the way the world is. It must be entirely true; it must 
be closed under strict implication; it must be as simple in axiomatisation as 
it can be without sacrificing too much information content; and it must have 
as much information content as it can without sacrificing too much 
simplicity. A law is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system. 
(Or, in case of ties, in every ideal system.)20 
Whether we want to say that, in the case of ties for best system, the laws are those 
regularities included in all tied systems (assuming any are!) or that the world is too 
disordered for there to be any laws is a tricky matter. It also changes nothing central 
to the account. For expositional ease, let us set aside these cases and assume that 
one system really does come out as best. 
A quick word of warning: it is easy to state the account in such a way that it looks like 
a thesis based on our knowledge: how we might organise information about the 
world or perhaps how God might present it to us.21 But we should not fall into the 
trap of mistaking this presentational trick for a substantial claim about the account. 
The BSA is not concerned in any direct way with the counterfactual behaviour of 
omniscient beings. Deductive systems exist independently of what anyone happens 
to know, and the laws are based on the ranking of such systems. 
The standard BSA has descriptions of the world competing against one another. The 
winner of this balancing act gives us the laws. “A best balance of what?” we might 
ask. Strength and simplicity. Strength may have been glossed as information content 
in the quotation above, but is standardly given meaning in terms of possible world 
consequences. A system is stronger to the extent that it is compatible with fewer 
                                                     
20 Lewis (1983) pp. 366-367. 
21 For example, Hall (2015) takes the unofficial line to be that the laws are whatever a 
‘Limited Oracular Perfect Physicist’ says they are and even Lewis appeals to the divine in his 
(1973) presentation of the account. 
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possible worlds; the more worlds that a system rules out as being actual, the stronger 
it is. Clearly, some systems are stronger than others: the more that a system says, 
the fewer possible ways there are for things to be consistent with that system. At 
the extreme end, a maximally strong system would list all of the world’s truths and 
so rule out all non-actual worlds (barring any worlds indiscernible to our own, if there 
are any).  
Strength is in tension with simplicity, since the more that is added to a system the 
more complex that system becomes. Very simple systems contain very little 
information, perhaps only the truths of logic. Simplicity is to be understood in a 
broadly syntactic sense where, for example, a linear function is simpler than a 
quadratic function. Simplicity in the BSA ends up being a language dependent notion, 
and so we must specify a language to express candidate systems in if we are to assess 
how simple each is. As an easy way to see the motivation for this claim, imagine how 
different this chapter would look if it was written without using words whose first 
letter lies in the second half of the alphabet! The issue of language will come back to 
cause problems in chapter three, and we will see how some modern developments 
part ways with Lewis on this issue in chapter four. For now, let us merely note that 
Lewis has a preferred language in mind for candidate systems: one where all of its 
predicates refer to perfectly natural properties. 
The BSA in its early form involved a two-way balancing act between strength and 
simplicity. Lewis later sought to incorporate chance into his reductive project by 
asking the BSA to do a bit more work.22 A third virtue, fit, was introduced and systems 
that included probabilistic laws were allowed to compete. The regularities in the best 
system might talk about the chances of some outcome in various situations (with 
decay probabilities being the standard example here). In addition to trying to be as 
simple and strong as possible, candidate systems should also try to fit the history of 
the world, in the sense of assigning a high chance to the world’s history occurring as 
it did. With chance included in the reduction alongside laws, the best system must 
balance three different virtues against one another. However, despite this 
                                                     
22 Lewis (1994a). 
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amendment to the structure of the account, little else changes. For this reason, I will 
adopt the usual convention of those writing about the BSA without a specific focus 
on chances and largely set this amendment aside. Since the core discussions later in 
the thesis are not dependent on whether chance is reduced via the best system, 
there is no need to complicate matters by continually bringing it up. 
The BSA aims to capture the fundamental laws, typically taken to be those 
discovered by certain branches of physics. But what about the other sciences and 
nonfundamental laws? We should not expect these to enter into the best system as 
axioms due to the vocabulary requirement the BSA imposes. Since all regularities 
must be expressed in terms of perfectly natural properties, any regularity concerned 
with the distribution of nonfundamental properties must be given an appropriate 
translation in order to be included in a system. This translation may be rather long 
and complicated. Take an ordinary object like a cat. Now try to describe it and its 
behaviour in terms of particle positions, spin states and the like. It is hardly plausible 
that the result will be a simple one. The widespread agreement that even attempting 
this has more than a whiff of madness to it indicates general opinion that translations 
of the special sciences into the language of fundamental physics would be an 
extremely messy affair. (We might still want to say that an in-principle description of 
the feline behaviour exists even if it is not one that we will ever grasp. This would be 
to affirm a commitment to there being some fundamental level to which everything 
else reduces. Since the cat is nothing more than patterns in this base level, a 
summary of the relevant fundamental goings-on is sufficient to capture the cat’s life. 
There is something obviously attractive to this thought if one accepts something like 
Humean Supervenience.) 
 The defender of the BSA can make two points here. First, it is a somewhat 
controversial matter whether the special sciences genuinely have laws. If they do 
not, then the absence of such laws from the best system is no problem for the 
account. Second, if the special sciences have laws then there is still a space for them 
in the BSA. Since Lewis claims that every regularity-expressing theorem in the best 
system is a law, there is the possibility that the best system will contain derived laws. 
If some theorem is a consequence of the best system’s axioms, it will also count as a 
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law. We can then draw a distinction between different kinds of laws: those that are 
axioms are the fundamental laws, those that are derived from the axioms are 
nonfundamental laws. These might not be immediately apparent to us, which is why 
we need branches of science other than physics to help us discover them. For 
Humeans favouring the regularity view but who lack Lewis’ firm commitment to 
natural properties, there is another option open. We could modify the vocabulary 
requirement in order to let the generalisations of the special sciences be simple 
enough to enter the best system directly. This is a major motivation for the Better 
Best System Account, which we will examine more closely in chapter four. 
It is not uncommon to find complaints that Lewis, and the BSA’s later advocates, do 
not say enough about the notions of strength, simplicity, fit and balance.23 The 
notions are unclear, so the complaints go, and sometimes problematic. So Humeans 
ought to say more about precisely what it is they mean when they appeal to these. I 
agree. The notions are often left vaguer than we could wish, and there is a need for 
clearer statements of what these are and how they balance against one another. But 
note also that this is not a knockdown problem: a claim that Humeans still have work 
to do is very different from a claim that there is work Humeans cannot do. Perhaps 
part of why this work has not been completed to the extent we might wish is that 
thought that the relevant virtues are the ones found in scientific practice. The virtues 
used in theory building are constitutive of lawhood, and the usual virtues mentioned 
are just first approximations to what the correct virtues are. Something about this 
seems right. Given the lack of a better alternative set of virtues, I will continue to 
refer to strength and simplicity as the ones being balanced, but we should keep in 
mind the thought that it might not really be those specific virtues (understood in the 
usual way) that are found to an optimal extent in the best system. 
As we have just noted, there might well be issues with the virtues of strength and 
simplicity: there is a need to either give further details about them or replace them 
with more appropriate virtues. A more worrying concern is that scientists do not 
                                                     
23 For example, Hall (2015) considers strength to be an embarrassment, Woodward (2014) 
is bothered by being unable to find this kind of simplicity in scientific practice, and Elga 
(2004) shows that fit leads to problems. 
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engage in the balancing act that the BSA thinks is inspired by scientific practice. 
Woodward has given voice to this as the claim that scientists adopt something closer 
to a threshold view: theories might be dismissed on account of being too complex or 
ad hoc, but they must first meet a certain value of strength to even be considered.24 
This threshold value is quite straightforward, as it is just the requirement that a 
theory accounts for all (or perhaps virtually all) of the available data. Any theory that 
is not strong enough to do this is inadequate, no matter how simple it may be. So 
there is really no balancing at all, and the laws of the BSA do not reflect the scientific 
laws. 
Let us set aside the issue of whether the BSA-laws and the scientific laws have to 
match up (that’s a substantive question on its own). Let’s also set aside a dismissive 
response to all of this, that in stating what laws are constituted by, Humeans are not 
tied to any specific scientific practice. The thought behind that kind of response is 
that the nature of laws is a metaphysical matter and if actual scientific practice is 
misaligned with that nature, so much the worse for scientists: the scientific laws may 
fail to be the ‘genuine’ laws. But while this is a possible response, it is not one that 
fits comfortably with other Humean commitments.25 Humeans are typically 
respectful of science and deeply suspicious of additional metaphysics that operates 
behind the scenes, inaccessible to our empirical investigations. We can see this in 
the quotation from Lewis above, that the best system has ‘the virtues we aspire to 
in our own theory-building’. Claiming that there are laws that, for example, 
underwrite our counterfactual statements but that the scientists who take 
themselves to be discovering these fundamental laws are looking in the wrong 
direction, would be in considerable tension with this.  
Instead, let us focus on whether Humeans adopting the BSA can say anything about 
the practices Woodward has brought up. There are really two cases that need to be 
given a Humean explanation. The first is the apparent lack of balancing: if scientists 
                                                     
24 Woodward (2014) pp. 100-102. 
25 Although the Lewisian way I characterise the Humean position here is not the only way to 
approach matters. Swartz (1985) is an example of an author with Humean commitments 
who draws a distinction between scientific laws and underlying laws of nature. 
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look unwilling to sacrifice strength for simplicity, then how are they balancing 
virtues? The second is that many fundamental laws look to be both simple and 
strong. If laws like those of Newtonian mechanics can be both highly simple and 
highly strong, what need is there for a balancing act?26 We will take these in order. 
First, the threshold view that Woodward mentions is not the only way to interpret 
scientific practice. That scientists appear unwilling to sacrifice strength for simplicity 
does not immediately mean that there is a minimum level of strength required for a 
theory to be considered. This is where the term ‘balance’ might be accused of being 
misleading. It is no part of the BSA that strength and simplicity are equally valued, 
only that the best system has achieved an optimal trade-off of them. The metric by 
which a system is judged to be best might be weighted towards one of the virtues 
that it considers. If the metric prizes strength to a greater degree than simplicity, 
then small gains in strength might be valued as highly as large gains in simplicity. This 
is a possible explanation for the practices Woodward draws our attention to. With a 
weighted metric in place, it might still be possible for the best system to sacrifice 
some strength for a correspondingly large amount of simplicity. But, as a practical 
matter, none of the theories that scientists consider plausible show this in action. 
That is, none are so much simpler than the others that they can afford to miss out 
on any available strength. (That we don’t see scientists offering up radically simpler 
but weaker theories could be explained by an implicit acceptance by the community 
that strength is to be favoured, even if the scientists don’t think of themselves as 
actively trying to achieve a kind of balance.) 
In fact, the second point Woodward makes could be viewed as a good example of 
the balance the BSA envisages – contra his initial impression! Consider a system of 
Newtonian mechanics that lacks Newton’s second law of motion. Such a system is 
simpler than one which contains that law, for it has fewer axioms. But it is massively 
weaker, for it says nothing about how an object should behave when acted upon by 
a force. Adding the second law to the system brings a large increase in strength at a 
                                                     
26 Of course, the laws of Newtonian mechanics are neither fundamental nor, strictly 
speaking, what the BSA would class as laws. Woodward is undoubtedly aware of this, so I 
take his point to be that the fact that scientists were willing to consider them as such 
indicates that scientists may think the genuine best system is relevantly similar. 
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small price to simplicity, and so it buys its way in. This is all really as Humeans would 
expect here, perhaps unsurprisingly given then classical flavour of Lewis’ 
Humeanism. That serious candidate systems are both strikingly strong and simple is 
not a bug of the account, it is very much a feature. This consideration ties back into 
Woodward’s first concern, that scientists seem unwilling to sacrifice any strength. 
The reality is that that observation is not quite accurate: there is a straightforward 
way that scientists do give up on strength. Notice that our scientific theories tend 
not to contain within them a list of all of the details of every relevant experiment. 
They might be formed from that data, but Newtonian mechanics does not consist of 
Newton’s laws of motion plus the details of every experiment involving forces in any 
way. Such a system would be absurdly large and complicated. But it would also be 
stronger, since it makes specific claims about what happens at the world. One might 
want to object at this point that it would be no stronger than Newton’s laws plus the 
initial state of the world, since this system is deterministic and so implies every 
successive world state. Perhaps so, but the same cannot be said for any system that 
contains probabilistic laws. Those sorts of scientific theories can be made stronger 
by including experimental results rather than merely probabilities for those results. 
But including the results brings a high complexity cost for its strength gains. If 
scientists are balancing strength and simplicity with respect to a metric weighted 
towards strength, they might still prefer the system with just the laws of motion (and 
perhaps the initial conditions – see the following section). We have then an example 
of potential strength that scientists are willing to leave out of a system, and balancing 
considerations could plausibly be part of an explanation of why this happens. 
 
1.3 Initial conditions 
Let us turn to an amendment to the structure of the BSA suggested by Hall.27 With 
regards to physical possibility, the aim of the best system is to set out which histories 
of fundamental events are possible. Supposing that our world was Newtonian and 
                                                     
27 Hall (2015) and in more detail in Hall (unpublished). 
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its fundamental existents were point-particles, the world’s best system would aim to 
tell us which particle trajectories through spacetime are nomologically possible. 
When looking to the practices of working scientists, we notice that one thing theories 
pick out are dynamic laws. These tell us how a system will behave: if it is in one state 
now, the theory will predict what state it will be in in the future. But this alone is not 
enough to tell us which distributions of fundamental matter are possible. In our 
Newtonian example, the dynamic laws will tell me how a particle can behave, given 
its location and properties. But they provide no information regarding what 
properties that particle actually has, or where it is located right now. In order to 
determine a particle’s trajectory, I also need information regarding its state at some 
point in time (such as its mass, charge, position and velocity). If the laws are 
deterministic, then it makes no difference which point in time is supplied, for both 
its past and future trajectories will be determined. To simplify, we will talk of initial 
conditions, taken to mean the state of the world’s fundamental constituents at some 
initial time. 
When it comes to determining physically possible histories, the best system comes 
in two parts. The initial conditions hypothesis (ICH) makes a claim regarding the 
world’s initial conditions. The dynamic hypothesis (DH) makes a claim about how 
these conditions change. Together, they tell us how the world’s perfectly natural 
properties can be distributed across spacetime. That this sort of division can be 
found in our scientific theories is expressed by Wigner: 
The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavours to 
uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very 
appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behaviour under certain 
conditions but do not try to regulate all actions and behaviour, the laws of 
physics also determine the behaviour of its objects of interest only under 
certain well -defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise. The 
elements of the behaviour which are not specified by the laws of nature are 
called initial conditions.28 
One motivation for including initial conditions in the best system has just been given: 
doing so better reflects scientific practice, something that the BSA seeks to align itself 
                                                     
28 Wigner (1967) p. 39. 
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with. Another reason is the use that they can be put to. A particularly well-known 
problem that this may help solve is that of the world’s temporal asymmetry. The laws 
provided by classical mechanics are time-symmetric, such that if a history is 
compatible with the laws then so too is the reversed ordering of that history. But our 
experiences are quite clearly not time-symmetric. There is a subjective difference 
between those of our experiences that occurred in the past and those that will occur 
in the future (most obviously, I have memories of some past events, but no 
memories of future events). When I place an ice cube in warm water it melts, and I 
am confident that I can distinguish this from the sequence of events where an ice 
cube forms in the warm water. Time, then, has a distinctive direction that the 
classical laws look ill-placed to explain. Our world is not a classical one, but there is 
no easy solution to this problem to be found by appealing to quantum, rather than 
classical, mechanics. The dynamics of quantum mechanics are captured by 
Schrödinger’s equation, which is also time-symmetric.29 
It has been suggested that an answer to why we experience this asymmetry can be 
formed from thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics states that the 
entropy of a system – a measure of the system’s energy unavailable for useful work 
– will increase over time until the system reaches an equilibrium (at which point its 
entropy is maximised). This is taken to form an explanation for why my ice cube 
melted in the warm water. The ordered molecules that form the ice cube have lower 
entropy in that state to the state in which those molecules form part of the warmer 
water. The water in the glass reaches thermal equilibrium when the ice cube has 
melted so that the temperature of the water is more evenly distributed. (Pretending 
that the glass of water is a closed system. A similar process that occurs between the 
water and the surrounding air in the room will result in the warm water eventually 
cooling to room temperature, and so forth.) Unlike the (fundamental) classical laws 
gestured at earlier, the second law of thermodynamics is not time-symmetric. It 
would seem that the arrow of time is connected to this thermodynamic asymmetry, 
if not for an immediate problem. As thermodynamics is not fundamental, its laws do 
                                                     
29 Quantum mechanics will be set aside in the following discussion for simplicity. Albert has 
argued that his proposal extends to the GRW interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
although this is not without difficulties. 
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not describe the fundamental processes that are occurring. But how can time-
symmetric fundamental processes give rise to time-asymmetric processes? If the 
melting of the ice cube is compatible with the mechanical laws, then so is the 
spontaneous formation of that ice cube in warm water! 
Boltzmann is credited with taking the first step to answer this through statistical 
mechanics. Relative to a measure over the microstates of some system, a majority 
of microstates of the macrostate are on trajectories increasing in entropy and 
therefore approaching equilibrium. Taking this measure to specify a probability 
measure, the probability of a system increasing in entropy is close to 1. This grounds 
the thermodynamic and associated temporal asymmetries in the more fundamental 
mechanics. But it alone does not solve the problem. The same reasoning that showed 
the entropy of future states was very likely to be greater can be run in reverse to 
show that the entropy of past states was also very likely to be greater. The absurd 
conclusion is that entropy increases no matter which direction of time we look in. 
Yet – again – we do not observe ice cubes forming in warm water. 
Albert and Loewer have recently advocated introducing an additional postulate to 
capture the required asymmetry.30 If the universe started in a low entropy state, we 
can apply the statistical mechanical reasoning to show that it will tend to increase in 
entropy over time. A boundary condition concerned with the early universe is 
sufficient to generate the required asymmetry when combined with time-symmetric 
laws. If our fundamental scientific theory includes three elements, the claim is that 
we can recover the asymmetry of time from them. Taking their inspiration from the 
film A Serious Mind, Albert and Loewer call these three elements the Mentaculus: 
                                                     
30 Albert (2000) and Loewer (2012). 
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(i) The fundamental dynamical laws. 
(ii) The Past Hypothesis: the claim that the world’s early macrostate had low 
entropy.31 
(iii) The Statistical Postulate: a law specifying uniform probability over the 
microstates that make up this macrostate. 
A full discussion of the consequences of accepting the Mentaculus would take us far 
afield from the present concerns. That said, it is worth pointing out just how 
important a role the Mentaculus is supposed to play. We have already mentioned 
that it grounds time’s arrow as a non-fundamental phenomenon. It is also supposed 
to ground the asymmetry of action, the fact that I do not appear able to influence 
past events while I do seem able to influence the future. Since the Mentaculus 
assigns probabilities to every proposition regarding microstates, and macrostates 
are realised by these microstates, it assigns probabilities to propositions concerning 
macrostates. Albert and Loewer have argued that these can play the roles that we 
expect objective chances to play. Despite its only dynamical laws being the 
fundamental ones, the Mentaculus is also taken to explain the successes of the 
special sciences. Since it assigns probabilities to all propositions concerned with the 
world’s macrostates, it must assign probabilities to all special science 
generalisations. All probabilistic explanations made by these sciences will be 
underwritten by the Mentaculus. This is an impressive amount of work, if it 
succeeds.32 
Albert and Loewer’s proposal is a specific example of the more general project of 
elevating the status of initial conditions in the BSA. It won’t work with the standard 
formulation of the BSA as the Mentaculus has no real chance of being counted as the 
best system under those rules. Candidate systems must be stated in a language 
whose predicates refer to perfectly natural properties. But entropy is not 
fundamental and, when put in terms of microstates possessing such properties, 
would need to be cashed out as an infinite disjunction. This means that the 
                                                     
31 That this needs to be added to the laws was also suggested by Feynman (1965) p. 116. 
32 Unsurprisingly, not everyone thinks that all of this can be done. For some criticisms, see 
Earman (2006), Frisch (2011) and Elga (2001). 
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Mentaculus scores horribly on simplicity and so will not be the best system.33 Let us 
set this aside for now, since the relationship between the BSA and language will be 
explored in more detail later when we encounter the so-called Better Best System 
Accounts, and these provide Albert and Loewer with the resources necessary to 
respond to this concern. 
Once we have set aside concerns arising from the non-fundamentality of the notion 
of entropy, one might wonder whether the claim that the Mentaculus is the best 
system is really a modification of the usual BSA at all. After all, the best 
axiomatisation of the world’s truths might well include more than just regularities. 
This point is noted by Lewis in his presentation of the BSA: 
The ideal system need not consist entirely of regularities; particular facts 
may gain entry if they contribute enough to collective simplicity and 
strength. (For instance, certain particular facts about the Big Bang might be 
strong candidates.) But only the regularities of the system are to count as 
laws.34 
 So the original BSA allows for there to be information concerning initial conditions 
in the best system. Statements regarding initial conditions will have to earn their 
keep in the usual way: by contributing to the system’s strength without costing too 
much simplicity. But it is easy to imagine how this might go, since such propositions 
will be assessed in the same way as those making generalisations about the mosaic. 
In a world of Newtonian point-particles which are neither created nor destroyed, it 
is plausible that a statement of the total number of particles might enter the best 
system. Such a statement would not need to be particularly complex, given that it 
only assigns a (potentially very large) number to the particle distribution. It would 
also contribute much strength, given that it would cut down considerably on the 
number of possible worlds compatible with that system. The only caveat is that this 
information won’t be counted as a law, since it is only the regularities that can be 
marked out as special in that way. 
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34 Lewis (1983) p. 367. That the laws could mention particular places or things is considered 
in the postscripts to Lewis (1980), reprinted in his (1986a) p. 123. 
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This last point marks a crucial difference between the Mentaculus and the orthodox 
BSA. Loewer intends for all axioms that enter into the best system to count as laws, 
not just those expressing regularities. Both the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical 
Postulate gain lawhood through this move, despite both being concerned with how 
the world was at a particular time, as opposed to how it develops over time. The 
question we should ask is whether this extension of lawhood is well motivated. On 
the one hand, this does not appear to violate Humean scruples. Since laws are not 
taken to have any kind of metaphysically productive role, it is not as if allowing initial 
conditions to be laws raises any difficult questions regarding exactly what is being 
produced or generated. Laws are particularly important and striking parts of the best 
description of the world; one might well want to say similar things about the initial 
conditions. As the world’s initial state is just another part of the mosaic to be 
described, should a strong yet simple description of it be available, why not give that 
description the same metaphysical role as the parts of the system describing the 
other features of the world?35 
The problem is not so much that the Humean account cannot make this move, but 
that it drags the account into difficulties. First and foremost, taking all of the best 
system’s axioms to be laws is in tension with scientific practice. There is typically 
thought to be a difference between the laws of a theory, expressed by its dynamic 
equations, and the contingent initial conditions that one plugs into these equations 
in order to generate predictions. But if those initial conditions are laws, then 
scientists are mistaken to think of them as contingent, since they will be physically 
necessary. Cosmological features of the world, such as the large-scale flatness of the 
universe might end up as laws as they plausibly score well on the strength-simplicity 
balance. But cosmologists do not take these to be laws, instead treating them as 
contingent uniformities that hold because of how the early universe happened to 
be. For an account that is explicitly intended to be respectful of science, this is a 
heavy price to pay. There is also tension with how we normally treat counterfactuals 
and possibility. When assessing questions of how things might have been different, 
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Maudlin (2007b) pp. 280-281. 
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we typically try to hold the laws fixed and vary the contingent particulars. But if the 
initial conditions hold as a matter of law then there is far less physical possibility than 
we usually think, especially if the dynamical laws are deterministic. It would be 
physically impossible for the universe to have evolved such that our solar system 
didn’t form, or that I were not writing this or that there was one fewer particle in the 
world.36 That the laws are not ‘active’ in some metaphysical sense does not mean 
that it is harmless to allow for there to be more of them. 
Due to these difficulties, we ought not relax the requirement that the laws express 
only regularities.37 Woodward has claimed that this restriction will not be of any help 
to Humeans.38 Cosmological facts, like the world’s having a low entropy past, might 
look like they avoid getting counted as regularities (and hence laws) on account of 
only being singly instantiated. However, he points out, many such facts can be 
written as though they are regularities in the form ‘For each region of spacetime…’. 
As such, he does not see how the BSA can avoid having many statements of initial 
conditions turn out to be laws. The response to Woodward should be to 
acknowledge that wording can be an issue, but to deny that rewriting some fact has 
any influence on whether it is a candidate for lawhood. The language surrounding 
properties can often be misleading, this is nothing new. Take the single-place 
predicate is a father as an example. The surface appearance of this predicate 
suggests that, on account of it having a single subject, it singles out a monadic 
property. But this is not a required conclusion, for we might also note that the 
predicate can only be truthfully ascribed to someone if that person stands in a 
relation. One must be a father to someone else in order to be a father. Expressing 
this state of affairs in terms of single-place predicates does not change the 
                                                     
36 This depends on how much of the initial conditions get set in the best system; systems 
that set fewer initial conditions end up as more permissive regarding later states. The 
situations I mention might not end up being regarded as impossible if the initial conditions 
are only roughly characterised, but the risk remains. 
37 This is a place that I part company with Hall, who is unconcerned about extending the 
lawhood franchise to non-regularities. While I agree that the BSA ought to pay more 
attention to initial conditions, particularly when it comes to applying the standards for 
judging which system is best, letting those initial conditions play the law role causes too 
much trouble for too little gain. 
38 Woodward (2013). 
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underlying reality: it is a relation that we are really concerned with. In the case of 
cosmological facts, that it is possible to express them in a manner that might suggest 
a regularity holds does not thereby make such facts genuinely express regularities. 
This is just one more occasion where we need to be careful that our ways of speaking 
do not lead us into making mistakes about what is going on. 
The requirement in the original BSA does a better job of aligning with scientific 
practice and protecting the account from the charge that, say, statements of the 
universe’s total energy enter into it as laws in a mistaken manner. Even sticking with 
this original requirement, it is not entirely clear that the Mentaculus will be the best 
system. Set aside concerns about whether Albert and Loewer can recover all that 
they wish to from the Past Hypothesis and Statistical Postulate, there are issues 
relating to the choice of best system that concern us here. Suppose that we compare 
a system consisting of just the dynamic laws with one that adds the world’s precise 
initial conditions to those laws. The first will be simpler by far, but will be massively 
lacking in strength when compared to the second system. Assuming deterministic 
laws, the second system will entail the world’s entire history, while the first will not 
imply any particular matter of fact. The Mentaculus will fall somewhere between 
these two extremes as it adds some – but not all – of the initial conditions to the 
system. The question then is which of these will be counted as the best. 
Frisch is willing to agree with Loewer that the Mentaculus might beat out the system 
of the dynamic laws alone: if we ignore the issue of how to state entropy in a 
language of perfectly natural properties, then the Albert-Loewer proposal adds a 
small amount of complexity in return for a significant gain in strength.39 But he finds 
it less clear how to adjudicate on the question of whether the Mentaculus will beat 
out the system of the laws plus the precise initial conditions. Both the gains in 
strength and the cost in simplicity are very high in such cases. There is a fair concern 
here, but the target is mistaken. Frisch is picking up on a long-standing issue 
concerning how strength and simplicity are balanced. The metric that is used to 
select the best system has not ever appeared in print. As far as I know, no-one has a 
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clear understanding of precisely how it works and exactly how much it favours 
strength or simplicity. That is an extremely difficult question to answer, and the lack 
of details is a cost to accepting the BSA. Some might be tempted to handwave the 
issue and declare it a problem for the scientists to solve when selecting theories, not 
one that philosophers ought to be deciding from the outside. But ignoring the 
problem will not make it go away: if a balance of theoretical virtues is a core feature 
of one’s account, then one ought to have some desire to say something about that 
balance. So there is an outstanding problem here, but it is not with the Mentaculus. 
Albert and Loewer do not need to change any of the details regarding how systems 
get to be best, so concerns relating to that metric are really concerns about the wider 
Humean BSA. (Frisch also has the stronger worry that the gains in both strength and 
complexity are so great that there may not even be a determinate winner. That is 
premature, since he does not provide any additional reason to think that the metric 
cannot cope with large trade-offs. In order to properly argue for or against this 
criticism, we would need to possess more details about the metric.) 
Schaffer suggests that we should expect the Albert-Loewer package to lose to the 
laws plus precise initial conditions package.40 His thought is that the cost of 
introducing two somewhat simple axioms is roughly equivalent to that of adding one 
more complex one, but the strength gained by adding precise initial conditions far 
outweighs what the Mentaculus can achieve. Hence the Mentaculus will not be the 
best system. Given that this involves a specific claim regarding how simplicity should 
be weighed, it is difficult to fully assess without having a more complete metric for 
simplicity in the BSA. But we can point out that it is not obvious Schaffer is right to 
think that the two packages are on a par with regards to simplicity. The axiom in the 
precise package is going to be very complex indeed, perhaps even infinitely so. 
(Schaffer is aware of this and suggests falling back to systems that include some 
information but not the entirety of the initial conditions. He may well be correct that 
one of these will beat out the Mentaculus, but from the perspective of the current 
project it doesn’t really matter. The important thing is that the best system will strike 
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a balance that takes the initial conditions into consideration; which particular system 
does this best is another matter.) 
Might the initial conditions be simple? Well there are certainly ways in which this 
could occur. For one, it might be the case that some of the initial conditions happen 
to have a neat mathematical representation. If the number of particles in the world 
happened to be describable in a mathematically concise manner, there would be a 
good argument that adding an axiom concerning that particle number to a system 
would not come at a high price. But perhaps we don’t need to rely on the world being 
'fortunate’ in this way. Hall has suggested that there is a way in which the state of 
the world at some time can be easily expressed, this forms what he calls the problem 
of the phony fundamental constant.41 Take all of the physical magnitudes possessed 
by the world’s particles and express them in decimal notation. Then the phony 
constant can be generated by combining all of these into a single number and 
interleaving the digits. This constant now contains a massive amount of information 
regarding our world: its precise fundamental state at some point in time. As such, it 
can buy its way into candidate systems by adding to their strength. 
If adding the initial conditions to our candidate systems is this easy, then we should 
expect the best system to be one in which the precise initial conditions are added to 
the dynamical laws. There would be little need to consider more moderate systems 
like the Mentaculus. Hall (rightly to my mind) considers this a problem and modifies 
the way that initial conditions interact with the theoretical virtues in order to 
overcome it. His modification is both interesting and independently motivated; it will 
be dealt with shortly. But we do not need to appeal to the problem of the phony 
fundamental constant to motivate it, because there is no such problem for the BSA. 
The obvious way to respond to it – by claiming that adding a hugely long number is 
actually a substantial increase to complexity – does not work well. As Hall is quick to 
point out, while it is part of the practice of physics to appeal to fundamental 
constants, there is no good reason to think that these happen to take mathematically 
tractable values. It might well be the case that our universe happens to have 
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especially long constants. Rejecting the problem on those grounds creates tension 
with the practice of physics.  
A better way to respond to the problem is to remember what exactly it is that the 
phony constant mathematically represents. We get the number by sticking together 
the values particles have for certain properties. These properties are good 
candidates for being perfectly natural properties. The information in the constant is 
really information concerning the instantiation of all of these natural properties. To 
say that the world has this constant is to say that it has a particular distribution of 
properties. The phony fundamental constant is just a way of disguising a massively 
(perhaps infinitely) conjunctive claim regarding the instantiation of natural 
properties. It is not fit to enter a best system as-is, since it is not perfectly natural 
and all systems must be stated in a language of perfectly natural properties. But once 
we have translated it into the appropriate vocabulary, we end up with a very large 
conjunction. And that is plausibly not a simple addition to any system. 
While the phony fundamental constant is not a problem, there is still good reason to 
adjust how the Initial Conditions Hypothesis interacts with the virtue of a system’s 
strength. If we apply the same standards to the ICH as we do to the Dynamic 
Hypothesis, we get the result that a system is better the more strictly it specifies our 
world. Systems compatible with fewer possible worlds are stronger, regardless of 
whether the lack of compatibility arises from the dynamic laws or the initial 
conditions. The issue here is the tension with scientific practice. As Hall points out, it 
is not uncommon for physicists giving explanations to appeal to counterfactuals that 
concern other worlds which have different initial conditions to our own, but have 
the same dynamic laws.42 A representative example of just this is Comins’ What If 
the Moon Didn’t Exist?, which considers various counterfactual ways in which the 
Earth might have differed.43 It is clear from the way in which he treats the 
counterfactuals that it is the initial conditions which are taken to differ while the 
relevant dynamics remain unchanged. These are typically taken to be physical 
possibilities that simply happened not to obtain: we are not considering some distant 
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world with different physics. But that is exactly the result that we would get if the 
initial conditions were specified precisely in the best system. This lets us see the 
phony fundamental constant in a new light. Its philosophical relevance comes not 
from the problem that it creates for the BSA (after all, the BSA has the resources to 
deal with that problem already), but from the way in which it highlights an issue with 
one of the theoretical virtues that candidate systems are judged by. Strength – at 
least in its usual form – cannot be applied in the same way to the system as a whole. 
If we attempt to do so, we get the result that a system is better when both its ICH 
and DH narrow down the possible worlds. But what we want is a more nuanced 
account. As a first attempt: a system is better when its DH narrows down the worlds, 
but worse when its ICH does that same thing. 
Let us look at this suggestion, that a system is improved when its ICH is 
uninformative. There is certainly a sense in which this is true: a candidate system 
that requires precisely specified and seemingly arbitrary initial conditions in order to 
capture the phenomena looks to be worse than an alternative system that makes no 
such requirement of its initial conditions.44 Wigner for example claims that we want 
the initial conditions to impose as little structure on the world as we can: 
[The] existence of regularities in the initial conditions is considered so 
unsatisfactory that it is considered necessary to show that the regularities 
are but a consequence of a situation in which there were no regularities.45 
We can say a bit more than Hall does about how the resulting account goes. A system 
is judged according to how well it balances simplicity and strength, where this latter 
virtue is taken to divide into the informativeness of the DH and uninformativeness 
of the ICH. Uninformativeness, however, is easy to achieve. Simply take a system 
whose ICH says nothing at all. A system making no requirement on what the initial 
conditions be like will be both maximally strong and simple with regards to its ICH. 
So it is important to note that the two components of a candidate system are not 
judged separately and then their scores summed together for the final tally. For if 
that were to happen, then we could be sure that the best system would say nothing 
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at all about the world’s initial conditions since that would be the best strategy for 
maximising its score on the ICH portion of the competition. The system is judged for 
its simplicity as a whole in the usual manner. The system, rather than either of its 
two parts, is assessed for its strength, again in the usual manner. The 
informativeness of the ICH is a trade-off that systems make, much like complexity. 
Adding in additional information concerning initial conditions allows a system to buy 
some strength – albeit at the cost of losing simplicity and uninformativeness of ICH. 
A system does not increase in strength through having an uninformative ICH, it loses 
strength. But that is just a part of the normal balancing act that candidate systems 
must go through: strength is in tension with both simplicity and uninformativeness.46 
So including an ICH in our candidate systems pushes us towards assessing how the 
strength of systems is judged and getting clearer on what is being balanced. Might 
we also do the same thing with the DH? Hall suggests that it is better to claim that 
we search for two-way determinism of the DH, rather than strength in the sense of 
ruling out possible worlds. As was just mentioned, that cannot be quite right since 
the strength that counts is a property of entire systems; we are not judging the 
strength of system components directly. Pedantry aside, does the move to 
determinism change anything? Or, to phrase things differently, does judging a 
system according to how deterministic it is differ in some substantive way from 
judging according to the usual notion of strength? To make things plain, I don’t think 
that it does. To start with, notice that a maximally deterministic system will rule out 
all nonactual worlds, while a maximally strong world is consistent with the world 
evolving in one way only. Now take the first direction of implication: does moving a 
DH towards full determinism also decrease the range of possible worlds that it is 
compatible with? The answer here is clearly that it does. If some process is 
deterministic then there is only one possible outcome to that process. If all processes 
are deterministic then there is only one possible state of affairs compatible with 
those processes occurring as they did. A system whose DH is fully deterministic will 
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be compatible with only those worlds that give the same outputs as our own does 
to specific inputs. The space of possibilities is not shrunk to one, worlds can still differ 
due to different initial conditions. But we have ruled out worlds which match our 
own up to a point and then differ, or which used to differ and then began to perfectly 
match.  
Now take the second direction: does having a DH rule out more worlds make it more 
deterministic? One set of worlds to rule out are those that match up to a point and 
then differ. Another set of worlds to rule out are those that differed and then started 
matching. Incompatibility with such worlds makes a system stronger, but it also 
makes its DH more deterministic. There are also worlds which do not have any 
spatiotemporal regions that match our own. A system that rules these worlds out 
would be stronger in the usual sense, although not necessarily deterministic. Adding 
in probabilistic propositions to a system might well make the system incompatible 
with such worlds, although it would not make the system deterministic. But there 
are ways to increase the system’s degree of determinism without going all the way: 
a system that specifies smaller ranges of probabilities is arguably stronger than on 
which is more permissive about the permitted probabilities.47 So while increases in 
a system’s strength might not always be obtained by adding fully deterministic 
propositions, even the addition of chancy ones can make the system as a whole more 
deterministic. As such, I see little advantage in abandoning the usual talk of strength 
as the ruling out of possible worlds. 
To summarise: the practice of physics pushes us to include a split between a system’s 
Initial Conditions Hypothesis and its Dynamic Hypothesis. The original presentation 
of the BSA actually allowed for initial conditions to enter the best system, although 
not as laws. I have urged that we retain this constraint; Lewis was right to restrict 
lawhood to the universal generalisations. The real change to the BSA that is required 
by this move is a better awareness of how the theoretical virtues that pick out a 
system as best interact with both parts of candidate systems: while both strength 
and simplicity are applied in the usual way, the system’s strength must also be 
                                                     
47 I am assuming here that a system which specifies probabilities for some process is closer 
to full determinism than one which remains completely silent. 
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balanced against how informative an ICH it requires. This is not without precedent, 
as the notion of fit plays a similar role when the BSA is extended to include 
probabilistic laws and play a role in the reduction of chance. Albert and Loewer’s 
Mentaculus project can be viewed as one substantive suggestion on what the best 
system might look like in this more general framework (bearing in mind that we 
needn’t view the Past Hypothesis or the Statistical Postulate as laws). 
 
1.4 Targets of scientific inquiry 
Despite suggesting that we amend the BSA to include a distinction between the ICH 
and DH, Hall suggests that there is a problem with doing so.48 The concern is that 
once we have made this distinction, it is hard to see exactly why scientists ought to 
care about the laws generated by the BSA. That is worrying, since scientists quite 
clearly do try to find what the laws are! Let us examine what the problem is supposed 
to be. Anti-Humean views that do not attempt to reduce the laws have a 
straightforward way to explain why scientists ought to care about them. If the laws 
genuinely do have a role to play in guiding and constraining what happens at the 
world, then any account that correctly identifies them has picked up on a central 
feature of the world that has a deep relation to the nonmodal facts. Conversely, any 
account which ignores them fails to pick up on an important aspect of the way the 
world is. It is easy to see, therefore, why scientists should care about finding anti-
Humean laws since, by doing so, they uncover a vitally important part of the world’s 
structure. If we have any desire to find out about the world around us, we ought to 
be interested in laws like these. In short, this is why anti-Humeans have an easy time 
explaining why the laws are, in Hall’s phrase, distinctively appropriate targets of 
scientific inquiry (DATSIs). 
The Humean story must be somewhat different, since they must deny that sort of 
deep metaphysical connection between laws and nonmodal facts. Humean laws are 
a useful part of our investigation into the world’s nonmodal facts. We do not use 
                                                     
48 Hall (2015) pp. 272-273. 
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experiments to discover patterns that point to something behind the scenes that 
directs the worldly phenomena; there is no director behind the curtain! The mosaic 
and its patterns are not just all that we can observe, they are all that is in the picture 
at all. The role that laws play in our scientific investigations must be rather different. 
The usual evocative metaphor that suggest what this role is has been given by 
Beebee: 
So the idea is something like this. Suppose God wanted us to learn all the 
facts there are to be learned. (The Ramsey-Lewis view is not an 
epistemological thesis but I’m putting it this way for the sake of the story.) 
He decides to give us a book – God’s Big Book of Facts – so that we might 
come to learn its contents and thereby learn every particular matter of fact 
there is. As a first draft, God just lists all the particular matters of fact there 
are. But the first draft turns out to be an impossibly long and unwieldly 
manuscript, and very hard to make any sense of – it’s just a long list of 
everything that’s ever happened and will ever happen. We couldn’t even 
come close to learning a big list of independent facts like that. Luckily, 
however (or so we hope), God has a way of making the list rather more 
comprehensible to our feeble, finite minds: he can axiomatize the list. That 
is, he can write down some universal generalizations with the help of which 
we can derive some elements of the list from others. This will have the 
benefit of making God’s Big Book of Facts a good deal shorter and also a 
good deal easier to get our rather limited brains around.49 
This is a rather pragmatic role, for it suggests that the only reason that we care about 
what the laws are is that they help us to learn more about the world. That they are 
laws is, on its own, not sufficient to make us care about them. Rather, we care 
because they are useful to us (the contrast here with the more privileged anti-
Humean laws becomes clear as there is reason to care about them beyond merely 
gathering nonmodal information in an efficient manner). The anti-Humean laws are 
DATSIs due to their metaphysical nature, while the opposite is true for Humean laws. 
Those laws must be DATSIs for some independent reason – the passage from Beebee 
suggesting the reason is that they are particularly useful in summarising the world’s 
nonmodal facts – and their lawfulness is entirely dependent on them playing this 
role. 
                                                     
49 Beebee (2000) p. 547. 
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Returning to Hall’s worry, it appears that the standards of strength used by scientists 
come into tension with the Humean claim that we care about laws due to their 
summarising role. The best system of laws will more recognisably be a DATSI if it is 
best because it is especially good at summarising nonmodal facts. After all, if finding 
out such facts is the purpose of scientific inquiry, Humeans will have a 
straightforward story to tell about why scientists ought to care about the best 
summary of those facts. This points towards Lewis’ suggested way in which the virtue 
of strength should be evaluated: the more possible worlds that a system rules out as 
being actual, the more informative it is about the actual world’s nonmodal facts. But 
if this is the case, it is no longer clear why scientists should look for their initial 
conditions to be as non-specific to our world as possible. The more uninformative 
the ICH, the less the system as a whole will rule out possible worlds. So if we aim to 
adopt the standards used by actual scientists, then why should we care about the 
laws generated by the Humean account? Once we make the split between the ICH 
and DH in the BSA, Hall’s worry is that we can no longer explain why the resulting 
laws are DATSIs. 
This can be expressed in the form of a dilemma. On the first horn, we look to the 
practices of scientists to inform the standards by which candidate systems are 
judged. But then it becomes a mystery as to why we ought to care about the laws 
the best system will generate. On the second horn, we stick to Lewis’ original 
standards and so explain why it is that laws are DATSIs. But then we struggle to give 
a reason why scientists appear to be using rather different standards in their 
investigations. As Hall nicely puts it, this choice ‘between a guilty intellectual 
conscience and insane revisionism is not a happy one.’50 
The dilemma, however is a false one. While those may be the two available options 
available if one accepts this way of setting up the problem, there is a third option: 
reject this characterisation of scientific inquiry and the roles that laws play in it. It is 
fair to expect Humeans to give an account of laws that allows us to see why scientists 
might care about them. It is also right to require that if this Humean account shows 
                                                     
50 Hall (2015) p. 273. 
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why laws are DATSIs, it does so for reasons beyond their lawhood alone. But what 
Humeans can reject is the suggestion that science is concerned only with the 
accumulation of information regarding the world’s nonmodal facts. Suggestions as 
to what else science might be aiming at have been made: 
All science is a search for unification … Finding hidden links between 
seemingly disparate phenomena is what makes the scientific method so 
powerful and compelling. The distinctive feature of science is that it is both 
broad and deep: broad in the way that it tackles all physical phenomena 
and deep in the way it weaves them, economically, into a common 
explanatory scheme requiring fewer and fewer assumptions.51 
[T]he important thing in science is not so much to obtain new facts as to 
discover new ways of thinking about them.52 
The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanations of complex facts.53 
That we wish to discover more of our world’s nonmodal facts seems difficult to deny. 
But the scientific project is not solely concerned with listing these facts. It is also 
concerned with issues of explanation and – more controversially – understanding. 
Stating some collection of facts is one thing, showing how they fit together and relate 
to one another is a step beyond that. Not for nothing are scientific laws expected to 
play a role in scientific explanations. If I am able to appreciate that a given fact fits 
into a general pattern, I have gained a different kind of knowledge to that which I 
would have if I was merely aware of the fact and not its wider significance. One way 
in which we get a grip on explanations is through thinking about counterfactuals and 
difference-making.54 If I had performed some other action, how might things have 
developed differently? If the world’s initial conditions were tweaked just so, would 
it still have been hospitable to lifeforms like ourselves? If Isildur had cast the One 
Ring into the fires whence it came, what kind of life would Frodo have lived? In 
                                                     
51 Davies (2006) p. 103. 
52 This is attributed to William Bragg by Hydén (1969) p. 115. 
53 Whitehead (1920) p. 163. 
54 Although the association between explanation and understanding is not without 
controversy, this is closely related to discussions on the relationship between explanation 
and counterfactuals. The most well-known defence of the claim that (causal) explanations 
are a matter of seeing what would be different under a counterfactual is Woodward (2003). 
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considering such questions, we need to grasp how different facts relate to each other 
in order to formulate any kind of reasonable response.  
It is with this sort of aim in mind that we can say why scientists might care about the 
laws generated by a BSA that incorporates an ICH/DH split. Informativeness of the 
Dynamic Hypothesis is clearly a virtue, as the more deterministic the laws are, the 
better they pick out our world. Accumulation of nonmodal facts may not be the only 
aim of science, but it is still an aim. The reason that uninformativeness of the initial 
conditions is a virtue is that it plays into our counterfactual reasoning. If a maximally 
specific set of initial conditions was taken to be physically necessary, it would be very 
difficult to understand how any phenomenon depended on any other. Any 
difference in set-up would require that we consider physically impossible worlds 
when evaluating counterfactuals. But considering differences is a large part of how 
we get an explanatory grip on (and perhaps an understanding of) the world. A 
theory’s ability to contribute towards answering counterfactuals regarding 
alternative initial conditions is a significant part of its ability to provide explanations. 
Aiming for a less specific ICH lets a wider range of worlds count as relevantly like ours 
when we start to ask what things would be like if certain facts were different. The 
purpose of having uninformative initial conditions is to enable us to see that certain 
features of our particular world are not arbitrary. That this planet is home to 
creatures like us, or that there is a planet Earth in the first place, might well count as 
arbitrary: small changes in the boundary conditions could have led to different later 
results. But we can see how these differ from the patterns captured by the laws: that 
the planets should have orbits like the ones they in fact do is not arbitrary in the 
same way. In making every one of the world’s nonmodal facts count as physically 
necessary, a maximally specific ICH obliterates this difference. This is why a best 
system amended to include a split between the DH and the ICH should count as a 
DATSI. It plays a role in efficiently summarising the nonmodal facts at our world. It 
also helps us to understand how those facts fit together by supporting 
counterfactuals.  
In tackling various issues that arise when we set out the regularity view, I have not 
tried to argue specifically for a single account that solves all of these issues in a way 
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that all of the participants in the debate would accept. If that’s the criterion for 
success, then I suspect that no such account is available. There are too many 
differences between starting presuppositions of the philosophers in question and 
their assessments of the relative upsides and downsides of each solution for that to 
be a reasonable goal. Happily, I don’t think that trying to provide that single account 
is necessary, given the goals of this thesis. What we need is a reasonably clear idea 
of the Humean approach to laws, and metaphysics more generally. That’s 
compatible with there being various accounts sitting together under the Humean 
umbrella. I leave it up to the individual Humeans as to which specific variation of the 
regularity account they find most palatable. In responding to Hall regarding what 
would make a system a DATSI, I have appealed to explanation. However, one might 
worry that Humean accounts of laws are unsuited to generate genuine explanations 
due to their lack of metaphysical ‘oomph’. The following chapter takes up this 
question in some detail. 
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Chapter 2 Humean explanations 
 
While the previous chapter was concerned with setting out the core Humean 
position, we turn now to a common objection to it. Regularity-based accounts of 
laws are often thought to fail to be explanatory and so cannot give us genuine laws. 
For all that it is well-known, the statements of this objection differ from one another 
in their emphasis. As such, the first step is to set out the problem in what I take to 
be its most troublesome form. Discussion then turns to a prominent response given 
by Barry Loewer, along with a restatement of the circularity objection that takes his 
distinction into account. Two further responses in the literature are considered: one 
based on the irreducibility of macro-explanations, the other on multiple realisability. 
Unfortunately, the circularity objection overcomes both and so I conclude that 
Humeans must look elsewhere. One such route requires examining the reduction of 
laws in more detail. There are multiple options here, depending on whether one 
takes the relationship between the mosaic and the laws to involve grounding and, if 
so, how the grounding relations are arranged. A radical solution to the problem of 
explanation beckons, although this comes at the price of giving up on what many 
take to be a core feature of the Humean world-view. For those reluctant to make 
this contrarian move, I then offer two alternative ways to respond. The first is to 
claim that the problem of explanation has not been sufficiently well motivated and 
that Humeans are free to reject one of its central premises (unless, of course, 
Humeanism’s philosophical opponents can supply the missing motivation). The final 
response is to bring into question the nature of the explanation being appealed to in 
this debate. I suggest that Humeans are not required to appeal to the kind of 
explanation that anti-Humeans are presupposing and that a pluralistic approach 
might both better fit the view and allow for non-circular explanations involving 
Humean laws. 
 
- 43 - 
2.1 The circularity argument 
One of the roles commonly ascribed to laws is that they must be able to explain their 
instances. But, goes the immediate objection, this is something that the regularity 
view of laws cannot give us. The core worry is that the laws are what they are in 
virtue of the way the world is, and hence they cannot explain why the world is that 
way. Attempts to do so are guilty of circular reasoning. If the fundamental state of 
the world explains the fundamental laws, then we cannot immediately turn around 
and explain the world’s state by appeal to these very laws. Otherwise we would be 
claiming that the fundamental state of the world explains itself, only with the 
additional use of laws as a middle man. Regardless of what one thinks of the 
possibility of anything explaining itself, any sense of explanation here is clearly not 
what was being asked for in the first place. Here is Tim Maudlin making the point 
explicit: 
If one is a Humean, then the Humean Mosaic itself appears to admit of no 
further explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock in terms of which all 
other existent things are to be explicated, none of these further things can 
really account for the structure of the Mosaic itself. This complaint has been 
long voiced, commonly as an objection to any Humean account of laws. If 
the laws are nothing but generic features of the Humean Mosaic, then there 
is a sense in which one cannot appeal to those very laws to explain the 
particular features of the Mosaic itself: the laws are what they are in virtue 
of the Mosaic rather than vice versa.55 
The very same point is also expressed by Marc Lange: 
In short, if the Humean mosaic is responsible for making certain facts qualify 
as laws, then the facts about what the laws are cannot be responsible for 
features of the mosaic.56 
This is an objection commonly voiced by anti-Humeans.57 It has some intuitive force 
to it. Suppose it were a law that all ravens are black and, upon coming across a 
particular black raven, I were to ask why it was black. Our usual way of thinking about 
scientific laws suggests an immediate answer to the question: this raven is black 
                                                     
55 Maudlin (2007a) p. 172, italics in original. 
56 Lange (2013) p. 256. 
57 For example, by Armstrong (1983) and Bird (2007). 
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because it is a law that all ravens are black. In other words, an instance of the law is 
explained by appeal to that law. There is nothing particularly special about this case; 
we could multiply examples easily. However, anyone who provides an account of 
laws that takes them to be regularities faces a problem here. If the law that all ravens 
are black is a law because it is a regularity – perhaps one that possesses other 
features, such as being a part of the best systematisation of the world’s facts – then 
the reason it holds at all is ultimately because of the fact that there are ravens and 
the fact that they are black. But if the reason that this raven is black is because of the 
law and the reason that there is such a law is because of the black ravens, then we 
have an explanatory circle going on. For one of the law’s instances is a partial 
explanation of the law and so at least a partial explanation of itself. And self-
explanation is a high cost for Humeanism to bear.58 
Anti-Humeans like Lange and Maudlin take the absurdity of self-explanation to give 
us reason to give up on the idea that the Humean Mosaic is explicable by appealing 
to Humean laws. After all, if the laws do not explain their instances, then there is no 
explanatory circle and Humeans are not guilty of countenancing self-explanation. 
But the ability of laws to explain their instances is a core part of what we take laws 
to be: if Humean laws are unable to do this, then perhaps they do not deserve to be 
called laws at all.59 
In order to assess the options open to Humeans, it will be useful to have a clear 
statement of exactly what this argument for explanatory circularity is. Michael 
Townsen Hicks and Peter van Elswyk provide a particularly clear formalisation of the 
objection: 
                                                     
58 We might wonder whether there’s any genuine explanation going on at all here if things 
end up explaining themselves. That is, the failure of objects to explain themselves might 
plausibly be taken to be a prerequisite for an adequate account of explanation. 
59 See Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and Hempel (1965). 
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(P1) The natural laws are generalisations. 
(P2) The truth of generalisations is (partially) explained by their positive instances. 
(P3) The natural laws explain their instances. 
(P4) If A (partially) explains B and B (partially) explains C, then A (partially) explains 
C. 
(C1) The natural laws are (partially) explained by their positive instances. 
(C2) The instances of laws explain themselves.60 
The initial conclusion (C1) follows from (P1) and (P2). The second conclusion follows 
from (P3), (P4) and (C1). As mentioned above, it might be more accurate for the 
conclusion (C2) to say that the instances of laws partially explain themselves. In what 
follows, I will assume that even partial self-explanation is a bad enough result for 
Humeanism, leaving aside the question of whether it is any more plausible than full 
self-explanation. 
This is not the only way the argument might be formalised. Elizabeth Miller prefers 
to give it in the form of an inconsistent tetrad, to which Lange and others accuse 
Humeans of being committed to.61 But this is merely a change in emphasis as 
opposed to a different argument altogether: three of the principles that Miller gives 
have equivalents in the above argument (specifically (P3), (P4) and (C1)) and the 
fourth is simply the negation of conclusion (C2). As such, it makes no real difference 
which way we choose to write out the argument. 
A somewhat more substantive change that could be made would be to not frame 
the problem as one of self-explanation.62 Take the case of the black raven once more. 
The blackness of any particular raven is explained by the law that all ravens are black. 
According to the Humean view of laws, this law is not grounded in just this single 
instance of a black raven but in the black raven regularity taken as a whole. So it is 
partially grounded in each and every black raven that ever exists. If one accepts the 
                                                     
60 Hicks and van Elswyk (2015) p.434. 
61 Miller (2015) p. 1317. 
62 This is suggested by Miller (2015) pp. 1324-1325 and then echoed by both Marshall (2015) 
p. 3152 fn. 14 and Lange (2016). 
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transitivity of explanation (that is, premise (P4) in Hicks and van Elswyk’s 
formulation), one must also accept that each of these ravens partially explains the 
blackness of the particular raven being considered. But that is not a conclusion that 
we should wish to be saddled with! The colouration of some raven born in Russia a 
hundred years from now does not look like a suitable explanans for the colour of this 
raven here and now. The fact that a is G does not in general explain the fact that b is 
G. 
So the violation of the prohibition on self-explanation is not the only problem that 
faces Humeans who accept transitivity of explanation. The issue is a wider one: the 
tension between these two claims causes one to have to accept a range of rather 
implausible conclusions. Since biting the bullet on that particular point is not an 
attractive option, it is better to look for other routes of response open to Humeans. 
In what follows I will leave the above formulation of the objection from explanatory 
circularity unchanged, since I regard its conclusion that instances of laws explain 
themselves to be bad enough. But it is worth keeping in mind the point just made, if 
only as a reminder that looking for reasons to accept self-explanation is not helpful. 
Even if that particular ban can be called into question, it will not solve the larger 
problem facing Humeanism.  
It is also worth drawing attention to exactly who should be concerned with this 
objection to Humeanism. For the argument to get going, it requires that the laws be 
regularities. Despite labelling premise (P1) HUMEANISM, Hicks and van Elswyk are 
quick to acknowledge that the name is misleading. Humeans are certainly committed 
to the premise, but they are not the only ones. Anti-Humean views that take the laws 
to be generalisations that possess some additional nomic feature are also vulnerable 
to the argument. So the success or failure of this argument should be of interest even 
to those who are no friends of Humeanism. If nothing else, recognition of this point 
should be motivation for certain kinds of anti-Humeans to seek alternative 
arguments against their opponents! 
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An alternative way to raise this argument is given by Dan Marshall.63 Start with this: 
the law that all Fs are Gs, together with the fact that a is F, explains the fact that a is 
G. This is just the claim that the laws are supposed to explain their instances. On the 
Best System Account, whether some regularity is a law is determined by what the 
best system is. In turn, that is determined by the various particular matters of fact. 
So whether all Fs are Gs is a law is partially determined by the fact that a is G (along 
with the other matters of fact). As such, the lawhood of this regularity is partially 
explained by the fact that a is G. But given transitivity, the fact that a is G partially 
explains the ‘All Fs are Gs’ law means it also partially explains itself. We are back to 
self-explanation of a law’s instances. 
Marshall prefers this presentation of the issue with its talk of facts being determined 
by other facts as it avoids the claim that generalisations are explained by their 
instances. This, in fact, forms a core part of his positive proposal on behalf of 
Humeanism (and will be dealt with later in this chapter). He also raises an objection 
to the style of presentation favoured by Miller and Hicks and van Elswyk.64 
This is the thought that accepting that generalisations are explained by their 
instances come at considerable cost. He is willing to accept that accidental 
regularities are explained by their instances. The fact that everyone in this room is a 
philosopher does intuitively seem to be explained by appealing to the 
philosopherhood of each person who happens to be in the room (notice that 
explaining why some person in the room is a philosopher by way of appealing to the 
regularity is a far less satisfying approach). But this feature of accidental regularities 
should not be extended to laws: 
If laws can partly explain their instances then a vast number of particular 
matters of fact can plausibly be explained in terms of a much smaller 
number of particular matters of fact, together with a small number of laws. 
If [the explanatory priority of instances] is true, on the other hand, and laws 
cannot partially explain their instances, then a vast number of particular 
matters of fact will instead have to be foundational.65 
                                                     
63 Marshall (2015) p. 3148. 
64 Ibid. pp. 3161-3163. 
65 Ibid. p. 3163. 
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Of course, whether or not laws can (partially) explain their instances when instances 
explain those laws is precisely the point that is under discussion! Marshall finds 
reason to reject the approach taken in the next section, but that is a conclusion to 
be reached, not the starting point of the debate. It is important at this juncture not 
to beg the question against any of the accounts that we will consider. 
Further, I find it unclear that the first case of explanation Marshall mentions is 
simpler or more parsimonious than the second. Humeans certainly do not need to 
take every particular matter of fact in the world as unexplained by any further facts. 
For one example, Lewis’ project of Humean Supervenience aims to recover the 
richness of the world from a particular kind of austere base. Particular matters of 
fact that are non-local or non-fundamental are ultimately explained by the 
distribution of certain other (local and fundamental) particular matters of fact. One 
need not be wedded to the details of Lewis’ account in order to make a claim like 
this: any account that is compatible with Humeanism regarding laws and seeks to 
explain non-fundamental facts in terms of fundamental matters of fact will have the 
same sort of result. The vast number of foundational particular matters of fact that 
Marshall envisages are not a necessary commitment of this approach to 
generalisations. Even if this were not so, we would still be lacking an argument that 
the gain in quantitative parsimony outweighs the loss of qualitative parsimony. That 
is, Marshall does not provide reason to prefer explanations based on particular 
matters of fact and unexplained laws to those based on a greater number of 
particular matters of fact alone. 
For these reasons, I see little advantage in rejecting the original formulation of the 
argument given earlier. This will provide us with a clear way in which to set out the 
various responses that Humeans could make to the charge of explanatory circularity. 
The next section will begin with a particularly influential distinction that has been 
recently been drawn between different kinds of explanation involved in the Humean 
account.  
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2.2 Metaphysical and scientific explanations 
In order for Humeanism about laws to be guilty of an explanatory circle, the 
explanations appealed to must be of the same kind. If we use A to explain B and then 
use B to explain A in the same kind of way, then, intuitively, there is something wrong 
with the explanation being offered. But if B is used to explain A in a different kind of 
way from the first case, then intuition may not tell against this. To put it another 
way, we might be prepared to grant that the transitivity principle in (P4) of the 
formalised argument holds for one kind of explanation, but resist the claim that 
transitivity will hold across different kinds of explanation. That is exactly the 
approach that I will describe in this section.  
Here is a quick and dirty way of motivating the idea that we do treat explanations in 
this way. I am currently drinking a cup of tea, which a rather common event. 
Someone – presumably a person unfamiliar with British customs – might wonder 
why it is that I am so often found drinking tea. One kind of explanation available 
would be to identify certain kinds of distributions of fundamental particles as being 
tea drinking events (in a way analogous to how particles distributed table-wise might 
well constitute a table or a catty distribution of particles might be identified with a 
cat). We might then point out that if you were able to know the distribution of 
fundamental particles across my lifetime, you would find many such events. Another 
kind of explanation makes no reference to particles and instead appeals to my 
desires, local customs and, perhaps, mild addiction. While these two kinds of 
explanation are very different to one another, both of them deserve to be called 
explanations of my tea drinking habits. 
Moreover, the two explanations do not merely explain the tea drinking, but they also 
explain each other to a certain extent. The first kind of explanation provides a 
physical ground for the mental states and cultural tendencies that the second 
appeals to. The second kind of explanation tells us why we should expect there to be 
the physical patterns that the first is built upon. But this interdependency of the two 
explanations introduces no problematic circles. The distinctness of the explanations 
is not diminished by acknowledgement of this connection. It would be very odd to 
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dismiss either of these explanations on the grounds that having both makes each 
one guilty of self-explanation. 
So much for the everyday case. For this to work when applied to laws, of course, we 
will need to see some details as to exactly what the different kinds of explanation 
appealed to by Humeans are supposed to be. Barry Loewer has suggested that there 
is such a distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations.66 
Metaphysical explanations are concerned with constitution in some way. To say that 
A metaphysically explains B is to say that B is grounded in A, or that B holds in virtue 
of A or that B is constituted by B.67 An explanation of this sort does not need to cite 
laws. If explanans and explanandum are both temporal entities, then they must be 
co-temporal. This last captures the following idea: if we want to say that A is the 
underlying stuff out of which we get B then they clearly must both exist at the same 
time. It would make little sense to claim that B is constituted by something no longer 
around. 
Scientific explanations do not need to mention grounds in that way. Rather, Loewer 
suggests that the core of scientific explanation of some event is showing why that 
event occurred through appeal to other events and certain laws. If B scientifically 
explains A, then events mentioned in B will typically be temporally prior to events in 
A. That said, this is not a strict requirement since there is no requirement that the 
explanans or the explanandum be temporally located entities. Another difference 
between the two kinds of explanation is probability: scientific explanations may be 
probabilistic while metaphysical ones cannot. 
For example, the quantum mechanical explanation of why a lump of radium 
emits alpha particles goes by way of showing how the laws and the 
quantum state of the radium atoms make the emission likely. But of course, 
this doesn’t show what the emission of alpha particles consists in.68 
                                                     
66 Loewer (2012) p. 131. See also his (2007). 
67 More details about the contemporary notion of grounding can be found in Fine (2012) 
and Rosen (2010). The link between grounding and explanation specifically is considered in 
Jansson (2016). 
68 Loewer (2012) p. 131. 
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This is far from a full account of scientific explanation. That said, it is not intended to 
be one. Loewer is simply trying to give some characterisation of what the kind of 
scientific explanation he has in mind is. The most important point is that it be clearly 
distinct from metaphysical explanation; this at least seems successful. Suppose that 
your window was shattered and you came to me for an explanation. Setting aside 
claims of ignorance, there are multiple different reasons that I might offer for why 
your window is in its current state. I might point out that the various component 
pieces of your window are disconnected from one another. It is in virtue of this 
disconnectedness that your window is shattered. In ordinary conversations it is 
implicit that this is unlikely to be the sort of explanation that you are looking for, but 
it is a reason nonetheless. This sort of explanation is a metaphysical one: I am 
claiming that your window’s current state is grounded in how its parts are distributed 
(widely, we can assume). Another kind of explanation I might offer is by way of telling 
you a story about Suzy kicking a ball through the window. I could talk about the 
fragility of the window, the hardness of the ball and the momentum with which it 
travelled through the air. If pressed, I might make appeal to Newton’s laws of 
motion. This is an explanation of a different sort to the first. It seems likely that 
Loewer would be inclined to count this causal story as the basis of a scientific 
explanation. A further alternative exists. I might instead point out that every other 
house on your street has had a broken window this week and yours is no different. 
Here I am identifying some sort of pattern in recent events and portraying the 
incident with your window as another instance of that pattern. 
As this is something of a toy example, let’s consider a more detailed case. The 
following example, of Arbuthnot’s regularity, will hopefully bring out the distinction 
that Loewer has in mind.69 The regularity which forms our explanandum is simple: 
over an 82 year span from 1623 onwards, more boys than girls were born in London. 
Calling this mere coincidence is hardly credible given how unlikely this is to have 
come about by chance. But there are two kinds of explanation on offer for this 
regularity. Call the first the fundamental physics explanation. We may not have such 
                                                     
69 A discussion of Arbuthnot’s regularity and explanation can be found in Kitcher (2001) p. 
71. See Frisch (2011) for further discussion. The relevance of this example to Loewer’s 
distinction was first brought to my attention in a talk by John Roberts. 
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an explanation presently available, but we can sketch out the form it might take. 
Take the fundamental laws of physics and assume that they are deterministic. Now 
take the exact state of all of the fundamental physical particles at some point prior 
to 1623. (Given deterministic laws it doesn’t matter when; the initial conditions of 
the universe would suffice. We might also appeal to the position of the particles at 
some future time, but the sense in which that would explain why this past regularity 
occurred is very slim indeed.) As the laws are deterministic, we can now in principle 
derive the positions of the particles for any later time, and for the relevant 82 year 
period in particular. Associate some distributions of particles with the birth of a boy 
and some other distributions with the birth of a girl. Count the number of boy-birth 
distributions and compare it to the number of girl-birth distributions. We can clearly 
see that more boys than girls were born in London each year! 
There is a sense in which this constitutes a good explanation of the Arbuthnot 
regularity. We have given the details (or, at least, the form such details might take) 
of what the regularity might fundamentally consist in. The regularity obtains in virtue 
of such-and-such fundamental physical facts (despite my having just called it a 
fundamental physics explanation, this is a metaphysical explanation in the sense of 
giving information regarding what grounds what). But it is also easy to see what this 
explanation misses. Most obviously, it is an ‘in principle’ explanation: we do not have 
epistemic access to the world’s fundamental state prior to 1623, we do not believe 
we have discovered what the fundamental laws actually are and we cannot even 
decide whether such laws will turn out to be deterministic. But even if we had all of 
this information available to us, the explanation would still be missing out on 
something. The fundamental physics explanation does nothing to help us 
understand why the regularity is not some big coincidence. It might not be a 
coincidence in the sense of having come about by a random process since 
deterministic laws rule out any of that kind of coincidence. But there is still the 
unanswered question: why this particular fundamental distribution that generates 
the Arbuthnot regularity when so many others are compatible with the laws? 
Furthermore, the explanation explains too much. For the fundamental physics 
explanation not only explains the Arbuthnot regularity but also every other event 
and regularity that occurs after the time associated with the given state of the 
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particles. So the very same explanans will explain my tea drinking, the first moon 
landing, and the rise and fall of alien empires in other galaxies. The sense in which 
this is an explanation of the Arbuthnot regularity is perhaps a rather slim one. 
So there is plenty of room for an alternative to the metaphysical explanation just 
given. Contrast this with Fisher’s neo-Darwinian explanation of the regularity. In any 
population which differs from a 1:1 ratio at sexual maturity, there is a selection 
pressure in favouring of producing more offspring of the sex that is not as well 
represented. If one sex in a population is more vulnerable than the other, and so less 
likely to reach sexual maturity, natural selection will favour a birth ratio skewed 
towards the more vulnerable sex. In humans, males are more vulnerable than 
females: boys are more likely to die before puberty than girls. Any large human 
population which fails to birth more boys will experience a selection pressure 
towards having more boys. This is why Arbuthnot observed this regularity; because 
of natural selection, every year is likely to be a year in which more boys are born 
than girls. 
This scientific explanation does not generate the same sense of mystery as the 
metaphysical one given previously. The regularity in the London births no longer 
appears to be a coincidence, but rather something we should expect to hold. This is 
a virtue of the second explanation in that it grants a greater understanding of the 
explanandum than the first does.70 We might also note that this explanation is more 
specific than the first. It does explain more than just a regularity in seventeenth- 
century London – it explains similar birth trends across different places and times – 
but it explains far less than the first does. By appealing to the entire Humean mosaic, 
the metaphysical explanation explains every regularity that holds (assuming the 
fundamental state of the world was given at an early enough point; even if it were 
given at the beginning of 1623, it would still cover a wide range of regularities). So 
the explanations differ in how widely applicable they are.71 
                                                     
70 See de Regt and Dieks (2005) for an emphatic defence of the importance of understanding 
in explanation. 
71 A third difference between the two explanations is that the first appeals to fundamental 
laws of physics, while the second appeals to the non-fundamental laws of biology. It would 
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2.3 The revised circularity argument 
The first challenge to Loewer’s distinction comes from Marshall, who complains that 
even if there is such a distinction, it is not obviously relevant.72 Take proper parthood 
as an example. We can distinguish two different types: the first where one of the 
relata has a smaller volume than the other, the second where either the relata do 
not have volumes or they are the same size. But noticing that proper parthood comes 
in these different forms does not convince us that it is not asymmetric. Similarly, the 
fact that there are different kinds of explanation does not mean that explanation 
fails to be asymmetric. 
The analogy here is rather weak. The distinction between different kinds of proper 
parthood partitions the set of proper parthood instances into two equivalence 
classes. Loewer’s distinction does not. While every case of proper parthood will fall 
into one of the categories that Marshall picks out, Loewer makes no claim that the 
kinds of explanation he identifies are the only ones available. Moreover, being in one 
proper parthood category rules out being in the other. But, as we have just seen, 
multiple different kinds of explanation of some phenomenon can coexist. Most 
importantly, this sort of objection misses the point of drawing a distinction in the 
way Loewer does. The point is this: explanation is not homogeneous, so it makes 
little sense to ask whether explanation is asymmetric. Different explanatory relations 
are doing different things, although insofar as they all aid in our understanding, we 
are justified in referring to each as an explanation. We might sensibly ask whether 
any given explanatory relation is asymmetric. Perhaps Hicks and van Elswyk are right 
to suggest that some are, perhaps not. But even if all explanatory relations are 
asymmetric, we cannot make any further claim about explanation as a whole from 
this. None of this should be terribly surprising: Marshall’s distinction is an arbitrary 
                                                     
be interesting to see a similar case being made without use of the special sciences, if that is 
even possible. 
72 Marshall (2015) pp. 3149-3150. 
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one between two different ways that some relation can be instantiated whereas 
Loewer is making the claim that there are entirely different relations involved. 
So much for the analogy. Marshall continues: 
Moreover, no further reason to reject (A) [the asymmetry of explanation] is 
provided by Loewer’s particular way of drawing this distinction. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, if we assume that all explanation is either 
scientific or metaphysical, and we slightly simplify his characterisation so 
that it holds that f partly metaphysically explains g only if f and g are co-
temporal or both non-temporal, and that f partly scientifically explains g 
only if f is temporally prior to g, then his characterisation will entail (A) 
rather than refute it! 
Marshall is right that if we make two assumptions then all explanation comes out as 
asymmetric. (If the explanans is located at a different time to the explanandum then 
it will be a scientific explanation, otherwise it will be metaphysical. Since whether 
two things are co-temporal is symmetric, any putative explanation running the other 
way will be of the same kind as the first. But each particular kind of explanation is 
intuitively asymmetric.) But this is no better an argument than the one from proper 
parthood as the simplification suggested is misleading. Not only has Loewer not 
claimed that there are no other kinds of explanation (indeed, this seems highly 
doubtful), but the simple characterisation of scientific explanation is simply false. 
Non-temporal entities can be involved in the scientific explanation of temporally 
located entities. The most obvious examples of this are laws! They are not normally 
taken to be located in time yet are clearly a major part of the scientific explanation 
of phenomena in the world. The simplification here shows only that we ought to be 
careful in how we characterise each kind of explanation so as to avoid problems like 
this. It does not reveal anything more about the nature of the distinction. 
I suggest that what Marshall is really trying to get at is the following. Explanation is 
taken to be asymmetric on the basis of – presumably – intuition.73 But Loewer’s 
                                                     
73 In fairness, that asymmetry is involved in explanation might well be a particularly well-
entrenched intuition such that any view which fails to introduce a requirement that there 
be asymmetry is not a view that captures what we mean by explanation. This is rather 
plausible: if explanations could be symmetric there would be cases where we would be 
unable to distinguish explanans from explanandum. It is not clear to me, however, that this 
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distinction does nothing to change Marshall’s intuitions on the matter. That 
explanation comes in different forms does not, by itself, lessen the circularity 
involved in the case of Humean laws. But intuitions are a notoriously shaky ground 
to build an argument upon. My own intuitions differ markedly from Marshall’s. I am 
happy to agree that explanatory relations are asymmetric, but I see no reason to 
move from this to the claim that if one such relation holds between two relata in one 
order then another kind of explanatory relation cannot hold between the relata 
taken in a different order. In short, my own intuitions only object when one 
explanatory relation is taken to hold symmetrically. Stalemate. We might take the 
clash of intuitions to tell us that Loewer’s distinction needs additional argument if it 
is to show that explanation can hold symmetrically if there are different relations 
involved. But we might equally take it to tell us that additional argument is needed 
to show that the instantiation of two different explanatory relations renders any 
explanation unacceptably circular.74  
Marshall complains that Humeans have not yet provided any ‘independently 
plausible’ examples where metaphysical and scientific explanation both obtain in a 
non-circular fashion. But neither have anti-Humeans provided any independently 
plausible examples of such explanations obtaining in cases that we find circular. 
Further, if the demand for the examples to be independently plausible requires that 
they not involve the very laws that we are interested in, then the demand may not 
be possible to satisfy. For one of the kinds of explanation under consideration is 
scientific explanation which involves appealing to laws in order to explain some 
phenomenon. There is little point in trying to meet a challenge that has been set up 
in such a way that ensures it cannot be met. 
                                                     
well-entrenched intuition has anything to say when different kinds of explanation are at 
play. 
74 Perhaps it is worth noting that Marshall’s conclusion follows if one already has accepted 
something like Lange’s transitivity principle below. But we should not start out by assuming 
that something like this holds, that must be argued for. There are arguments that transitivity 
fails in the cases of particular examples of explanation, so let’s not assume that it will hold 
across different kinds. See Paul (2000) for an argument that causal explanations fail to be 
transitive and Schaffer (2012) for an argument that grounding explanations fail to be 
transitive. 
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A more challenging line of response is given by Lange.75 Grant that there is a 
distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanations. Grant also that the 
holding of some explanatory relation between A and B, and another explanatory 
relation between B and A does not automatically entail that either explanation is 
viciously circular. Even so, Loewer’s distinction will not save the Humean account. 
The problem is that these two kinds of explanation are connected to one another by 
a transitivity principle.76 Here is the original statement of it: 
If E scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically explain] F and D grounds 
[or helps to ground] E, then D scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically 
explain] F.77 
The motivation for this update to our first transitivity principle is straightforward. If 
D is the ground of E, then E obtains because of D. It is only in virtue of D obtaining 
that E does. If metaphysical explanation is concerned with constitution, then we can 
say that E is constituted by D. Any role that E plays, it plays because of the way it is 
and D is what makes E the way it is. So if E is involved in the scientific explanation of 
some other fact then D must also scientifically explain that other fact. 
This allows us the run the argument against Humeanism again. The laws scientifically 
explain the mosaic, while the mosaic metaphysically explains the laws. Due to this 
latter fact, the mosaic must scientifically explain whatever the laws scientifically 
explain as it is only in virtue of the mosaic being a certain way that we have these 
laws to explain with. But then by the new transitivity principle, this means that the 
mosaic scientifically explains itself. 
Rather abstract considerations about the relationship between scientific explanation 
and grounding are not the only reason to accept this principle. Lange offers an 
example of this in action from evolutionary biology.78 Fitness differences in two types 
                                                     
75 In Lange (2013). This is developed further in Lange (2016). 
76 Loewer’s distinction is a way to dispute the relevance of (P4) in the formalised explanatory 
circle argument by claiming it only applies when all of the explanation involved are of the 
same type (which is not the case when we consider Humean laws). Lange’s transitivity 
principle given here updates (P4) so as to be able to accommodate the distinction. 
77 Lange (2013) p. 256. 
78 Lange (2016). 
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of moth are involved in the scientific explanation of why the fitter type of moth has 
more offspring than the less fit type. But we cannot use the average number of 
offspring to ground the fitness differences in these two types of moth. This is 
because: 
Where fitness is defined in terms of survival and reproduction success, to 
say that type A is fitter than type B is just to say that type A is leaving a 
higher average number of offspring than type B. Clearly, we cannot say that 
the difference in fitness of A and B explains the difference in actual average 
offspring contributions of A and B, when fitness is defined in terms of actual 
reproductive success.79 
A transitivity principle of some kind is involved here as the authors quoted are 
evidently keen to avoid self-explanation. Lange takes it that the kind of transitivity 
principle just given fits this case nicely. Pointing out that fitness differences 
scientifically explain average offspring number while average offspring number 
metaphysically explains fitness differences does not seem to help. That said, I do not 
find it all that clear how analogous this case is. Notice that a key part of why 
explaining fitness differences and average offspring number in terms of one another 
is unsatisfactory is because the former is defined by reference to the latter. The 
example Lange gives is motivation to accept a transitivity principle when there are 
definitions involved. But it would be misleading to say that Humeans define laws in 
terms of the mosaic.  
While I do not take this particular example that Lange gives to be sufficient 
motivation to think his principle holds, he does offer others. Further, Harjit Bhogal 
makes the case that even if the Humean finds examples where this sort of 
explanation transitivity fails, we still need an account of why this is sometimes taken 
to be possible: 
For example, we can chain together (i) a scientific explanation of the facts 
about the energy of the particles in this room from facts about those 
particles ten minutes ago, with (ii) a metaphysical explanation of the fact 
about the current temperature of the room in terms of facts about the 
energy of the particles in the room, to form (iii) a larger scientific 
                                                     
79 Mills and Beatty (1979) p. 265. 
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explanation of the fact about the temperature in this room from the facts 
about the particles ten minutes ago.80 
Clearly this sort of chaining together of explanations so as to form a scientific 
explanation from the grounds of some other explanatory fact is sometimes done. 
This is prima facie motivation to think that Lange’s transitivity principle – or 
something very much like it – does hold. But the importance of these sorts of 
examples is not merely to motivate that principle. Rather, they give us a better 
understanding of the challenge that the Humean faces: the project is not only to 
show that the transitivity principle does not hold generally, but to do so in a way that 
does not condemn all instances of such explanation transitivity. It must remain 
possible, after the Humean has offered a defence of the distinction between 
different types of explanations, for this chaining together to sometimes be a 
legitimate move. Taking a straightforward example, this rules out claiming that the 
scientific explanation of some explanandum has a unique explanans. An argument 
for this would rule out the transitivity principle, since E and the grounds of E would 
not be able to both scientifically explain some F, but would leave it completely 
mysterious as to why we think explanations like the one in Bhogal’s example are 
legitimate. 
With this discussion in mind, we can now consider the explanatory circle argument 
that Humeans adopting Loewer’s distinction must face: 
                                                     
80 Bhogal (2016) p. 3. 
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(P1’) The natural laws are generalisations. 
(P2’) The truth of generalisations is (partially) metaphysically explained by their 
positive instances. 
(P3’) The natural laws scientifically explain their instances. 
(P4’) If A (partially) metaphysically explains B and B (partially) scientifically 
explains C, then A (partially) scientifically explains C. 
(C1’) The natural laws are (partially) metaphysically explained by their positive 
instances. 
(C2’) The instances of laws scientifically explain themselves. 
Given the similarity of this updated argument to the previous one, there is little need 
to explain the premises. Let us take this to be the objection that Humeans are 
challenged to overcome. The question now is how best to do that. The next two 
sections consider attempts in the literature that fall short of the task before we turn 
to responses that will do the job, if we are willing to make the relevant claims.  
 
2.4 Irreducibility of the special sciences 
The first line of response available to Humeans is given by Hicks and van Elswyk.81 
This is the worry that Lange’s transitivity principle amounts to a claim that macro-
explanations (those given by the special sciences) are always reducible to micro-
explanations (those given by lower-level sciences, ultimately fundamental physics). 
Suppose that some E scientifically explains F and that D, the phenomena grounding 
E, thereby scientifically explains F. Since D is the grounds of E, it is likely that (at least 
some of the time) D and E will be involved in the explanations offered by different 
sciences. This is a part of seeing the world as coming in levels which differ in their 
fundamentality: the grounds for some phenomenon will typically be more 
fundamental than the phenomenon itself, and it is the job of the more fundamental 
sciences like physics to investigate the more fundamental phenomena. 
                                                     
81 Hicks and van Elswyk (2015) pp. 440-441. 
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Suppose that D is the sort of object studied by physics and E is part of a biological 
explanation of some event. Then by the transitivity principle, there is an explanation 
of that event available from physics. But, so the objection goes, this rides roughshod 
over the usual debates concerning the reducibility of the special sciences. If one sees 
the world as structured according to these levels, with physics describing the bottom 
one and various other sciences describing the higher-levels, the project of spelling 
out exactly how these levels interact and relate to one another is an interesting and 
substantive one. By taking the reducibility of facts to entail the reducibility of the 
explanatory relations concerning those facts, Lange is claimed to be committed to 
trivialising such a project. Of course, there might still be work to do be done when it 
comes to finding what the correct lower-level explanation is whenever we have a 
higher-level explanation. But we no longer need to ask any deep questions about the 
relationship between the various levels: higher-level ones are ultimately reducible 
to the level described by physics. But that is too quick a move, even if one agrees 
with the conclusion. The reducibility of the special sciences is not something that can 
be convincingly proven from a principle connecting metaphysical and scientific 
explanations. 
Unfortunately, this response will not help Humeans to refute the transitivity 
principle. According to that principle, if E provides a macro-explanation of an event 
and is grounded in D, then D will provide a micro-explanation of that event. So we 
should not expect macro-explanations to be the unique explainers of events. But 
that is not the same as saying that in such a case there is no macro-explanation of 
the event. The transitivity principle is compatible with there being multiple scientific 
explanations of a single event. If the macro-explanation provides some sort of 
explanatory contribution that the micro-explanation does not provide, then it is 
entirely reasonable to think that the macro-explanation is not reducible to the micro-
explanation.82 Someone who accepts the transitivity principle may wish to go further 
and claim that the special sciences are reducible to physics. But while the principle 
is compatible with that move too, it does not require it. 
                                                     
82 This point is made in Lange (2016). 
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Recall the example of the Arbuthnot regularity given earlier, where I suggested that 
the birth regularity can be explained through appeal to fundamental physics or 
natural selection. The fact that the biological explanation is a scientific one and is 
grounded in the goings-on studied by physics entails by the transitivity principle that 
there is a scientific explanation of the birth regularity that could be given by 
appropriately informed physicists. That would, of course, be the in-principle 
explanation suggested that appealed to the positions of the world’s fundamental 
particles at some past time. But as the discussion of the example hopefully made 
clear, the existence of such an explanation does nothing to make us think that there 
is not still a neo-Darwinian explanation available. Nor is Lange committed to such a 
claim. The apparent irreducibility of the biological explanation arises from the 
explanatory contributions it makes that the physics explanation does not. The 
biological explanation is stable over a (small) range of different initial conditions of 
the universe, whereas the physical explanation, in appealing to the exact positions 
of the particles, is not. This is the sense in which the appeal to natural selection 
makes the regularity seem like less of a coincidence, since it would still hold if the 
world were different in appropriately small ways. Since it makes no appeal to the 
regularity occurring in seventeenth-century London, it also unifies relevantly similar 
explanations about birth rates at other times and places. As the explanation from 
fundamental physics does not make these sorts of explanatory contributions, we 
should not expect the neo-Darwinian explanation to be reducible to one of a lower-
level science (even if the transitivity principle tells us that a lower-level one does 
exist). 
 
2.5 Multiple realisability 
Here is a different reason to reject the transitivity principle: it gives the wrong results 
in cases of multiple realisability.83 Again we appeal to that picture of the world 
                                                     
83 I will be largely following the presentation of Hicks and van Elswyk (2015) pp. 437-438. A 
similar response is offered by Miller (2015) pp. 1320-1328. Miller does also suggest that 
Humeans could repeal the ban on self-explanation. However, as she herself acknowledges 
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coming in levels, with different sciences studying different levels. Suppose that E is a 
fact that turns up in an explanation offered by a higher-level science of some 
phenomena F. Fact E forms the scientific explanation of F. But rather than worry 
about whether E is reducible to some lower-level fact as we did in the last section, 
let us instead suppose that E is multiply realisable. That is, there are multiple 
different lower-level facts that would be capable of grounding E. As such, fact E’s 
obtaining is consistent with the failure of each of these lower-level facts to occur 
(although presumably not with the failure of all of them). Finally, some of these D 
facts will be compatible with different E facts. So the occurrence of one of these 
lower-level facts does not automatically entail this particular E fact. 
The charge is that in cases like this, Lange’s transitivity principle will predict that D 
will be part of a scientific explanation of F. But this often seems to be the wrong kind 
of result. When examining such a case we often think that scientific explanations of 
the phenomena F will not mention D. Hicks and van Elswyk’s Lion example makes 
this point clear: 
The position of electron e partially metaphysically explains the position of 
lion L. The position of L scientifically explains the number of prey animals in 
region R. But the position of electron e does not explain the number of prey 
animals in region R. For if the electron were elsewhere, L would still be 
warding prey animals out of R. 
The example meets the criteria just mentioned. The lion’s existence is multiply 
realisable, in that it is consistent with there being different underlying particle 
configurations. And many of the facts that serve as partial grounds of the lion (such 
as the presence of electron e) are compatible with there not being a lion there at all 
as opposed to, say, a tree. There’s nothing particularly special about this example; it 
is easy to see how further examples with the same general form can be given. 
Crucially, this example appeals to a counterfactual: had the electron not been 
present, the prey-warding explanation would be unaffected. In other words, had 
grounding fact D not obtained, fact E would still scientifically explain fact F. Since the 
                                                     
and I noted in the first section of this chapter, such a Humean is still left saying very odd 
things about explanation. Better to not have to make such a desperate move. 
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holding of the scientific explanation is independent of whether the electron is 
present, it is concluded that the electron’s presence cannot be part of a scientific 
explanation of the number of prey animals. One might worry, as Marshall does, 
whether we ought to have such faith in that sort of counterfactual test.84 Cases of 
causal overdetermination also seem to fail the test. For example, Suzy and Billy 
throw a rock each at a window. The rocks hit the window at the same time, at which 
point it duly shatters. In explaining the breaking of the window, I should mention the 
rocks impacting it. The fact that the breaking of the window was overdetermined – 
had either rock missed it would still have broken – changes nothing. It would be 
incorrect to announce of either rock that since the window’s breaking is independent 
of that rock hitting it, the rock should not feature in a scientific explanation of the 
breaking. So checking for counterfactual differences in such a simple way cannot be 
the right test for whether D can scientifically explain F.85 
This should not be an especially surprising result. The Lion example is not too 
dissimilar in the relevant respects from the example of Arbuthnot’s regularity. Ratios 
of males to females in a given population are multiply realisable, since a given 
population might be made up from any one of multiple different particle 
configurations. The failure of any one particle to have its actual position would not 
change the ratio in the population. But that alone does not mean that we have good 
reason to claim that it is impossible for physics to explain the regularity. 
Further, Hicks and van Elswyk do not apply their counterfactual test to cases of 
metaphysical explanation.86 After all, the existence of the lion is independent of 
electron e’s presence, but the electron is still taken to be a part of the metaphysical 
explanation of that lion. One might take this to be further evidence that the 
counterfactual test is a poor one. But that conclusion might be a step too far. After 
all, there is a sense in which the electron’s presence is not part of why there is a 
                                                     
84 Marshall (2015) p. 3152. 
85 We might wish to rule out cases of causal overdetermination through appeal to something 
like Kim’s (1989) principle of causal exclusion, which denies that there are ever two complete 
causal explanations of a single event. But such a principle is highly controversial and so of 
limited use in defending Humeanism generally. Moreover, it does nothing to respond to 
Lange’s point regarding contrastive explanations, which I deal with shortly. 
86 This is pressed in Lange (2016) fn. 2, where Lange credits the point to Chris Dorst. 
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certain number of prey animals in the area, and that sense does seem connected to 
the fact that it doesn’t matter whether the electron is there or not. That sense does 
strike me as distinct from the sense in which the lion does not require e in order to 
exist. So perhaps there is room for Hicks and van Elswyk to reply with a more 
sophisticated counterfactual test, one that is sensitive to cases of causal 
overdetermination and makes it clear why metaphysical explanation does not seem 
to require counterfactual dependence in the same way scientific explanation might. 
Unfortunately, at this point I have little idea what such a test would look like. 
In any case, there is a further problem facing the defence by way of the Lion example. 
As Lange presses, explanations are often contrastive.87 An explanation of some 
phenomenon might well appeal to reasons that make it clear why some other X did 
not occur, but not even attempt to show why it was not Y that occurred. Taking up 
an earlier example, my preference for tea over the other hot drinks in my house 
would feature in an explanation for why it is tea that I was drinking (as opposed to, 
say, coffee). But an appeal to this sort of preference would not help to explain why I 
was having a drink at all. Similarly, a preference for coffee would explain a coffee 
drinking incident rather than a tea drinking one, but would still not help explain why 
a drink was being had in the first place. In order to explain that fact, we could appeal 
to my thirst. My being thirsty – as opposed to my being satisfied – would explain why 
I was drinking a drink of some kind, but would not be sufficient to explain why it was 
tea.  
Neither the original nor the revised transitivity principle appealed to in the 
explanatory circularity argument mentioned contrasts explicitly. But it is easy to 
modify the fourth premise to take into account the contrastive nature of 
explanations: 
(P4C) If the fact that E rather than E’ (partially) scientifically explains the fact that 
F rather than F’, and if the fact that D rather than D’ (partially) metaphysically 
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explains the fact that E rather than E’, then the fact that D rather than D’ (partially) 
scientifically explains the fact that F rather than F’. 
It is easy to see why Lange originally went for the previous, more readable version. 
Nevertheless, this is simply the result of making each step in the non-contrastive 
version explicitly contrastive. Lange goes on to offer an example by way of 
motivation for thinking that this principle still holds. Imagine a seesaw whose centre 
of mass is over its base of support rather than slightly to the right. This helps to 
scientifically explain why the seesaw is balanced rather than tipping to the right. The 
fact that Jones sitting on the right weighs 90 pounds rather than 120 pounds helps 
to ground the fact that the centre of mass is over the base of support rather than to 
the right of it. By (P4C) above, the fact concerning Jones’ weight helps to scientifically 
explain why the seesaw is balanced rather than tipping to the right. The claim that 
Jones’ weight is involved in a scientific explanation of the seesaw’s balancing rather 
than tipping to the right seems to be correct. 
This new transitivity principle is then deployed by Lange to show why transitivity 
does not give the wrong result in the Lion example. In order to get the result that 
Hicks and van Elswyk expect, this principle must be combined with two premises: (i) 
The lion’s presence at rather than absence from the region helps to scientifically 
explain why there are few rather than many prey creatures there, and (ii) Electron 
e’s presence at rather than absence from a given location helps to metaphysically 
explain the lion’s presence in rather than absence from the given region. While (i) is 
true, (ii) is false. Electron e’s presence does help to metaphysically explain the lion’s 
presence. But the relevant contrastive claim does not hold: e’s presence rather than 
e’s absence does not help to explain why the lion is present rather than absent. Here 
Lange also appeals to a counterfactual test. Had electron e been absent, the lion 
would not also have been absent since it can very well exist without that electron. 
Therefore, e’s absence cannot help to metaphysically explain the lion’s absence. The 
upshot of this is that accepting (P4C) does not commit one to the conclusion that 
electron e’s presence rather than absence helps to scientifically explain the number 
of prey animals in the area. 
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Suppose that both Fa and Ga are included in the mosaic. Then, in conjunction with 
the rest of the mosaic, Ga’s presence rather than ¬Ga’s presence helps to 
metaphysically explain why ‘All Fs are G’ is a law (if ¬Ga held, then not all Fs would 
be G and so the universal generalisation could not be a law). The fact that ‘All Fs are 
G’ is a law rather than not a law helps to scientifically explain why Ga rather than 
¬Ga. By (P4C), this means that Ga’s presence rather than ¬Ga’s presence helps to 
scientifically explain why Ga rather than ¬Ga. But this is blatantly a case of self-
explanation. So Lange’s revised transitivity principle generates a challenge for 
Humean accounts of law while not being vulnerable to problems arising from 
multiple realisability. If we are to resist the implausible conclusion, we must look 
elsewhere. 
 
2.6 Direction of grounding 
Disputing the transitivity principle is not the only way in which Humeans might resist 
the explanatory circularity argument. After all, that principle only causes trouble if 
we accept that there is two-way explanation – regardless of whether those 
explanations are of the same kind of not. Suppose that we wish to hang on to the 
argument’s third premise: we want to be able to say that the laws explain their 
instances. We could then re-examine the second premise, which claims that 
generalisations are (metaphysically) explained by their instances. If this does not 
always hold, and in particular if it failed for laws, then there would be no explanatory 
circle. For then we would only have one-way explanation, which is no problem at all. 
That line of thinking is the focus of this section. 
There are two main ways in which laws might not be explained by their instances. 
The first is what Miller refers to as ‘groundless Humeanism’.88 This is a Humean who 
takes there to be no metaphysically explanatory relations holding between laws and 
their instances. The second, again following Miller, is ‘contrarian Humeanism’.89 This 
                                                     
88 Miller (2015) pp. 1318-1320. 
89 Ibid. pp. 1328-1331. 
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is a Humean who thinks that there are metaphysically explanatory relations holding 
between laws and their instances, it is just that they do not run in the usual direction. 
Instead, laws are involved in metaphysically explaining their instances. 
Let us deal with the groundless position first. It is important to be clear that such a 
Humean is not advocating for a failure of supervenience. A core part of standard 
Humeanism regarding laws is the idea that the laws are not ‘free-floating’ or 
independent of how the world is. Rather they are dependent on the world in the 
sense that variation in what the laws are must be accompanied by variation in how 
the underlying worldly facts are. In other words, the laws supervene on the world. 
This supervenience is asymmetrical, as not every variation in the worldly facts will 
be accompanied by a change in the laws. Consider how little difference the presence 
of the electron made to the lion: a world with one fewer particle in it might well 
exhibit the same pattern of zebra hunting as ours. (This is just as well, or else no two 
possible worlds containing different events will have the same laws. Consequently, 
our world would end up being the only physically possible world, since no other 
world would have the same physical laws.) 
No part of this commitment to asymmetrical supervenience requires a further 
commitment to grounding claims. One fact supervening on another does not require 
one fact to have some form of metaphysical priority over the other. This suggests a 
straightforward way out of the debate: accept that laws scientifically explain their 
instances but deny that they are grounded in those instances. Since there is no 
metaphysical explanation at work here, there cannot be an explanatory circle. 
Such a Humean need not deny that there are any grounding relations in play at all. 
So far I have been loosely talking of whether instances metaphysically explain laws. 
For a fan of the Best System Account, however, the laws are not determined by 
individual events but by the mosaic as a whole. Call C the fact conjoining all the 
individual events that make up the mosaic. Then as Miller rightly points out, a 
‘groundless’ Humean might still wish to say (i) that C grounds the laws, even though 
C is not grounded in the individual mosaic facts, or (ii) that those latter facts ground 
C, even though C does not ground the laws. Thus a groundless Humean need not be 
without grounding at all, as long as there is not a clear chain of grounding from the 
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local facts up to the laws. This is something of a minor point however. If one were 
worried by the thought of Humean laws not being grounded in local facts, I very 
much doubt that either of the above options will assuage those concerns. The first 
option involves a commitment to conjunctions not being grounded in their 
conjuncts. The second is really just a restatement of the groundless Humeanism 
position taking into account the point that it is the entire mosaic that determines the 
laws. 
Given that both Lange and Loewer do not stop to mention this distinction between 
grounding and asymmetric supervenience, we might worry that the position just 
suggested does not capture the kind of Humeanism that they are interested in. Put 
another way: is groundless Humeanism sufficiently Humean? If not, then while one 
might be able to call oneself a Humean while using the groundless defence to avoid 
explanatory circularity, actual Humeans might still be vulnerable to the argument.90 
To support the idea that this is a genuinely Humean position, Miller quotes David 
Lewis at length: 
Imagine a grid of a million tiny spots – pixels – each of which can be made 
light or dark. When some are light and some are dark, they form a picture, 
replete with interesting intrinsic gestalt properties. The case evokes 
reductionist comments. Yes, the picture really does exist. Yes, it really does 
have those gestalt properties. However, the picture and the properties 
reduce to the arrangement of light and dark pixels. They are nothing over 
and above the pixels. The make nothing true that is not made true already 
by the pixels. They could go unmentioned in an inventory of what there is 
without thereby rendering that inventory incomplete. And so on. 
Such comments seem to me obviously right. The picture reduces to the 
pixels. And that is because the picture supervenes on the pixels: there could 
be no difference in the picture and its properties without some difference 
in the arrangement of light and dark pixels. Further, the supervenience is 
asymmetric: not just any difference in the pixels would matter to the gestalt 
properties of the picture. And it is supervenience of the large upon the small 
and many. In such a case, say I, supervenience is reduction.91 
                                                     
90 I should note in passing that anti-Humeans who take the laws to be regularities plus some 
additional factors might find this sort of defence to be an attractive one. This will obviously 
depend on their overall commitments, but there’s no in-principle reason why such anti-
Humeans could not utilise Miller’s suggestion for their own ends. 
91 Lewis (1994b) pp. 413-414. 
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This is taken to support the claim that Lewis had nothing stronger in mind when 
setting out his position. And if Humeanism’s most famous defender was not making 
grounding claims, it would be unreasonable to claim that a Humeanism without 
grounding is not Humeanism at all. 
Of course, this does nothing to protect actual Humeans. Many of them do seem to 
have something stronger in mind than Miller’s reading of Lewis. Bhogal and Perry 
explicitly introduce a fundamentality claim into their overview of Humeanism.92 
Loewer takes Humean Supervenience to be claiming that contingent properties are 
instantiated in virtue of what is instantiated in the mosaic.93 Maudlin, no Humean 
himself, takes the mosaic claim to be one of determination by a separable physical 
base.94 Nor is the passage quoted above especially clear on the matter: the ‘nothing 
over and above’ claim and the statement that the picture is not a separate entry into 
the world’s inventory both suggest that something stronger is at play here.95 
Advocates of a stronger form of Humeanism appear to be taking the mosaic 
metaphor more seriously: ‘all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters 
of particular fact, just one little thing and then another.’96 Contemporary Humeans 
are not always in agreement with Lewis regarding what the mosaic is made of.97 But 
the crucial point here is that the mosaic – however it may be – is all there is to the 
world. Extending the metaphor, if God were to set out the world’s mosaic, then there 
is nothing else that He would need to do. Tables and chairs, relations of causation 
and even laws do not need to be added in by hand afterwards. This is stronger than 
mere covariance; there is no talk of how things are at duplicate worlds here. Setting 
                                                     
92 Bhogal and Perry (2015) note 2. 
93 Loewer (1996) p. 102. 
94 Maudlin (2007a) pp. 51-2. 
95 This is not an exegetical work, so I do not intend to argue for a particular stance on what 
Lewis’ views really were. I will mention a cautionary point though: we ought to be careful 
when interpreting work that both informs and precedes contemporary debates. The current 
literature on grounding and metaphysical explanation was not available when Lewis was first 
developing his form of Humeanism. We ought not, therefore, take a lack of references to 
grounding to mean that something like grounding was not intended (or would have been 
intended). 
96 Lewis (1986a) ix. 
97 Recall the first chapter, where we noted some of the modifications that philosophers have 
suggested need to be made to the mosaic in the wake of quantum physics. 
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the mosaic down determines everything else. Even if this is not an explicit appeal to 
the metaphysical priority of the mosaic, it is something very close to it. For such a 
Humean, the account rescued by Miller’s groundless Humeanism will not capture 
what they are reaching for.  
That is not to say that groundless Humeanism is incoherent or indefensible. It is 
neither, and it makes a substantial claim about the way the world is. But adopting it 
does require that many contemporary Humeans abandon their current views in 
favour of something weaker. As such, I take this to be a possible response to the 
explanatory circle argument, but not an ideal one. The next view I shall examine 
perhaps fares even worse in this regard, but is worth discussing nevertheless. 
Take the global facts about the mosaic to include both conjunctions of the usual local 
facts and generalisations about the mosaic. This means that laws will be counted as 
global facts since they are generalisations for Humeans. For Humeanism to hold, the 
global facts must supervene on the local facts. Further, this supervenience is 
asymmetric as the local facts do not supervene on the laws (two worlds might have 
the same laws while having different events in their histories). But this does not 
mean that the local facts do not supervene on these global facts more generally. In 
fact, we should expect them to because the global facts include conjunctions of local 
facts. There cannot be a change in the local facts without there also being a change 
in what the conjunctions of local facts are. So while the supervenience between local 
facts and laws is asymmetric, the supervenience between local facts and global facts 
is symmetric. 
At this point a groundless Humean will stop and say that this is enough to 
characterise the view; there is no need to introduce grounding claims. But a 
contrarian Humean will go further: the symmetric supervenience between local and 
global facts does not have to be taken to mean that there is no grounding at all. 
Rather, the grounding might run in the opposite way to how it is usually taken to go. 
That is, the local facts could be taken to be grounded in the global facts. This includes 
the laws, which would partially ground the local facts. It is still the case that the local 
facts do not supervene on the laws, which might be why their grounding in the laws 
is only partial: the laws will help to ground local facts when taken with other global 
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facts, but cannot do it by themselves. This is supposed to mirror how grounding is 
usually taken to work in the standard Humean account. There the laws are grounded 
in the entire mosaic – in all the local facts taken together. The laws are not grounded 
in just a few local facts and neither will they in general supervene on such a restricted 
base. Just as the laws are not expected to be grounded in a restricted portion of the 
local facts on the standard Humean account, the local facts will not be grounded in 
a restricted portion of the global facts (that is, the laws) on the contrarian Humean 
account. 
The view held by Miller’s contrarian includes all of the generalisations about the 
mosaic in the global facts. This includes the laws and the accidental regularities, both 
of which might be involved in the grounding of some local fact. But this is not the 
only possible contrarian position. Bhogal suggests a similar view, where the 
grounding relations can be used to distinguish laws from accidents.98 Take the 
accidental regularities to be grounded in the local facts as normal. The classic 
generalisation ‘everyone in this room is a philosopher’ is an example of this. It holds 
because of the philosophical status of each person in the room, where ‘because’ is 
understood to indicate a grounding fact. (We might note that taking grounding to 
run in the opposite direction seems mistaken: it is not the case that everyone in the 
room is a philosopher because of the regularity. Not with the same sense of ‘because’ 
at any rate.) 
The laws are then distinguishable from the accidents by virtue of not being grounded 
in their instances. Bhogal’s example here is of the law that 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎, which he does 
not see as grounded in local facts in the same way that the accidental regularities 
are. While accidents are grounded in their instances, instances of laws are grounded 
in the laws. In support of this disunified treatment of generalisations, we could point 
to the fact that laws and accidents are commonly taken to play different roles when 
we are dealing with, say, explanations or counterfactuals. 
That said, I take Bhogal’s claim that this is motivated by how we ordinarily conceive 
of laws and grounding to be rather shaky. It is true that 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 does not 
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immediately seem to be grounded in its instances in the obvious way that everyone 
in the room being a philosopher is. But much of that might be in the presentation. 
Consider instead the generalisation that all objects accelerate proportionally to the 
net force they are experiencing and inversely proportionally to their own mass. It is 
far less clear to me that there is a relevant distinction in grounding between that 
statement of the regularity and the statement of the accidental one. More forcefully, 
recall Lange’s example of the law that all sodium salts burn with a yellow flame. It is 
not immediately apparent to me that this ought to be grounded differently to the 
one concerning the room of philosophers. 
Such concerns suggest that the motivation for the view is not as clear-cut as we 
might like. But that alone is not enough to rule it out. Theoretical virtue might tell in 
its favour. Solving the explanatory circle problem for Humeanism would be a mark 
in its favour. In common with Maudlin’s primitivism, it also does not seek to 
understand fundamental laws in terms of anything else.99 This brings it closer to 
scientific practice, where physicists do not typically look for reductions of laws that 
they take to be fundamental. Having a view on some part of science be closely 
aligned to scientific practice is also plausibly a virtue.100 
This is a more straightforward conception of the grounding relationship between 
laws and local facts than Miller’s. Her contrarian does not ground the local facts in 
laws alone, but in the global facts all together. It is less clear whether this is an 
advantage or not. Both are consistent with the Humean desire to have the laws 
supervene on the local facts. Both seek to avoid the explanatory circle argument by 
undermining the second premise: since laws are not metaphysically explained by 
their instances, having them scientifically explain their instances does not create any 
form of explanatory circle. Whether a contrarian favours Miller’s or Bhogal’s version 
of the view will depend on whether that contrarian finds it plausible for the local 
facts to be grounded in the laws alone. For my part, I have no view on the matter. 
                                                     
99 Maudlin (2007a). 
100 Of course, the willingness of Humeans to reject what scientists say when they talk – 
perhaps unreflectively – of governance or constraint suggests that Humeans do not see 
being closely aligned to all of scientific practice as a great virtue. A tendency towards this 
sort of revisionism is part and parcel of the view. 
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Fortunately, this difference plays no role in the usefulness of contrarianism in the 
present debate and can be set to one side. 
Marshall also offers a suggestion in a similar spirit.101 As already indicated, Marshall 
prefers to avoid casting the debate in terms of grounding and has little use for 
Loewer’s disambiguation of explanation strategy. However, his position has a natural 
equivalent in those terms. Given that I am describing the issue in that way, I will give 
the analogous version. The crucial point here is that we can draw a distinction 
between some law and the fact that it is a law. Suppose that it is a law that all Fs are 
Gs. Then there is a difference between the law that all Fs are Gs and the fact that all 
Fs are Gs is a law. Most obviously, Humeans will take the law to be a regularity 
whereas the latter fact is not itself a regularity. Rather, the fact that all Fs are Gs is a 
law is a higher-level fact ascribing lawhood to some regularity. Hence this fact 
concerning lawhood cannot itself be a law. We might also note that it is possible for 
the regularity to hold while the lawhood fact fails to obtain: this is exactly what 
happens in the case of accidental regularities. Therefore, they cannot be the same 
thing. 
This distinction matters because of how these are both related to explanation. The 
law that all Fs are Gs can be expected to turn up in scientific explanations of worldly 
local facts, like all laws. However, Marshall claims, instances of this law – such as Ga 
– do not (metaphysically) explain the law itself. This latter claim unfortunately is not 
supported by an argument, other than to note it is not required for instances to 
explain laws. I take this to be where Marshall’s view has much in common with 
Miller’s and Bhogal’s, for it too is committed to the claim that not all regularities are 
explained by their instances (or, indeed, grounded in them). By contrast, the fact that 
all Fs are Gs is a law is explained by its instances. This is because the lawhood facts 
are determined by what the best system is, and this in turn is determined by the local 
matters of fact in the mosaic plus the particular standards used for judging which 
systematisation is the best. The explanation, then, is metaphysical. But the lawhood 
fact does not scientifically explain local matters of fact. This is because it is not 
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concerned with them. Facts ascribing lawhood to regularities are concerned with 
which universal generalisations appear in the best system. 
We might wonder why actual scientific explanations do appeal to facts about which 
regularities are laws. After all, a sensible response to the question “Why did this 
powder burn with a yellow flame?” might well mention the fact that it is a law that 
all sodium salts burn with a yellow flame. But there is a straightforward way to 
interpret this. The lawhood fact is not itself an explainer here, but it does provide 
information regarding what the real explainer is: this powder has something in 
common with other sodium salts that causes all of them to burn yellow. The 
response is a partial answer to the question that points to where the rest of the 
answer lies (the burning of the sodium salts causes a change in the energy levels of 
electrons, which is associated with the release of photons with a wavelength that we 
see as yellow).102 
So on this view the laws scientifically explain their instances while not being 
metaphysically explained by them in turn. There are also facts ascribing lawhood to 
regularities: these are metaphysically explained by the instances of the relevant law, 
but are not scientific explainers of those instances. This is not an explanatory circle, 
even granting the transitivity principle.  
On Marshall’s account, this raven’s blackness helps to explain why it is a law that all 
ravens are black. The fact that it is a law that all ravens are black requires that the all 
ravens are black regularity holds (a generalisation must be true in order to be a law). 
The truth of this regularity helps to explain why this raven is black. But while, strictly 
speaking, the circle fails to obtain, we might worry that lawhood facts are too tightly 
associated to the scientific explanations that they cannot be allowed to feature in. 
Lange gives voice to this concern: 
[W]e do not have to figure out whether the lawhood of All F’s are G helps 
to explain why it is that Ga or merely helps to explain why it is that Fa helps 
to explain why it is that Ga. The prohibition on self-explanation should be 
interpreted not only as prohibiting a fact q from helping to explain itself, 
                                                     
102 This example aligns with the treatment in both Lange (2016) and Skow (2016) pp. 139-
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but also as prohibiting q from helping to explain why (if q obtains) some 
other fact helps to explain q. Both of these are too circular to qualify as 
explanations.103 
Does the blackness of this raven help to explain why some other fact helps to explain 
the blackness of this raven? Well, it is supposed to help to explain the lawhood of all 
ravens are black. And it is explained by the relevant regularity. So the connection 
between the law and the fact of its lawhood is important. If the lawhood fact helped 
to explain the regularity then we would have a straightforward chain of explanations 
from this black raven around in a circle back to this black raven. In order to avoid 
self-explanation, Marshall is then committed to the claim that the fact that A is a law 
does not help to explain why A obtains (even though it entails that A must obtain). 
This has the advantage of getting around the updated prohibition, since it means 
that there is no single other fact that both explains the raven’s blackness and is 
explained by the raven’s blackness. 
But even if there is an explanatory gap between laws and the facts of their lawhood, 
this sort of case is clearly of the kind that Lange intends to rule out with the revised 
prohibition on self-explanation. There is some intuitive force to this: getting out on 
a technicality does not remove the suspicion that something explanatorily untoward 
is going on. But suspicions are not arguments. Lange does offer some precedent for 
widening the scope of what we count as circularity. Salmon argues that there are 
two ways for an argument to be circular.104 The first is for the conclusion to turn up 
in the premises. The second is to use a rule of inference in an argument to conclude 
that that very rule of inference is a reliable one. Similarly, Lange takes there to be 
two ways in which an explanation might be broadly circular. The first is for a fact to 
turn up in the explanation of itself. The second is for a fact to explain which some 
other fact turns up in an explanation of the first fact. 
But while there might be a structural analogy in this kind of scope widening, it is not 
clear that this suffices to justify such a move. Salmon was taking a broader view of 
what counts as unhealthy circularity in the context of inferences, and it is clear to 
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see the motivation for doing so. Both ways that he identifies are ways of assuming 
the very point at stake, albeit in different forms. That’s not what is going on in 
Marshall’s account. 
Here is another way of raising the circularity worry: how is it that the blackness of 
this raven explains the fact that it is a law that all ravens are black? Supposing that it 
does, we might wonder what exactly is being explained (taking explanation to be 
contrastive, this is to look for the relevant contrast). Perhaps it is why a certain 
regularity is a law, as opposed to a mere accidental regularity. If so, particular 
instances of black ravens look irrelevant to the explanation since both the 
explanandum and the contrast state of affairs assume that the regularity holds. The 
information relevant to this explanation concerns the Best System Account and the 
standards being used for judging if a system containing the regularity is the best. So 
the blackness of this raven does not explain the lawhood fact in that way. 
Perhaps, then, the relevant contrast is not between the regularity being a law or an 
accident but rather between the regularity obtaining or not. For a regularity to be a 
law it must first be true. So if the blackness of this raven helps to explain why the 
regularity obtains, it could plausibly be said to be involved in the explanation of the 
lawhood of that regularity. But here we have a problem. Marshall’s view is 
committed to lawful regularities (scientifically) explaining their instances. If those 
instances also (metaphysically) explain the regularities, transitivity brings us right 
back at the circle we started with. So the blackness of this raven does not explain the 
lawhood fact in that way either. 
I do not see another way in which instances of laws can explain the associated 
lawhood facts. The obvious conclusion of this is that they simply do not. We are left 
with a picture where the laws scientifically explain their instances but are not in turn 
metaphysically explained by those instances. This leaves it open as to where we 
should take there to be grounding relations. One option is that there are not any, in 
which case Marshall’s view is that of a groundless Humean. The other option is that 
the instances are grounded in the laws, making this another way of spelling out the 
contrarian position. 
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Roughly speaking, for there to be an explanatory circle there must be both 
explanation of the laws by the mosaic and explanation of the mosaic by the laws. 
Contrarian positions neatly sidestep the debate regarding the transitivity principle 
because they do not take explanations to run in both directions. Rather, the laws are 
taken to both scientifically and metaphysically explain the mosaic. Since explanation 
therefore runs in only one direction, there cannot be a circle. But such views are not 
without costs and I shall now mention the two main ones. 
The first downside to contrarianism is that it requires us to give up on otherwise 
attractive ideas regarding metaphysical explanation. It is standard (for those who 
accept the notion of grounding) to take conjunctions to be grounded in their 
conjuncts. Fine is a particularly clear example of this. To introduce the notion of 
grounding he uses the following example: the fact that the ball is red and round 
obtains in virtue of the fact that the ball is red and the fact that the ball is round.105 
The ‘in virtue of’ locution here is intended to bring grounding to mind. But on Miller’s 
presentation of the view, this does not hold. Global facts – including conjunctions of 
local facts – are not grounded in those local facts, but instead serve as grounds for 
them. The ball is red and the ball is round in virtue of the fact that the ball is both 
red and round. That is an odd consequence, as we normally take more complex facts 
to be grounded in the less complex ones rather than vice versa. However, it is not an 
unprecedented move. Schaffer’s priority monism is an excellent example of a view 
that takes the more complex to serve as an ontological foundation for the less 
complex.106 Alternatively, one might hold the view that conjunctive states of affairs 
are more fundamental than their derivative conjuncts. For example, the ball in front 
of me is both red and round. To appreciate each of these qualities individually, I need 
to ‘abstract’ away from the actual situation. Ultimately, it is the ball (which is both 
red and round) that grounds the truth of various ball-concerned propositions. 
Someone with such a view might well claim that it is only the influence of logical 
atomism that inclines us to think that the ball’s being red is more fundamental than 
the ball’s being red and round. 
                                                     
105 Fine (2012) p. 37. 
106 Schaffer (2010a) and (2010b). 
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Similar things regarding grounding need to be said about the relationship between 
universal generalisations and their instances. A standard approach to this is to take 
the generalisations to be grounded in their instances. As Bhogal notes, this might not 
be the whole story.107 Take two worlds, both of which contain ten entities that are 
both Fs and Gs. There is nothing else in the first world and so the generalisation that 
all Fs are Gs is true. It cannot be grounded solely in those ten entities, however, as 
the second world contains a further entity which is F but not G. If the generalisation 
were grounded in the ten entities alone, then it would also be true in the second 
world since those ten entities are present there too. But, obviously, it is not true in 
the second world. So generalisations cannot be grounded in only their instances. 
Now a Humean willing to accept modal realism might well object at this point that it 
is not true that the same ten entities are present at both worlds. Worldly entities 
exist at one world and one world only. The second world does not have the same ten 
entities as the first, although it might well have counterparts to the original ten. But 
then this is no counterexample to generalisations being grounded in their instances 
since we do not have a situation where both worlds have the same grounds but 
different grounded facts. 
That said, there is something to the point Bhogal makes that is not answered by that 
response. Even if we accept modal realism, something remains unexplained: why is 
it that the counterpart entities do not ground the generalisation? Counterparts often 
end up having rather different properties and grounding very different facts: after a 
period of bloody warfare, one of my counterparts becomes ruler of a new British 
Empire and in doing so grounds many different facts to those that I actually ground. 
But in this case the counterparts seem sufficiently similar to the originals (by 
stipulation they have the same relevant properties!) that pointing this out does not 
help. The most obvious way to explain why the generalisation is true in the first world 
but not the second is to appeal to totality facts. Crucially for this discussion, totality 
facts are not instances of generalisations like all Fs are Gs. 
                                                     
107 Bhogal (2016) p. 9. 
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However, if the laws are to ground the local mosaic facts, then merely showing they 
are not grounded in their instances alone is not enough. Nothing in the above story 
indicates that generalisations are not partially grounded in their instances. 
Concluding that either there are no relevant grounding relations here or that 
grounding runs in the opposite direction to what we normally assume is too much. 
As we have already seen previously, Bhogal takes there to be independent reason to 
think that laws like Newton’s second law of motion are not grounded in their 
instances. Such a position is not obviously false and there is no contradiction involved 
in accepting it. But – again, as already noted – I do not find it clear that grounding 
runs in the direction that contrarians favour in such cases. Humeans who share my 
uncertainty will see this commitment as being insufficiently motivated. 
Lurking behind all this discussion is the most significant issue with this response to 
the explanatory circle. The clue, really, is in the name. So far I have used Miller’s 
terminology and called the view contrarian Humeanism. But Bhogal’s view is very 
similar in the crucial respects, and he favours calling it minimal anti-Humeanism.108 
A rose may smell sweet no matter its name, but this particular disagreement over 
names is a bit more worrying: it points to disagreement over exactly what 
Humeanism is about. Let us follow Bhogal in distinguishing between three different 
ways to characterise the Humean claim.109 These are supervenience, necessary 
connections and dependence. 
First the supervenience interpretation. Here the core idea is that modal facts, 
including laws, must supervene on a base of occurrent facts. As we have already 
seen, Miller favours this approach and identifies it with certain passages in Lewis’ 
work. Since this supervenience thesis is a claim about covariation alone, it is 
compatible with different claims regarding the more metaphysically-laden notion of 
grounding. That is, the supervenience of modal facts on occurrent ones does not 
mean that the former must be grounded in the latter. It is also compatible with the 
local facts being grounded in the laws, or there being no relevant grounding relations 
                                                     
108 Marshall, by way of contrast, does not offer a name. This is because he takes his 
suggestion to be the natural response for Humeans generally. 
109 Bhogal (2016) pp. 11-13. 
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at all (as in the case of groundless Humeanism mentioned earlier). If one accepts this 
characterisation of Humeanism, then the contrarian position genuinely counts as 
Humean despite its unorthodox commitments. 
The problem with this first interpretation is not so much that it cannot be true, but 
rather that it misses what many take to be the motivation to be Humean at all. This 
point was raised as an issue for the groundless defence as well: those attracted to 
Humeanism through a love of sparse desert landscapes and an uneasiness towards 
metaphysically powerful entities (such as irreducible dispositions) have something 
stronger than this claim in mind. For nothing in the supervenience claim says that 
there are no fundamental modal facts, only that there cannot be a change in them 
without also being a change in the occurrent facts. 
The second way to capture Humeanism is to deny that there are any necessary 
connections in the world. Or, at least, there are not any between distinct existents. 
This does a better job of expressing the negative claim that Humeans make. There is 
nothing preventing this part of the mosaic from being independent of that part. 
Dispositions, for example, get ruled out on account of the link between a disposition 
and its manifestation.110 While Bhogal favours the third characterisation, he does 
note that the view will count as Humean in this second sense. Necessary connections 
are only banned if they hold between distinct existents. If the local facts are 
grounded in the laws, then they are not existents distinct from those laws (this is 
presumably the sense in which grounded facts are nothing over and above grounding 
facts). 
One might worry that something of a trick has been pulled here. Humeanism 
regarding laws is often contrasted with anti-Humean pictures where the laws are 
taken to be metaphysically productive in some sense. Metaphorically speaking, God 
could set down the laws for the world, then arrange some physical stuff for the laws 
                                                     
110 Of course, this is not to say that a substance disposed to dissolve in water must do so in 
all circumstances. We would not expect it to dissolve in an already saturated sample of 
water, for example. So perhaps it is more that it would dissolve in ideal circumstances, with 
no blockers present. But even that hedged amount of necessitation is uncomfortable for 
Humeans. 
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to govern and finally sit back at watch the events unfold.111 But the metaphor for the 
current account looks rather similar: God sets down the laws for the world, the 
physical stuff comes along as an ontological free lunch and God is once more able to 
sit back and watch (this metaphor is suspiciously silent on the fact that the laws 
underdetermine the physical events). What happened to the idea that physical 
events occur and the laws are mere descriptions of them? 
One response to this might be to question whether grounded facts are really nothing 
over and above the grounding ones. Another, more radical response, is to deny that 
there are any necessary connections between existents at all, distinct or not. But 
there is a simpler solution: this is just an impoverished characterisation of 
Humeanism. It lacks serious commitment to something like the underlying mosaic: 
in writing an inventory of the world’s entities, we need only write down those in the 
mosaic since everything else ‘comes for free’. This is the dependence approach, 
although it might equally be called the grounding approach, and it more closely 
captures the orthodox Humean’s position. The idea is that there is a base of local 
occurrent facts and all the modal ones are grounded in this (as opposed to merely 
supervening upon it). We might go further, of course, and distinguish between 
fundamental and non-fundamental occurrent facts. Then we could require that the 
non-fundamental ones be grounded in the base as well. But the distinction is not 
important for present purposes. On this characterisation, contrarians will not be 
counted as genuine Humeans. Neither will groundless Humeans, as both positions 
fail to ground the laws in the local occurrent facts. 
Whether one takes the contrarian route to be a viable response to the explanatory 
circle argument depends on how strong a version of Humeanism one is committed 
to. On a minimal characterisation concerned only with supervenience, contrarianism 
is a viable option. More would need to be said by the defender of such view regarding 
why the groundless variant is not sufficient for their purposes. For my part, I see little 
advantage to introducing non-standard grounding relations if all one cares about is 
supervenience. Those Humeans who favour a stronger characterisation, where there 
                                                     
111 Beebee (2000) nicely covers the God metaphor when discussing the nature of laws. 
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is a real sense in which everything is based on the underlying mosaic, must reject the 
contrarian route. This is unsurprising: if one’s view is committed to grounding 
relations running in a certain direction, then one cannot defend this view by claiming 
that the grounding relations run in the opposite direction! 
 
2.7 Is transitivity motivated? 
If we set aside the contrarian route, are we then committed to the circularity 
argument’s undesirable conclusion? Not immediately, for we might still have 
concerns about the transitivity principle. Earlier we saw that drawing a distinction 
between metaphysical and scientific explanations does little to avoid the principle, 
since it is possible to give a revised principle that takes that distinction into account: 
the worry now is that the mosaic will scientifically explain itself. We also looked at 
two unwanted consequences that it might be thought to entail. The first was 
implying the reduction of all higher-level explanations to those of physics, the second 
was getting the wrong results in cases of multiple realisability. The former worry is 
not a problem since the principle does not claim that there are no higher-level 
explanations or that they cannot make an explanatory contribution beyond that 
provided by lower-level explanations. The latter worry was responded to by noting 
the contrastive nature of explanation: once this has been acknowledged the 
principle does get the right results for multiply realisable cases. 
So much for the uncontroversial cases: the transitivity principle gets the expected 
results in those. But the reduction of scientific laws to patterns in the mosaic is not 
an easy uncontroversial case. If anti-Humeans wish to apply the principle to this case, 
they must ensure that it has been sufficiently well-motivated. Whether it has been 
depends very much on how close the motivating examples are to the case we are 
particularly interested in. If the examples are analogous to the Humean reduction of 
laws then that would be good reason to think that transitivity holds. If there is a 
significant enough disanalogy, it becomes far less clear that Humeans ought to 
accept transitivity. The concern examined in this section is that there is an important 
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difference between the cases looked at so far and the case that the argument applies 
the principle to.112 
In order to assess whether there is a close analogy between the motivating examples 
and the Humean reduction of laws, we first need to know what those examples are. 
So what are the examples taken to motivate the principle? Here is a brief statement 
of a sample of them. An object falls over because its centre of mass is not over its 
base of support; its centre of mass is grounded in the masses and locations of its 
parts. A balloon expands because the pressure inside the balloon is greater than the 
external atmospheric pressure; the internal pressure is grounded in the forces with 
which the gas molecules collide with the balloon’s walls. The temperature of the 
room has some value because of the state it was in ten minutes ago; the (relevant) 
state it was in ten minutes ago was grounded in the energy the particles in the room 
had. In each of these cases a scientific explanation is given (an explanation from 
physics, although that does not seem to be a requirement), grounds for the scientific 
explanans found and then a new scientific explanation using those grounds as the 
new explanans is offered. And in each of those cases the new scientific explanation 
is a plausible one: transitivity is getting the right results! 
There are also a couple of examples taken from the philosophy of science literature 
that do not follow that pattern but where an assumption of transitivity is still clearly 
in play. Random genetic drift explains why the frequency of a trait in a population 
does not match its expectation value. But the drift cannot just be that departure 
from the expectation value, for it would then explain itself. Fitness differences 
between two groups explains why one group has a greater average number of 
offspring. But then those fitness differences cannot be defined in terms of the 
average number of offspring, for then the fitness differences would explain 
themselves. The chance of this coin landing heads explains the frequency with which 
it lands heads. But the chance cannot just be the actual frequency of heads, for then 
the frequency would explain itself. 
                                                     
112 This line of objection was first raised to me by Steven French in discussion. 
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We have already encountered the example drawn from fitness differences and 
noticed the disanalogy to the case at hand: the Humean account of laws is not one 
concerned with definitions. Let us therefore set this example aside. Of the remaining 
examples, the one concerned with frequency and chance is of a different kind to the 
others. It has more in common with Humean claims about laws. Because of how 
close it is to the case we ultimately care about, I will delay discussion of it until the 
more numerous examples have been dealt with. 
Let us now consider those examples. All of them have something important in 
common: the grounds appealed to in the new scientific explanations are what we 
might call ‘scientifically respectable’ entities. They are, in short, the sorts of things 
that scientists might take themselves to be studying. Take the example of the 
expanding balloon as representative of this. The expansion of the balloon is partially 
explained by the balloon’s internal pressure. This internal pressure is grounded in 
the forces generated by the molecules of the gas inside the balloon when they collide 
with the walls of the balloon. Both the interior pressure and the forces exerted by 
the gas molecules are studied by scientists. There is a branch of physics – kinetic 
theory – that is concerned with the relationship between the two. What the balloon 
example provides is support for the claim that transitivity holds when both of the 
relata in the grounding relation are scientifically respectable. The other examples 
function in exactly the same way. When both the initial explanans and the entities it 
is grounded in are studied by scientists, it is reasonable to think that the grounding 
entities can function as the explanantia in a scientific explanation of the explananda. 
The grounded entities exist in virtue of the grounding ones, so one might take it as 
completely unsurprising that the grounding entities are able to play the same roles 
as that which they constitute. 
However, the Humean account of laws is not like this. The laws are just the 
regularities recognised by the best systematisation of facts regarding the mosaic. 
They are grounded in the local matters of fact across spacetime. But while the laws 
of nature might be scientifically respectable, their grounds are not. Or, at least, they 
aren’t in any genuinely revealing sense. To see the difference, consider the 
difference between discovering that pressure is not grounded in the motion of gas 
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molecules to discovering that laws are not grounded in the way Humeanism 
envisages. The former discovery would call kinetic theory into doubt and require an 
explanation of why certain experiments give the results that they do. We would 
expect to see a new branch of physics emerge that incorporates the successful 
elements of kinetic theory while explaining gas pressures in some other way. The 
second discovery would spark no such scientific revolution (although it would very 
likely generate a good deal of philosophical interest into how exactly such a 
metaphysical claim has been discovered to be false). Philosophers of science would 
have to adopt other views of laws – perhaps taking them as primitives – but science 
and the practices of scientists would remain unchanged. 
While (most of) the examples taken to motivate the transitivity principle may not 
have appealed to metaphysical accounts, a defender of the principle might still 
expect it to hold when they are involved. Absent any opposing argument, it is not 
unreasonable to think that if scientific explanatoriness is transitive over some 
grounding relations then it might also be transitive over others. That said, there is 
reason to think that the kinds of metaphysical claims that we are interested in are 
different enough from the scientific claims of the examples that we should not make 
that assumption. 
Let us take a more neutral example of a distinctly metaphysical claim to illustrate the 
point. Bundle theorists take objects to be nothing more than bundles of properties 
(perhaps including relations, or alternatively tropes). Substance theorists take the 
directly opposing view that there is something more to objects than the properties 
they have. This ‘something more’ is some sort of bare substance. The entities 
appealed to by these accounts, be they collections of properties or substances in 
which those properties inhere, are not scientifically respectable entities. No scientific 
theory appeals to the fact that there is an underlying substance to the objects it is 
concerned with. It would be a mistake to try to scientifically explain some 
phenomenon by appealing to one of those accounts rather than the other. The 
forces exerted by the gas molecules in the balloon example are partially grounded in 
what those gas molecules are. If one is a substance theorist, then one will take each 
of the gas molecules to ultimately be grounded in a bare substance. But the fact that 
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there are bare substances with various trajectories is no scientific explanation of the 
balloon’s expansion. 
It is a distinctive feature of these sorts of metaphysical claims that they are 
underdetermined by the scientific evidence.113 Of course, it is not only purely 
metaphysical claims that are underdetermined by the available empirical data. 
Underdetermination of scientific theories is hardly a new issue in the philosophical 
literature. But there is a significant difference between a scientific theory being 
underdetermined by the current evidence that we have managed to gather and the 
underdetermination at play when it comes to metaphysical claims. 
Underdetermination in the latter case is of an in-principle kind. While we might have 
no way of deciding between two current scientific theories, we can remain optimistic 
that we will eventually have evidence in favour of one rather than the other. No such 
hope exists for metaphysical claims like bundle theory since both it and substance 
theory are empirically equivalent (trivially so, since neither makes any empirically 
testable claims). 
This underdetermination of metaphysical accounts makes them unsuitable to play 
roles in scientific explanations. Since they are compatible with all physically possible 
states of affairs, they cannot be appealed to in order to explain why this state of 
affairs came about as opposed to another. It is difficult to see how they play any role 
in scientific explanations given that they are not difference-makers to those 
explanations. Whether a putative explanation is genuinely scientifically explanatory 
does not seem to depend on what the underlying metaphysical account of the 
matter is. So those metaphysical claims cannot be doing any scientifically 
explanatory work on account of their irrelevance to the explanation. 
In making this claim, we respond to a challenge raised by Bhogal.114 We have reason 
to think that there are cases where transitivity holds, such as in the balloon example 
as given. So if Humeans wish to argue that the transitivity principle fails, they need 
                                                     
113 One might take the tension between Humean Supervenience and quantum physics as a 
counterexample to that claim. But, as the first chapter indicated, it is no straightforward 
matter to show that the former has been refuted. 
114 Bhogal (2016) p. 3. 
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to explain why there are cases where chaining a scientific explanation to a grounding 
claim generates a new scientific explanation. What has just been said goes some way 
towards meeting that challenge. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate 
applications of this chaining is in the relata of the grounding relation. Where a 
scientifically respectable entity is grounded in another scientifically respectable 
entity, we should expect for scientific explanations to be transitive over that 
grounding relation. If it is instead grounded in a distinctly metaphysical entity, then 
we have no good reason to expect transitivity to hold. This is not a full response to 
Bhogal’s challenge, as meeting that would require spelling out how we can tell 
whether an entity is scientifically respectable or not. But it does go some way 
towards indicating why there are legitimate and illegitimate cases of chaining. 
So far so good, but so far we have only dealt with the first group of motivating 
examples – those in which grounding relates scientifically studied entities to other 
scientifically studied entities. There is also the example of the relationship between 
chance and frequency. This example is taken from Hájek; the relevant section is given 
below: 
We posit chances in order to explain the stability of these relative 
frequencies. But there is no explaining to be done if chance just is relative 
frequency: you can’t explain something by reference to itself. Here I am 
echoing a well-known argument due to Armstrong (1979) against the ‘naïve 
regularity theory’ of lawhood (that laws are simply true universal 
generalizations). Compare: we posit laws of nature in order to explain 
regularities, so they had better not simply be those regularities, as a naïve 
regularity theory of lawhood would have it.115 
In this passage, Hájek could be read as arguing against the view that chance is 
identical to frequency, rather than arguing against the view that chance is grounded 
in frequency. Doing so would not provide any motivation to accept the transitivity 
principle as the principle links at least two distinct entities to one another.116 But if 
chances and frequencies are identical to one another, then we do not have two 
                                                     
115 Hájek (1996) pp. 79-80, italics in original. 
116 Setting aside trivial cases. The principle is compatible with self-grounding, self-explaining 
entities as it merely spits out the rather redundant result that such entities will explain 
themselves. Whether there are any such entities is unimportant, for they would be 
insufficient to motivate the transitivity principle. 
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distinct entities. Nor would it make any sense to attempt to explain one in terms of 
the other if they were identical.  
Let us set that interpretation aside. The example is specifically intended to mirror 
the reasoning used in the explanatory circle argument although, as we have seen, 
the argument can be raised against more than just naïve regularity theories. The 
chances are grounded in the frequencies while explaining them in the much the 
same way that Humean laws are grounded in the mosaic while explaining it (granting 
that it cannot be exactly the same way as the frequentism Hájek is arguing against 
makes no appeal to anything like the best system). But this makes the motivation 
from this example far too closely intertwined with the fate of the Humean account 
of laws. Hájek’s argument here is explicitly intended to piggyback on the argument 
against regularity theories of lawhood. The form of the argument is the same in both 
cases: both need to appeal to the transitivity principle. If one is in a position from 
which Hájek’s argument appears sound, then one has already accepted the principle 
under discussion. In that case, there is no need to look for motivation for it! In short, 
the argument against frequentism will look like good reason to accept the transitivity 
principle to those who already do. On the other hand, to those harbouring doubts 
about the principle, this will not provide any independent reason to accept it. 
(Frequentism, of course, may run afoul of one of the other fourteen arguments that 
Hájek raises against it.) 
 
2.8 Explanatory pluralism 
Let us begin by noting that someone could object to my treatment of Hájek’s 
example at the end of the previous section. Such an objection might well appeal to 
a feeling of unsatisfactoriness experienced when considering the explanation being 
offered by the frequentist. It just does not seem to be a good explanation, and this 
intuition may well support taking the example in the spirit Lange intended. That is, 
in an example explicitly designed to mirror the argument against regularity theories, 
the proposed explanation strikes us as being a very bad one. The most natural 
conclusion here is that this is because it is a case of self-explanation. So the 
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transitivity principle holds for these kinds of examples as well as for those that 
involve scientific entities in a more obvious way. Hence we have good reason to 
appeal to the transitivity principle when arguing against the Humean account. 
One response to that is to follow Lange and other anti-Humeans in rejecting 
regularity accounts of laws. But another is to suggest that the problem here lies in 
the explanation, not the view of laws. Putting the point more directly, none of the 
responses so far have questioned the circularity argument’s third premise: the 
natural laws scientifically explain their instances. Without this, there cannot be an 
explanatory circle as the relevant explanations would run in one direction only. That 
this premise has so far received a free pass is likely because it seems to be a 
commonsensical claim. If I were to explain why my pen falls to the ground when I 
drop it, I might well appeal to Newtonian mechanics and, in particular, the laws of 
motion. There is nothing unusual about this sort of example; we can multiply cases 
easily. 
This is not the place to develop a full account of what scientific explanation involves: 
the sheer variety of different views in the literature suggests that adding one more 
will not resolve the problem. Those who have responded to the explanatory circle 
argument have also avoided filling in the details of what they take scientific 
explanation to involve, likely in an effort to remain neutral. But there is something 
that we can say about the strength of the explanation involved: it is stronger than 
Humeans should be comfortable with. This can be most clearly seen in the quotation 
from Lange at the beginning of the chapter: 
In short, if the Humean mosaic is responsible for making certain facts qualify 
as laws, then the facts about what the laws are cannot be responsible for 
features of the mosaic.117 
The first sort of responsibility is understandable: this is the sort of responsibility that 
accompanies the grounding relation. The laws are what they are in virtue of the 
mosaic. But the second mention of responsibility is rather odd. On the Humean view, 
laws are mere descriptions. They do not govern or constrain or make anything 
                                                     
117 Lange (2013) p. 256, italics added for emphasis. 
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happen. Of course they are not responsible for the mosaic; Humean laws are not 
responsible for anything! Nor is anything responsible for the mosaic. There is nothing 
that forces it to be a certain way, as adding some such thing to the account would 
reintroduce the necessary connections that were dropped to begin with. In slogan 
form: things just happen, it turns out they can be described systematically. 
Following on from that, the second part of Lange’s quote might come as something 
of a surprise to Humeans in a certain frame of mind. It is picking out a core 
commitment of the view, that the relationship between the mosaic and the laws is 
bottom-up. However, here it is being taken to express an objection: that the laws are 
not responsible for the mosaic is supposed to be a problem for the view. Perhaps the 
lack of responsibility that laws show is an unattractive feature of the account for its 
detractors. But that in itself is not a strong objection, especially when Humeans find 
the notion of responsible laws mysterious. 
A belligerent Humean might wish to stop there. The problem with the explanatory 
circle argument is that it assumes that laws can scientifically explain their instances. 
Since explanation here is being meant in a strong sense, such a Humean does not 
take laws to be capable of doing that. Once the third premise has been rejected the 
argument fails since there is no self-explanation going on. I describe such a Humean 
as belligerent because of the bullet that needs to be bitten here. That laws can help 
to explain the world’s phenomena is a common assumption. It is involved in my 
appealing to the laws of Newtonian mechanics to explain the falling of my pen. It is 
involved in rather more sophisticated descriptions of how various systems evolve 
offered by practicing scientists. Denying the third premise both blocks the circularity 
argument and fits in nicely with the Humean conception of the role that laws play. 
But it comes at a great price, for this denial stands in conflict with both a 
commonsense belief about laws and how scientists are wont to use them. Perhaps 
the conflict with the folk usage can be explained away. After all, governance is 
commonly associated with laws but Humeans are committed to denying that they 
play that role. A revisionary approach towards a conceptually unclear area like the 
everyday conception of laws is no great sin. But the ascription of error to working 
scientists is not so easily dealt with. One of the main motivations for adopting a 
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Humean view is a respect for science and a suspicion of claims that science cannot 
grasp the nature of the world without some form of metaphysically weighty 
supplementation.118 To claim that scientists are misusing laws and should revise this 
usage on metaphysical grounds is, at the very least, in tension with this motivation. 
A Humean unwilling to take such a belligerent stance will not want to say that laws 
cannot explain their instances. But that is not to say that the explanatory circle 
argument goes through. Why think that the kind of explanation appealed to in the 
argument is the kind of explanation that Humean laws can provide? In other words, 
if anti-Humeans like Lange are appealing to a strong or ‘thick’ form of explanation in 
their objection, then it is open to Humeans to rescue the explanatory role of laws by 
appealing to a ‘thinner’ form of explanation. Taking this route requires rejecting a 
kind of dogmatism concerning scientific explanation, one that claims all scientific 
explanations are of the same kind. Putative explanations are intended to increase 
our understanding of the phenomena or help us to make sense of some aspect of 
the world.119 If this is the aim of explanations then there are different ways in which 
explanations might be employed to achieve this aim. 
In explaining some phenomenon, there are various kinds of explanation that I might 
offer. I could tell you what the phenomenon consists in. This rock is both heavy and 
hard because it is made of granite. Your window is shattered because the 
components of the window are disconnected from one another. I might instead offer 
some kind of causal story to inform you how the phenomenon was brought about. 
The rock has these properties because it was formed through the crystallisation of 
magma several thousand years ago. Your window is in its current state because Suzy 
threw said rock through it. I might alternatively give you reason to expect this 
phenomenon by fitting it into a more general pattern. It is no surprise that this 
granite rock is hard and heavy since all granite rocks have such properties. Your 
window is broken because every house on your street had a window broken last 
night. These ways in which explanations can differ is intended to be illustrative rather 
                                                     
118 This is particularly clear in Lewis (1994a) p. 474. 
119 This point is made by de Regt and Dieks (2005) and de Regt (2009). See also Hempel 
(1965) for a well-known rejection of the role of understanding in explanations. 
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than exhaustive. There are other kinds of explanation too. For example, the breaking 
of your window might be explained by referring to intentions or mental states: Suzy 
bears you a grudge. 
Which kind of explanation is relevant to the question being asked is context-
sensitive. Upon discovering that your window is broken it is unlikely that you will 
respond by querying what it is for a window to be in a broken state. You already 
understand that, so my offering such an explanation would miss the point of the 
question. What you are probably hoping for is the causal story. But some questions 
are more ambiguous. If you ask why the rock has the weightiness that it has, it might 
not be immediately clear whether you are inquiring into its constitution or its causal 
history. But just because one kind of explanation is a more relevant answer, it does 
not mean that the others fail to be explanatory. 
One might worry that not all the indicated kinds of explanation are on a par. Lange 
quotes with approval an example from Carroll where the students in a classroom 
explain their presence by pointing out that they are always present at that time.120 
For both Carroll and Lange, this is not a case of a regularity or pattern explaining its 
instances. On their view, that there is such a pattern indicates that there are other 
reasons for the students’ presence (such as their intentions). And it is these other 
reasons that are genuinely explaining why the students are in the classroom. The 
initial explanation mentions the pattern of attendance not because that pattern 
explains their presence but because it points to other reasons that do the 
explanatory work. It just happens that the explanation offered does not cite those 
other reasons directly. In a similar vein, Skow treats ‘all ravens are black’ as a 
reasonable response to being asked why this raven is black despite not taking it itself 
to be a reason why this raven is black.  Rather, that regularity is taken to provide 
information that all ravens share in some common feature that makes each of them 
black. 
There is undoubtedly something to be said for this response. There does seem to be 
a difference between fitting this phenomenon into a more general pattern and 
                                                     
120 Lange (2016). The example is drawn from Carroll (1999) p. 79. 
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providing the mechanisms by which it was brought about. But that alone does not 
indicate that the pattern-based explanation fails to be explanatory. One can gain 
understanding in different ways. Much of the intuitive force behind the claims made 
by Carroll, Lange and Skow could well be because we are aware that alternative kinds 
of explanation are available. As the case of the broken window indicates, we are 
inclined to prefer causal histories to pattern recognition when it comes to 
explanations. Perhaps the causal story is better at providing the understanding that 
we seek. But the existence of a stronger form of explanation does not mean that 
weaker kinds of explanation are either not explanatory or only derive their 
explanatoriness from the stronger kinds. We are not required to say that Carroll’s 
students failed to provide an explanation for their presence because there were 
alternative stronger explanations that they could have offered. Going further, there 
are cases where the recognition of a pattern provides a different kind of 
understanding to one, say, based on causal mechanisms. The smashing of your 
window is one such example. By drawing your smashed window into the wider case 
of your street’s smashed windows, I can provide you with a different understanding 
of the situation than if I had told you about Suzy throwing that rock. Explanation via 
patterns may often be thought of as a weaker form of explanation, but it is not a 
strictly inferior one. 
Returning to the Humean account of laws, this provides a way to avoid ascribing 
widespread error to working scientists. The explanation Humeans can provide of the 
laws is a constitutive one: the laws are grounded in the patterns that occur in the 
mosaic. The explanation of the mosaic via the laws cannot be one in which the laws 
are taken to have any responsibility of the goings-on in the world. Rather, the 
explanations that invoke the laws are explanations in the form of pattern 
recognition. If I say that my pen falls because of gravity, I am pointing out that 
massive objects show a general pattern: they move towards one another. As my pen 
has mass, it is just another instance of this pattern. I have not attempted to identify 
something that acts on my pen to ensure that it moves downwards. Nor have I tried 
to why there is such a general pattern (that would presumably be an attempt to find 
a deeper reason that Lange takes appeals to regularities to be pointing towards). In 
fact, I had better not try to do this if I am a Humean! Ultimately, there is no deep 
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reason why the world is one with this pattern of events as opposed to another one. 
For Humeans, there simply is no explanation of that kind of the mosaic. 
The explanatory circle argument as raised in the literature has too strong a sense of 
explanation in mind. Humeans who adopt a wider meaning of ‘explanation’ can say 
that laws are genuinely involved in explanations without running afoul of it. But 
there is an obvious objection to dismissing it on those grounds. Notions like 
responsibility were used to introduce the argument, but they are not central to it. If 
the argument’s third premise also includes forms of explanation like pattern 
recognition, Humeans still have a problem on their hands. 
That move might be obvious, but it causes another issue: transitivity once more. 
Setting aside the concerns raised in the previous section, the transitivity principle 
has some plausibility when we think of explanations as offering causal information. 
If E brings about F, and E is really just made up from D, then it is not unreasonable to 
think that D brings about F. That kind of neat story is not available when it is patterns 
that we are interested in. Suppose that E explains F by treating it as part of some 
wider pattern and that E is grounded in D. There is nothing to guarantee that D will 
be able to explain F in the same way that E does. If D is some lower-level fact, it might 
be so different in kind to the higher-level facts involved in the pattern that it will fail 
to unify F with them.121 
We began this chapter by formalising a common objection to regularity accounts of 
law based on their claimed failure to provide explanations. While Loewer’s 
distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations failed to resolve the 
issue, it did help to clarify exactly what was being appealed to in the debate. From 
here, three options are open to Humeans wishing to escape the circle. First, they 
might take an unconventional stance on the grounding relations involved so that 
explanation is one-way only. Second, they might complain that we have not yet been 
given sufficient motivation to accept the transitivity principle at the heart of the 
                                                     
121 This stops short of advocating that Humeans adopt a unificationist account of scientific 
explanation. The pluralist account suggested does not need to treat every scientific 
explanation as an attempt at unification. See Kitcher (1989) for an overview of the 
unificationist position. See Sober (1999) for some issues. 
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argument. Third, they might take themselves to be offering a different kind of 
explanation to the one looked for by anti-Humeans. I favour the third option, as I 
think that it best illustrates the fact that explanations of the mosaic cannot be 
identifying things responsible for it while still being Humean explanations. That said, 
this is a defeasible reason and any Humean unwilling to adopt the pluralistic stance 
indicated might instead focus on one of the other two lines of response. 
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Chapter 3 Symmetries as metalaws 
 
Now that we have the Humean account of laws in place and have seen how it can be 
connected to explanations, we turn to a different line of modification. Instead of 
seeking to tweak the Best System Account further, we now look to build upon it. 
Happily, there is a clear source of motivation for this. Lewis’ regularity account is 
primarily concerned with physics, and capturing the laws that physicists refer to. 
However, modern physics deals not only in laws but also in symmetries or 
invariances. As will be explained, these are taken to have a connection to the laws, 
yet the Best System Account says nothing about them. This chapter is influenced by 
Marc Lange’s understanding of symmetry principles as second-order laws that hold 
of first-order laws. The natural way to capture this in the Humean framework is to 
extend the best system account to include systems that systematise important 
regularities in the laws. To show that this proposal does in fact fit nicely with the 
approach to laws, I go on to consider whether the roles played by the second-order 
best system are analogous to those played by the first-order best system. After 
concluding that they are, I introduce two objections to this treatment, courtesy of 
Lange. While the first rests on anti-Humean presuppositions, I conclude that the 
second is a problem even on Humean terms.  
 
3.1 Introducing invariance 
If I pick up a rock, hold it in my hand and then release it, it will fall to the ground. If 
instead of performing that sequence of actions today, I do them tomorrow, then the 
rock will still fall to the ground in the same way. If, 500 years from now, one of our 
robot overlords does those actions, the rock will still fall to the ground. It does not 
matter where I stand before releasing the rock. The rock will move in the same way 
regardless of whether I stand here or at the end of the street. Even moving 
somewhere more exotic will not change that; a rock released on the surface of Mars 
will still fall towards the (Martian) ground. This may not be a motion towards the 
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surface of Earth as in the previous cases, but it still fits the general pattern. Objects 
with mass experience forces attracting them to one another in a predictable way 
formalised by Newtonian mechanics (of course there are certain limits to this, I am 
ignoring General Relativity for expositional convenience). 
None of that will come as a surprise. It is a familiar thought that objects move in the 
same sort of way no matter where or when they happen to be. As Wigner noted, the 
spatiotemporal invariance of laws looks to be a requirement on our being able to 
discover them.122 After all, if there was no reason to think that experiments 
performed at different times would get the same results, then experiments would 
no longer be repeatable. There would be no way to disconfirm someone’s claims, 
since the conditions under which I perform an experiment might fit into a different 
regularity to the conditions under which you perform your experiment. Further, if 
there was enough spatiotemporal variation of the laws then there would be little 
point in attempting any form of ordered investigation into the nature of the world. 
If we did not believe that there were universal patterns to be discovered, there 
would be little point in developing any kind of scientific method. 
The modern notion of a symmetry is a development of a concept that has been in 
use for a very long time. Informally, we might say that something possesses a 
symmetry if it remains unchanged by a certain action. A classic example would be of 
a square. Rotating a square through an angle that is a multiple of 90° leaves the 
square the same as it was pre-rotation. Similarly, reflecting the square either through 
one of its centre lines or one of its diagonals will not affect it. These eight 
transformations that do not affect the square are referred to as its symmetries. That 
they form a mathematical group leads to the modern definition: something 
possesses a symmetry when it is invariant under a certain group of transformations. 
The generality of this definition means that it is not just physical objects that can 
have symmetries. Laws too can exhibit symmetries when they remain unchanged 
under some transformation. The laws of Newtonian mechanics are invariant under 
                                                     
122 Wigner (1949) makes this point. Brading and Castellani’s introduction to their (2003) also 
mentions that this is sometimes seen as a prerequisite to describe the world by modern 
science. 
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spatial and temporal translations as we have just rehearsed. These two are not the 
only spacetime symmetries. For example, it does not matter how my rock is oriented 
in space when I release it, which is just to say that space exhibits rotational 
invariance. Nor are the laws associated with spacetime the only ones which possess 
symmetries. Consider Coulomb’s law: 
𝐹 = 𝑘
𝑞1𝑞2
𝑟2
 
Coulomb’s law claims that the force between two charged particles is proportional 
to the charges on the particles and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance between them. None of this is dependent on when the two particles exist, 
the lack of this dependence implies that Coulomb’s law is temporally invariant. 
Similarly, it is the distance between the particles that matters for the magnitude of 
the force exerted, not their absolute positions. As a spatial translation of such a 
system will not change anything about it, Coulomb’s law is also spatially invariant. 
Giving the mathematical form of Coulomb’s law makes it clear that the law is 
invariant under inversion of charges. If q1 and q2 both had their signs inverted, the 
force between the two particles would remain the same. This corresponds to the 
truth of an accompanying counterfactual: had all the charges in the world been 
inverted, there would have been no empirically discernible difference. 
Some of these symmetries are tied closely into how we normally think about laws. 
One common expectation regarding fundamental laws is that they be universal such 
that they do not hold only in one restricted area of spacetime. But while we expect 
laws to accord with this sort of symmetry, they are not conceptually required to do 
so.123 The requirement mentioned above, that their doing so is necessary for modern 
science, is an epistemic requirement. It is not an ontic one. That we need the laws to 
be spatiotemporally invariant to make an ordered investigation into the world does 
not mean that there would be no laws if this sort of invariance failed. Rather, it would 
simply be more difficult – impossible perhaps – for us to find out what they would 
be. We might be able to cope with a lack of invariance if it made a difference only in 
                                                     
123 This expectation that the laws take a certain form is a demonstration of the heuristic role 
played by symmetries. More will be said on this later. 
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extreme situations or if it manifested in a particularly ordered way, but this is an 
epistemic requirement brought about by our epistemic limitations.  
Lange gives a more concrete example of a world where not every law is invariant 
under spatial translations.124 Suppose that some world has a privileged centre and 
that every object at this world experiences a force towards this centre inversely 
proportional to the square of the separation of object and centre-point. The world 
also has a law that each object experiences this force. The law at such a world will 
not demonstrate spatial invariance. A translation of everything in that world’s space 
that leaves the forces and centre-point unchanged will result in a world where the 
associated ‘law’ is false. Since we can imagine a world in which spatial displacement 
makes a difference to the laws, invariance under spatial translation cannot be a 
conceptual requirement on laws. 
Investigation into the relationship between the world and symmetries is often not 
done from the armchair as in the case of Lange’s world with the privileged centre. 
Experimental results are expected to accord with those symmetries that we think 
hold at our world, but this does not always happen. A recent case of this was in 2011, 
when a team led by Webb published their (second) findings on fine structure 
constant variations.125 The fine structure constant, typically denoted by α, is a 
measure of the strength of electromagnetism. By analysing the light coming in from 
distant quasars, the team found indications that this ‘constant’ has a lower value in 
one direction and a higher one in the other, suggesting a spatial dipole. If the 
immediate interpretation of the results is correct, then we have evidence that the 
laws are not the same everywhere. Even if an error is found in either the experiments 
or the interpretation of the data, this is a clear indication that working scientists are 
willing to take seriously the suggestion that one of the classic spacetime symmetries 
fails. A note of caution here on just what is varying. In discussions of possible worlds 
with different laws to our own, it is common to see examples like an inverse cube 
law of gravity as opposed to an inverse square. In those cases, it is the form of the 
                                                     
124 Lange (2007) p. 461. 
125 Webb et al. (2011). 
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law that is varying (albeit to a minor degree).126 This sort of variation is not supported 
by the recent experiments. Rather, the variation they suggest is in the constants that 
occur in the laws. This is still variation, of course, but of a much more restricted kind 
to that usually seen in philosophical imagination. 
A more famous case is concerned with mirror reflection. Up until the mid-1950s, 
physicists thought that nature had no way of distinguishing between ‘right-
handedness’ or ‘left-handedness’ (more commonly referred to as ‘parity’).127 This 
was the belief that the laws of nature were symmetric under mirror reflection. We 
can define right or left relative to ourselves and our surroundings but there is no 
intrinsic difference between right and left hands.128 Hence a mirror reflection of the 
world would make no difference. A series of experiments showed that this is not the 
case for weak decay and that there is a difference between mirror reflections. At 
small enough scales, parity breaks down. It turns out that even commonsensical 
symmetries are vulnerable to empirical disconfirmation. 
The situation is somewhat more complicated than just indicated, as these things 
often are.  Parity is one of the symmetries that goes into the so-called CPT Theorem 
(corresponding, naturally, to the P). The letter C stands for charge-conjugation, the 
operation of swapping particles out for their corresponding antiparticles (in the 
quantum context, this is more impactful than the mere swapping of charge signs 
indicated earlier). Here, T is the time-reversal operation, the temporal analogue of 
P’s spatial inversion. The product of these three symmetries, the CPT-symmetry, is 
taken to imply that a mirror image of our world would evolve in the same way. While 
the C, P and T symmetries might be individually violated, the CPT-symmetry is 
currently taken by the Standard Model of particle physics to be one that holds at our 
world.129 
                                                     
126 The conservative nature of these changes is noted by McKenzie (2014). 
127 Dardo (2004) pp. 260-264. 
128 For a defence of the lack of intrinsic differences, see Pooley (2003). For commentary, see 
Huggett (2003). 
129 Coughlan and Dodd (1991) pp. 44-48. See Greaves (2010) for discussion. 
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The symmetries of interest to physics are commonly classified in some of the 
following ways.130 First there are the spacetime symmetries, examples of which we 
have already encountered. These are contrasted with the symmetries which do not 
involve spacetime (such as permutation invariance, discussed below). There are 
global symmetries such as rotation, those whose transformations can be specified in 
a time-independent way. These should be contrasted with local symmetries, those 
whose transformations are time-dependent.131 Some symmetries are continuous – 
their transformations can come in arbitrary amounts (think of the possible rotations 
of a circle; any degree of rotation leaves the circle unaffected). Other symmetries 
are discrete – the associated transformations are not continuous in this way (think 
of the possible rotations of a square; only rotations that are a multiple of 90° leave 
the square unaffected). More recently, Caulton has argued that it is useful to 
distinguish between ‘analytic’ symmetries and ‘synthetic’ ones. Only the holding of 
the latter corresponds to physical differences; the former are to be explained as 
constraints on theory interpretations.132 
Symmetries are often claimed to play particularly important roles. One of these is 
philosophical: that certain ones obtain is supposed to tell us something about the 
nature of the world. The classic example here is permutation invariance, which is 
often taken to mean that quantum particles are not individuals.133 This is typically 
introduced by way of a rough analogy. Suppose that we have two balls 
(corresponding to particles) and two boxes (the microstates that the particles can be 
in). Classically, there are four different ways to distribute the balls across the boxes: 
both in the left box, both in the right, one in each and finally the other way of putting 
one in each. Assuming that each of these distributions is equally likely, the chance of 
any one of them is 1/4. This leads to an empirical consequence: if there were some 
                                                     
130 Accessible overviews are provided by Bangu (2013) and Morrison (2008). 
131 For a discussion of why it is that time-independence has priority in this definition, see 
Wallace (2003). Earman (2003) complains that much discussion of this distinction is 
misleadingly presented. 
132 Caulton (2015). 
133 Here I draw upon French and Rickles (2003), and French and Krause (2006). The following 
discussion sets aside the issue of parastatistics. 
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process that randomly assigned balls to boxes, we would expect the frequency of 
each distribution to tend towards 1/4 as time passed. 
The classical case is straightforward enough because permuting the balls gives rise 
to new states of affairs. The quantum case is more interesting because permutation 
invariance is taken to imply that permuting balls (or, more accurately, particles) does 
not lead to a new possibility. Interchanging them produces no observable difference. 
Combinations of quantum mechanical particles have two forms of statistical 
behaviour. Bosons act according to Bose-Einstein statistics while fermions act 
according to Fermi-Dirac statistics. Relating this to the example set-up, since bosons 
can be in the same quantum state, bosonic balls can occupy the same box. On the 
other hand, Pauli’s Exclusion Principle rules out fermions from being in the same 
state. Fermionic balls, therefore, cannot reside in the same box. The difference in 
statistical behaviour is associated with a difference in the relevant possibilities. 
When distributing balls that obey Bose-Einstein statistics, there are only three 
possible distributions: both balls to the left, both to the right and one in each box. 
We ‘lose’ a possibility by moving away from the classical case since, from the theory’s 
perspective, the distributions where each ball has its own box are identical to one 
another (this is the invariance: permuting the balls makes no difference). The 
situation is even more stark for the fermionic balls. Once we have made the same 
identification as in the case of the bosons and ruled out distributions where both 
balls are in the same box, we have only a single distribution left: a ball in the left box 
and a ball in the right. Consequently, the probabilities in the two quantum cases 
differ from that in the classical case. The probability of finding any one configuration 
of bosons (assuming all the distributions are equally likely) is 1/3. Given that there is 
only one possible configuration of fermions, it will receive a probability of 1. 
The philosophical import of this is found in the identification of permuted 
configurations. One might take the fact that permutations of classical particles are 
treated as new arrangements to indicate that the particles have some form of 
identity that goes beyond their intrinsic properties (basing their individuality on their 
having different intrinsic properties fails as all instances of each kind of particle has 
these properties in common). This might be some form of haecceity or primitive 
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substance. But it is not required that we invoke metaphysically loaded notions like 
these. If we assume that some principle of impenetrability holds such that no two 
objects occupy the same spatiotemporal point, then classical particles will differ 
from one another in their spatiotemporal relations. Empiricists sceptical of primitive 
individuality might therefore wish to ground the individuality of particles in these 
different relations. This is an appeal to a Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, a 
claim that any two distinct objects must be distinguishable (that is, they must differ 
in their properties or relations). 
However, since permutation does not lead to any empirical difference when we are 
concerned with quantum statistics, the status of such a principle is more 
controversial when applied to quantum particles. Two electrons, for example, 
entangled in the singlet state will possess the same intrinsic properties as each other 
(these discussions usually make implicit appeal to the so-called Eigenstate-
Eigenvalue link, discussion of which I set to the side as tangential). Since quantum 
particles do not generally have unique spatiotemporal trajectories, at least under the 
standard interpretation of quantum theory, we cannot appeal to different 
spatiotemporal relations to distinguish them as we can for classical particles. This is 
commonly taken to indicate that the particles under discussion lack individuality in 
some substantive way. The evocative metaphor here is that particles are akin to 
money in the bank. If I have £100 in my account and withdraw £10, it makes little 
sense to ask which 10 of the original 100 that I took. The pounds in a bank account 
lack the individuality required to ask those sorts of questions about them. 
There are moves that can be made in response to this.134 Saunders has suggested a 
particularly prominent response, reviving Quine’s three grades of discriminability 
and arguing that even the individuality of entangled particles can be grounded in the 
fact that there exists a non-reflexive relation between them: an electron in the 
singlet state bears the relation of having opposite spin to another electron, but not 
to itself. This strategy has the advantage of covering other philosophically well-
known cases, such as Black’s two spheres.135 It is not maximally applicable, however, 
                                                     
134 See French and Krause (2006) pp. 149-173 for discussion of these. 
135 Black (1952). 
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since it will not suffice to recover a Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in every 
domain. Graph theory, despite sometimes being thought to provide cases 
appropriately analogous to quantum particles, has edgeless graphs which contain 
vertices that do not satisfy such a principle.136 On a more physical note, whether 
bosons are weakly discernible is still a contentious matter of debate. 
Of course, it is not just philosophers who are interested in the holding of symmetries; 
they are enormously important to the practice of physics. The acceptance of 
Einstein’s work on relativity marked, to use Wigner’s phrase, ‘the reversal of a 
trend’.137 Whereas laws had taken centre place in our efforts to understand the 
world, now principles of invariance were of prime importance. Years later, this led 
Nobel laureate Philip Anderson to comment that ‘It is only slightly overstating the 
case to say that physics is the study of symmetry.’138 
An indication of this importance is found in the use of symmetry groups to predict 
phenomena. Briefly, this is where a certain kind of invariance principle is posited and 
then particle behaviour is predicted on the assumption that the world behaves 
according to such a principle. The famous historical example of this is the Eightfold 
Way and the completion of the spin-3/2 baryon decouplet. When classifying 
particles, it is common to fit them into particular families called multiplets. The 
various quantum numbers that a particle possesses (corresponding to properties 
such as mass, charge and spin) determine its position in a multiplet. These multiplets 
do not have arbitrary structure, but rather are determined as bases of irreducible 
representations of various symmetry groups. The dimensionalities of these 
irreducible representations correspond with the cardinalities of the associated 
multiplets. If one assumes that an appropriate symmetry holds and has empirical 
data concerning particles that fit into a certain multiplet scheme, one can then 
predict the existence of the ‘missing’ particles that would complete that scheme.139  
                                                     
136 Ladyman (2007). De Clercq (2012) argues for a defence of the PII based on inter-graph 
relations, but see Duguid (2016) for criticisms of such approaches. 
137 Wigner (1967) p. 5. 
138 Anderson (1972) p. 394. 
139 A more thorough account of this prediction, and the assumptions that were involved, is 
given by Bangu (2008). 
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This is what happened through appeal to the classificatory scheme called the 
Eightfold Way. At the beginning of 1961, the physics community was aware of four 
baryons with spin 3/2 (and had been since their discovery in 1952).140 The relevant 
symmetry group, SU(3), allows for multiplets consisting of 1, 8, 10 or 27 particles. 
Later that year, the discovery of three more particles was announced. The properties 
of the known particles indicated that they could fit into either the 10 or 27 member 
multiplets. At a conference the following year, two more particle ‘resonances’ that 
fit into both schemes were announced, along with an experimental failure: 
experimentalists were unable to find results pointing towards the existence of 
particles that were expected if the spin-3/2 baryons were to fit into the 27 member 
multiplet. Based on this information, Gell-Mann and Ne’eman predicted that the 
particles fit into the decuplet. Of course, a decuplet requires there to be 10 particles 
and only 9 had so far been discovered. So they then predicted that the tenth place 
in the decuplet had a physical interpretation. Not only was there a particle that had 
not been found, but its properties could be predicted in advance based on position 
it was expected to occupy in the classificatory scheme. In 1964 the existence of this 
particle, named the omega minus, was experimentally verified. 
As the above discussion indicates, symmetries occupy an important role in modern 
science, and a particularly prominent place in physics. The question, then, is how 
best to understand them. This chapter will follow a suggestion that has been voiced 
by various scientists. 
At present, we regard invariance transformations as superlaws which we 
expect to hold not only for those laws of nature which we have come to 
understand but also for all others.141 
When learning about the laws of physics you find that there are a large 
number of complicated and detailed laws, laws of gravitation, of electricity 
and magnetism, nuclear interactions, and so on, but across the variety of 
these detailed laws there sweep great general principles which all the laws 
seem to follow. Examples of these are the principles of conservation … All 
the various physical laws obey the same conservation principles.142 
                                                     
140 This historical account follows Ne’eman and Kirsh (1996) pp. 202-203. 
141 Houtappel, Van Dam and Wigner (1965) p. 600. 
142 Feynman (1965) pp. 59, 83. 
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The content of the restricted relativity theory can accordingly be 
summarized in one sentence: all natural laws must be so conditioned that 
they are covariant with respect to Lorentz transformations.143 
The first quotation, from Houtappel, Van Damn and Wigner, is the most suggestive. 
It suggests that symmetry principles are to be understood as ‘superlaws’, laws which 
hold of other laws. The second two are less explicit, although they do claim that there 
are principles which the laws obey and that there are transformations which the laws 
must stand in a certain relationship to. It is important to sound a note of caution 
here. The third quotation invokes necessity directly, choosing to talk about how the 
laws must be. This is, obviously enough, not a Humean claim. Taking Einstein at face 
value here would prevent us from being able to give a Humean interpretation of 
symmetry principles since the interpretation would have the laws necessarily 
connected to them. The second quotation could be understood as making an indirect 
appeal to anti-Humean intuitions. The use of ‘obey’ might well suggest something 
akin to governance. That is appropriate for non-Humeans, as they are not restricted 
from having the laws govern their instances in some substantive sense. An 
immediate anti-Humean interpretation of symmetry principles would be to have 
them governing laws in a manner directly analogous to how the laws govern the 
world. 
Two of the above quotations have an anti-Humean flavour, although this is not 
uncommon when reading the writings of various scientists. It is important to 
emphasise, however, that these were not remarks made in the context of the 
modern debate over how laws of nature ought to be understood. It would be 
unreasonable to expect even very successful and intelligent scientists to anticipate 
the structure of a philosophical debate that would take shape later that century, and 
to carefully formulate all of their writings so as not to beg any questions in said 
debate! A far more reasonable response to the anti-Humean flavour of some of 
these remarks is to assign little weight to their consequences for arguments that the 
remarks were not intending to address. This parallels how Humeans normally treat 
the writings of scientists on laws of nature. It is not uncommon to find scientists 
                                                     
143 Einstein (1954) p. 329. 
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unreflectively talking of governance without indicating how they understand this 
notion. Humeans then assign little importance to this, commonly treating it as a 
holdover from older theological accounts of how the world works.144 But this re-
interpretation of comments is not intended to be dismissive of how well scientists 
understand their own subjects. Humeanism may be revisionary to some degree, but 
it is not that revisionary! Rather, it is simply an acknowledgement of the fact that 
many working scientists are either unaware of or uninterested in the philosophical 
debates that accompany their work. As with governance, so with necessity. This too 
can be given a Humean interpretation, via the possible worlds of modal realism, that 
aims to preserve the central points being made by scientists. In short, the anti-
Humean implications in the above quotations should not be assigned too much 
weight, since they can be understood in the same ways that Humeans normally 
understand such suggestive comments. How effectively this treatment can be 
carried out is the question that this chapter is concerned with. 
The interpretation of symmetry principles as metalaws has appeared in the 
philosophical literature, albeit not yet extensively. Margaret Morrison has talked 
about the view that laws are the manifestations of certain symmetries, although she 
also makes the anti-Humean suggestion that we take local symmetries to impose 
constraints on how physical systems can be.145 Marc Lange has pressed the issue 
more recently both by offering motivation for the metalaw interpretation and by 
showing how his account of laws can be extended to incorporate metalaws.146 This 
can be viewed as a challenge for rival accounts of laws: can they be extended in order 
to incorporate metalaws? Given the importance of symmetries to modern physics 
and their connection to laws (this connection will be examined further in the next 
section), it is highly desirable for an account of scientific law to say something about 
them. At the very least, it is a point in an account’s favour if it is able to do so and a 
mark against if it cannot. While Lange’s own account does not have a problem with 
explaining the nature and role of metalaws, it is not an account that will be of any 
help to Humeans. Lange is not squeamish about necessity and is happy to appeal to 
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it in order to spell out the difference between laws and accidents: the laws have a 
higher grade of necessity than accidental facts. Metalaws, in turn, are more 
necessary than laws and so occupy an analogous place in his system – only one step 
up. Given the unapologetically anti-Humean nature of Lange’s account, we must look 
elsewhere. The next section does just this, by first extending the usual Humean 
account of laws to incorporate metalaws, and then by discussing how comfortably 
this extension sits with pre-existing Humean commitments. 
 
3.2 Extending the BSA 
The focus of this chapter is to see how symmetries, understood as metalaws, might 
be incorporated into the Humean account of laws. To do this, I will pursue Lange’s 
suggestion on how this might look.147 What I will be calling the Extended Best System 
Account (or EBSA) is a very straightforward extension to the standard BSA. In the 
BSA, the regularities that turn out to be laws are first-order: they are patterns in the 
instantiation of perfectly natural properties across spacetime (more generally, they 
are patterns in whatever is fundamental). If we are to understand symmetries as 
laws of laws, they must be second-order laws. If all laws are just regularities, then 
second-order laws must be regularities. Not regularities in the distribution of natural 
properties, or they would simply be further first-order laws, but in the laws 
themselves. 
The EBSA, then, adds a second-order analogue of the BSA to the original account. As 
laws summarise patterns in the world, so metalaws summarise patterns in the laws. 
The manner in which a system is judged to be best need not be different to the usual 
BSA. Some systems of metalaws are stronger than others. Maximal strength can be 
achieved by a system that lists all and only those laws that hold at the actual world. 
This system would be consistent with only those worlds which have exactly the same 
laws as our own. Unlike for first-order systems, a maximally strong second-order 
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system will not suffice to pick out our world uniquely since different possible worlds 
can have the same laws while having different histories. If the physically possible 
worlds are those which have the same laws as ours, it is these which will be picked 
out by a maximally strong second-order system. The case of simplicity mirrors that 
of simplicity in the BSA. However it is that simplicity is judged (say by sentence 
length), there is no reason to think that it need be different for the EBSA. These 
virtues compete against one another in the usual way. For instance, adding 
sentences to a system will increase its strength while decreasing its simplicity.148 
A point of clarification: the extension to the BSA does not replace the original 
account. It had better not, since a second-order account will only give us metalaws 
and we still need laws! Rather, the competition for which system is best is run 
separately for each ‘level’, although the results of the competition for the metalaws 
will depend on the results of the competition for the laws; ontologically speaking, 
laws are prior to patterns in the laws. 
In the same way that we generated a second-order BSA, might there also be a third-
order BSA (and so forth)? There is nothing special about the move to a system 
concerned with patterns in the patterns, so if that is acceptable then the move to 
the other higher-order BSAs is open. Two salient comments. First, the mere fact that 
a Best System-like account is available does not guarantee that there will be any 
associated laws. Should the world be sufficiently disordered it will lack the sort of 
striking regularities that the BSA will describe via laws. Similar comments apply to 
the second-order BSA: should the first-order laws fail to exhibit regularities, there 
will be no metalaws. This will obviously continue to hold for the higher-order best 
systems, so there is no guarantee that by moving to a third-order BSA we will find 
metametalaws. The point would be a stronger one if we had good reason to think 
that there will be decreasing amounts of order as the level increased. So, once we 
are sufficiently far removed from the fundamental distribution, we run out of 
regularities and no longer have to worry about saying what these higher-order laws 
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are and what role they play. I think that this is plausible, but I lack an argument in its 
favour. 
Second, this is not a full explanation of how higher-order BSA laws link up with 
scientific practice (it is not even close to an attempt). The link between first-order 
BSA laws and scientific laws is well-studied in the literature; the former are supposed 
to capture the latter. While understanding symmetries as second-order BSA laws is 
a relatively recent move, the intention is clear here too. But I know of no account 
which suggests what in scientific practice would match up with third-order BSA laws, 
or what role these would play in assessing counterfactuals and the like. The lack of 
such a link might not be an objection to the higher-order BSAs, but would be a 
striking dissimilarity between the first two orders of BSA, and all the others. 
A stronger case for this extension of the BSA can be made if the resulting second-
order BSA plays philosophical roles analogous to those played by the standard first-
order account. That the roles are analogous is important. Given that the EBSA works 
in such a close manner to the usual BSA, unjustified differences in the usage of them 
would be a mark against the extension. But this requirement also serves to keep the 
challenge fair: if we have reason to think that the Humean account does not seek to 
capture some aspect of our folk conception of laws then we should not require that 
a Humean account of metalaws attempt to do so either. To judge how analogous the 
roles of these accounts are, we need to have a list of the roles that are played by the 
Humean account of laws. Then, for each role, we can assess whether this account of 
metalaws satisfies an analogous version of that role. Roles commonly thought to be 
played by laws include: holding of necessity, being confirmed by their instances, 
supporting a principle of inference, being an aim of scientific inquiry, explaining their 
instances and supporting counterfactuals.149 
Let us begin with necessity. One reason to move from a naïve regularity account of 
laws to the BSA is that the former fails to distinguish between accidental regularities 
and lawful ones. It is mere happenstance that everyone in the room is a philosopher, 
but laws like, say, Coulomb’s law are not just accidentally true. For anti-Humeans 
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this distinction can be spelled out through appeal to necessity. The laws hold 
necessarily, whereas the accidental regularities are only contingently true. While this 
route is obviously not open to those who deny necessary connections, the BSA 
provides an alternative route to distinguish between them. Laws appear as 
generalisations in the world’s best system, while accidental regularities do not. The 
link between laws and necessity is then reversed: rather than appealing to physical 
necessity to identify the laws, Humeans can appeal to the laws to set out what is 
physically possible. Those worlds with the same laws of nature as our own are the 
physically possible worlds. (If we assume the truth of modal realism, then there is 
nothing terribly special about our world, and so it is more accurate to say those 
worlds are physically possible relative to our world.) This allows for a reductive 
explanation of the link between laws and necessity. Since the physically possible 
worlds have the same laws as ours, it follows immediately that the laws are physically 
necessary. 
The EBSA therefore must allow for a way in which we can distinguish between the 
higher-order analogues of lawful and accidental regularities. Further, it should do so 
in a way that allows us to reduce modality rather than needing to appeal to some 
previously understood concept of necessity or possibility. But this is straightforward. 
The relevant distinction to be drawn is between symmetry principles and 
byproducts. Those generalisations that occur in the second-order best system are 
the symmetry principles. Byproducts do not contribute enough strength to the 
system to counteract the loss of simplicity created by adding them. This lack of 
importance captures the sense in which they merely happen to be true due to the 
specific laws our world has; there is nothing deeper to them. 
This is not an exact mirror of the relationship between first-order laws and their 
instances. Laws are physically necessary while worldly phenomena are contingent. 
The EBSA then cannot treat laws as contingent while metalaws are necessary. But 
this difference is due to the subject matter, it is not a defect of the Humean 
treatment of metalaws. What is more, there is a roughly analogous necessity-related 
difference between laws and metalaws to be found in the EBSA. Lange treats 
metalaws as more necessary than laws on account of their stability: since metalaws 
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are invariant under a wider range of counterfactuals than laws, his account treats 
them as more necessary.150 This then mirrors the relationship between laws and 
their instances. But there is nothing to prevent a Humean from giving an appropriate 
translation of that. We have already noted that Humeans define physical necessity 
in terms of laws. The account of stability is very similar: notice that we hold laws 
invariant under a greater range of counterfactuals than we do worldly facts, this is 
what it is for laws to be more ‘stable’ than their instances. It is just that the resulting 
sense of necessity is derivative. In the case of metalaws, Humeans are free to note 
that they too are held fixed under a greater range of counterfactuals than laws.151 
But, again, the necessity here is derivative. We can define a type of necessity in terms 
of metalaws just as we can define physical possibility in terms of the laws. A fact can 
be said to possess this kind of necessity if it is true at every world that shares in our 
metalaws. Similarly, a fact will possess this kind of possibility if it is true at least one 
of the worlds that share in our metalaws. Naming this kind of modality is a more 
difficult matter. It cannot be physical possibility, since a world might have the same 
metalaws as our own while having different laws. Metaphysical possibility too is 
unsuitable, for this is typically taken to refer to a kind of modality unrelated to the 
findings of any science. Perhaps metanomological possibility is a better fit, despite 
being a bit of a mouthful. Fortunately, selecting the right name might be difficult, 
but it is also largely unimportant. What does matter is that it demarcates an area of 
possibility space distinct from and wider ranging than physical possibility. Since 
Humeans can offer this, there is no great problem arising from how the EBSA treats 
necessity. 
The next role played by laws is confirmation, in that laws are typically taken to be 
confirmed by their instances. The main difficulty in assessing how similarly this role 
is played by the metalaws of the EBSA is that a canonical account of how 
confirmation is supposed to function in the BSA has not been explicitly offered by 
Lewis. Yudell however, has offered a speculative suggestion regarding Lewis’ 
intentions based around natural properties. One of the characteristics normally 
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assigned to natural properties is eligibility: predicates referring to them are 
projectable in a way that predicates referring to unnatural properties are not. We 
typically take ‘All emeralds are green’ to be projectable while taking ‘All emeralds 
are grue’ to not be. Assuming that we have accepted natural properties, we can put 
them to work here: the difference in projectability is due to the fact that green is a 
natural property and grue is not. Since the laws of the BSA are expressed in terms of 
perfectly natural properties, they are confirmable in a way that regularities 
expressed in terms of unnatural properties are not. 
If that is how confirmation works for first-order laws, then whether a similar story 
can be told for metalaws depends on whether metalaws will be expressed in terms 
of perfectly natural properties. As he notes himself, this is where Yudell’s suggestion 
runs into an issue.152 It is not altogether clear that metalaws will be expressed in 
those terms. The main reason for this is explained in more detail in the next section, 
where I discuss Lange’s second objection to the EBSA and how it motivates an 
extension to the account. For now, let us simply note the outline of the problem: the 
regularities of the second-order best system summarise the regularities in the first-
order best system, which in turn summarise the mosaic. The EBSA, then, provides 
information about the mosaic at a higher-level to the BSA. In a sense, then, it is 
‘nothing new’ as it is a second way in which to describe the very same mosaic. The 
natural properties are supposed to be sparse and never redundant, so the metalaws 
cannot contain natural properties. But then they cannot be confirmed in the way 
that Yudell has indicated. 
Loewer has suggested a straightforward alternative response to the issue of 
confirmation.153 For a law to be confirmed by an instance, examination of that 
instance must increase our confidence in both the generalisation expressed by the 
law and in our belief that unexamined cases will accord with this generalisation. 
Suppose that we accept a Bayesian account of confirmation. Then upon 
encountering some object falling in the way that one would expect from Newton’s 
law of gravity, I ought to increase my degree of belief in the truth of the 
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generalisation captured by that law. Since my degree of belief in Newton’s 
gravitational law has increased, my degree of belief that the next object I encounter 
will move in the same sort of way should also increase. Humean laws are required to 
be exception-less regularities, so if I am more sure that the regularity holds then I 
ought to be more sure that the next instance will not prove to be a counterexample. 
This does not guarantee that it is the Humean laws that will be confirmed, as 
opposed to mere accidental regularities. But the issue of a scientist having a 
probability distribution that results in non-laws getting confirmed is one that faces 
Bayesian anti-Humeans as well. Neither is the possibility of non-laws getting 
confirmed a disaster for the account: confirmability of accidental regularities has 
been suggested multiple times in the literature.154 A nice aspect to making the 
Bayesian commitment here explicit is that it highlights the way in which the 
confirmation of some generalisation depends on what background assumptions are 
in place.155 Change the background beliefs sufficiently and one changes the 
confirmation. 
We might note in passing that there is a long-standing objection to Humean laws 
playing any role in inductive reasoning. Armstrong, following Dretske, takes 
confirmation to be a sort of converse of explanation.156 Induction for him involves 
the – somewhat controversial – claim that it is based on inference to the best 
explanation: from examining instances of some generalisation, one can apply 
inference to the best explanation to infer that the corresponding law holds. From 
the fact that the law holds, one can then make inferences regarding the unexamined 
instances. This sort of story will only work if the relevant law can explain its instances; 
if it cannot then one cannot make an inference to it as the best explanation. Humean 
laws, so the story goes, cannot explain their instances and so cannot play this role in 
inductive reasoning. As we have seen in the previous chapter, things are not so 
straightforward. Even granting that inference to the best explanation plays any role 
in induction and confirmation, there are still moves that Humeans can make 
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regarding explanation. One need not accept that Humean laws cannot explain their 
instances. 
There seems to me to be no in-principle reason why the same Bayesian story would 
not work if we go up a level. Encountering instances of a first-order law needs to be 
replaced with encountering or, rather, discovering laws that exhibit a certain 
symmetry, of course. Once this is done, there is no reason why the discovery of a law 
that is, say, invariant over spatial displacements would not increase our degree of 
belief in the generalisation that all the laws are so invariant. And if we are more 
confident that all the laws are invariant in some way, then we should be 
correspondingly more confident that newly discovered laws will be invariant under 
that transformation. In the case of confirmation, the EBSA is directly analogous to 
the BSA. 
It has been suggested by van Fraassen that another thing we may wish of laws is for 
them to accord with a principle of inference.157 According to this principle, it is valid 
to make the move from ‘It is a law that A’ to ‘A’. For Humean laws, this is satisfied 
easily. Since the laws are the generalisations in the best systematisation of truths 
about the world, it follows immediately that they are all true descriptions of 
regularities. Hence whenever it is a law that some regularity holds, that regularity 
really does hold. 
Parallel things can be said about metalaws. The Humean account of laws satisfies 
van Fraassen’s principle because of the relationship it claims holds between laws and 
their instances. Exactly the same kind of relationship holds between metalaws and 
laws. As the laws summarise the local facts, the metalaws summarise the laws. So 
they too satisfy the principle. If it is a metalaw that the laws are invariant under some 
transformation, then the laws are invariant under that transformation. 
While setting down the form of the BSA in chapter one, we discussed the suggestion 
that the standard account be modified in order to include a more distinguished role 
for initial conditions. Hall’s proposal that candidate systems can be split into an Initial 
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Conditions Hypothesis and a Dynamic Hypothesis was introduced, and we saw how 
doing so influenced the way in which the theoretical virtues that determine which 
system is best interact with candidate systems. In short, strength is a property of 
entire candidate systems and must be balanced against both the entire system’s 
simplicity and the uninformativeness of its ICH. We also dealt with Hall’s concern 
that the laws of such a system would not be Distinctively Appropriate Targets of 
Scientific Inquiry – the kind of thing that scientists would be interested in – by 
pointing out the scientific project is about both the gathering of the world’s 
nonmodal information and about organising this information into explanations. The 
question to consider at this stage is how much of this discussion carries over to the 
EBSA. 
We can certainly say which part of the first-order BSA it is that the EBSA is concerned 
with summarising. It is the component that deals with the laws – the DH – as opposed 
to the initial conditions. When we talk of the laws remaining invariant under some 
transformation, this transformation is a change in the conditions under 
consideration. The laws must describe the same kind of behaviour even under 
changes described by, say, spatial rotations, but no such invariance is expected to 
hold for the initial conditions. It is not entirely clear what an invariance requirement 
on the initial conditions would even mean. But does the EBSA incorporate something 
like the ICH/DH split? And does this have any consequences for whether the 
metalaws are distinctively appropriate targets of scientific inquiry?  
On the one hand, we might want to deny that an account of metalaws has any 
business dealing with initial conditions. The purpose of a second-order account is not 
to summarise the mosaic directly, but to summarise patterns in the first-order 
summary of the mosaic. Initial conditions, dealing with how things actually stand in 
the mosaic, are from this view not obviously applicable to the second-order account. 
The question that underlies this thinking is the issue of how including these sorts of 
facts helps a system to better describe the laws. There is a potential problem too: 
given that a distinction between initial conditions and dynamic laws is arguably 
necessary in order to understand what invariance principles even are, allowing for 
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what looks something like initial conditions in the laws themselves threatens to 
collapse this important distinction. 
With that sort of worry in mind, we might not want to allow for there to be initial 
conditions in the EBSA, strictly speaking. This need not be so bad. Woodward, 
drawing on Wigner and Sklar, reminds us that there are contexts in which the 
distinction between initial conditions and dynamic laws is less useful.158 Certain 
cosmological models might provide examples of this. However, even if there are 
cases where the distinction breaks down, that fact alone does not undermine the 
distinction more widely. It is simply a sign that talking of the ICH or the DH in that 
context is unhelpful. Humeans might well want to extend this thought to the present 
case: once we have moved to the level of metalaws there is little to be gained by 
talking about initial conditions. That is no problem, since we didn’t have good reason 
to think that the distinction was going to be useful everywhere. Perhaps similar 
things would need to be said about the standard BSA if it were able to adequately 
deal with special science laws. Humeans taking this approach to the metalaw 
account would not even need to abandon the ICH/DH split entirely: it would remain 
possible to claim that the theoretical apparatus remains in place, even if the ICH 
happened to be empty due to nothing playing the required role to enter it. 
But recall that the aim of extending the BSA is to have an account that is analogous 
to the usual first-order one, not one that needs to match exactly. Not having an exact 
match here is perhaps inevitable, since there is something misleading about dividing 
talk of symmetry principles into a part concerned with boundary facts and a part 
concerned with dynamics. One might wonder exactly what is dynamic about a 
principle of invariance! So if we want to include something like the ICH/DH split in 
the EBSA, we need to remember that it cannot be precisely the same split that the 
BSA can incorporate. A more general way of talking about a split, one that dispenses 
with the misleading terminology, would be to distinguish between the component 
of the second-order account made up of propositions expressing regularities and the 
component whose propositions do not express regularities. 
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In the first-order case, a law allows for there to be various histories of events that all 
fit into a wider pattern. Yet, the fact that a law holds is not sufficient for us to make 
any predictions regarding what events actually occur: we need to supplement the 
law with some form of boundary condition in order to get that. Similar thoughts 
apply once we have moved up a level. A symmetry principle might allow for there to 
be different kinds of dynamics at the world. But that by itself doesn’t make any 
predictions regarding what dynamics the world has. This indicates that there is well-
motivated room in the Humean account for something (roughly like initial or 
boundary conditions) to supplement the metalaws. Including these non-regularity 
facts in candidate systems of metalaws strengthens those candidates in the usual 
way: it makes the system compatible with a narrower range of possible worlds by 
ruling out some of those that have different dynamical laws, even if those laws are 
invariant under the same transformations as our own. 
As an example of the sort of fact that might enter our world’s second-order best 
system, recall that Permutation Invariance allows for there to be paraparticle 
behaviour. As far as we can tell, there are no paraparticles. Perhaps there is an 
explanation for this that we have not yet discovered, but it might also be a brute fact 
about the world: there is just a region of fermionic behaviour over here, a region of 
bosonic behaviour over there, and so on. Another way of describing this is to say that 
the relevant symmetry principle (PI) allows for there to be various kinds of statistical 
behaviour captured by laws, but it is also a non-regularity fact in our best system of 
metalaws that some of this behaviour does not occur. Are metalaws like this 
appropriate targets of science? Well the reason that first-order laws end up as 
DATSIs is that scientists use them in explanations of the phenomena, not merely as 
efficient summaries of the data. This explanatory aim of science is served by 
metalaws as well as laws. If Humeans can offer reason to think that their metalaws 
can feature in explanations, then Humean metalaws are DATSIs. 
Let us now deal with explanation. As was noted more extensively in the previous 
chapter, this is a controversial area for Humean accounts. It is not uncommon to find 
claims that Humean laws are unsuited to play any role in scientific explanations on 
account of really being nothing over and above that which they are supposed to 
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explain. This is normally taken to be a rather damning objection by its proponents, 
and those who make it tend to reject Humean views of laws altogether. We can 
therefore set aside concerns taken to have that sort of impact, for if one is not on 
the market for a Humean treatment of laws, then one is unlikely to be interested in 
a Humean treatment of metalaws. As an alternative, one might agree that Humean 
laws cannot scientifically explain their instances, but be willing to bite the bullet 
here. Perhaps the view has advantages enough to overcome this cost. If this looks 
attractive, then there is very little that needs to be said about metalaws and 
explanation. If the laws cannot explain due to their relationship to their instances, 
then metalaws will be unable to explain due to their analogous relationship to laws. 
If it is nevertheless acceptable to have a first-order account that lacks this 
explanatory role, then there is no principled reason why it would be unacceptable to 
have a second-order account that also lacks that role. So if one rejects the link 
between Humean laws and explanation, then there is no new problem here. Either 
the Humean account is fundamentally flawed or the lack of explanation is not a 
decisive factor. Regardless, anyone going in for this stance on Humean explanations 
will find a discussion of this account of metalaws and explanation uninteresting. 
Let us therefore restrict our attention to views which allow for Humeans to give 
scientific explanations. The two questions that then arise are whether there is good 
reason to think that symmetry principles are involved in scientific explanations, and 
whether the Humean account has the resources to say something about that 
involvement. We will take these in turn. 
The most common place to look for symmetries and explanation is Noether’s (first) 
theorem.159 It is well known that there is a connection between symmetries and 
conservation laws. For example, conservation of angular momentum is associated 
with invariance under rotations, and conservation of energy is associated with 
invariance under temporal translations. Noether’s theorem states that for every 
continuous global symmetry there exists a corresponding conservation law. That is, 
for every such symmetry that a system exhibits, there will be a physical property that 
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is conserved. This connection might suggest that to understand the role that 
symmetries play in explanation we need only appeal to the theorem. If we can derive 
conservation laws from symmetry principles, then it looks plausible that those 
principles have explanatory priority. This sort of reasoning is not difficult to find: 
So, momentum conservation really follows from Newton’s third law of 
motion. But where does Newton’s third law come from? Noether’s theorem 
is the deeper statement, implying that the total momentum is conserved, 
because the interactions are determined by laws that don’t depend upon 
where the system is located in space!160 
Conservation of energy and momentum had been known for centuries … In 
light of Emmy Noether’s insight, it is instructive to ask what symmetries are 
responsible.161 
While these authors suggest that Noether’s theorem plays some sort of privileged 
explanatory role, Zee hints at a problem here. The relationship between symmetries 
and conservation laws that Noether’s theorem applies to was old news by the time 
that she published her paper. The theorem was praised for its generality, not for its 
surprise factor.162 As Lange has convincingly argued, Hamilton and Lagrange 
independently explained the conservation laws through appealing to symmetries 
well before Noether’s theorem was published.163 Given that conservation laws could 
be derived prior to the theorem’s appearance, it is odd to suggest that the 
explanatory nature of these derivations is dependent upon that theorem. This does 
not rule such a suggestion out, since there is room to claim that Noether’s theorem 
has an important role to play in improving such explanations by drawing them into a 
common framework (despite the derivations being possible without appeals to the 
theorem being made). But historical contingencies are not the deeper issue. More 
pressingly, Noether’s theorem can be run in reverse, allowing for symmetries to be 
derived from conservation laws. It is therefore difficult to see how Noether’s 
theorem assigns explanatory priority to symmetries over conservation laws given its 
two-way nature: 
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The very notion of explanation involved is misguided. Noether was not 
attempting to explain conservation principles in terms of variational 
symmetries; indeed she stressed that her first 1918 theorem can be proved 
in reverse … We have now established a correlation between certain 
dynamical symmetries and certain conservation principles. Neither of these 
two kinds of thing is conceptually more fundamental than, or used to 
explain the existence of, the other.164 
When it comes to explanation, Noether’s theorem is something of a red herring. 
However, as the above quote indicates, Brown and Holland go further than just 
dismissing the theorem as explanatorily irrelevant. Rather, they make the stronger 
claim that there is no explanatory priority to be given to symmetries or their 
associated laws. But that does not follow; the failure of Noether’s theorem to supply 
symmetries with explanatory weight does not entail that symmetries are thereby 
unable to explain conservation laws. The fact that this sort of explanation was 
attempted by Hamilton and Lagrange suggests that the theorem is neither required 
for the relevant sort of explanations nor a block on there being any. That derivations 
are two way does not imply that there are no explanations. There are various 
examples of just this in the literature on scientific explanations. For one classic 
example, take the flagpole counterexample to the DN model of explanation.165 Given 
the relevant laws, it is possible to derive the length of the shadow from the height of 
the flagpole and the angle of the sun above the horizon. The same sort of derivation 
can be run in reverse, as the sun’s angle and the shadow’s length together yield the 
flagpole’s height. Yet it is commonly thought that there is an explanatory asymmetry 
here, since it is the first case that is taken to involve a (causal) explanation.  
From the perspective of the present project, the explanatory irrelevance of 
Noether’s theorem is something of a relief. After all, it covers only those symmetries 
that meet certain criteria. Not all dynamical systems can be given a Lagrangian 
formulation, in which case the theorem is simply not applicable.166 Not all 
symmetries are continuous; as was noted earlier, there are important discrete 
symmetries. If Noether’s theorem was an important part of the explanatory role 
                                                     
164 Brown and Holland (2004) pp. 1137-1138. 
165 Salmon (1989). 
166 Wigner (1954). 
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played by symmetries, we would have unanswered questions to deal with. Why is 
there no equivalent principle that allows for discrete symmetries to explain? If 
discrete symmetries can explain without such a principle, why do those explanations 
differ in kind from the explanations that involve continuous symmetries? And if not, 
why not? Thankfully, such questions can be set aside. Let us now consider an 
example of an explanation that appeals to a symmetry principle. 
A classic example here is of star collapse.167 When a red giant star no longer has 
sufficient energy to fuse helium into carbon, it will begin to collapse. Pre-collapse, 
the outward thermal pressure generated by this process of fusion is balanced against 
the inward gravitational forces; so long as these are balanced, the star will remain in 
a state of equilibrium. The eventual exhaustion of its fuel source means that it will 
no longer be able to generate this level of thermal pressure and so the gravitational 
attraction will win out, causing the star to collapse. This collapse, however, comes to 
a stop and results in the formation of a very dense white dwarf. It is the halting of 
the collapse that has received the most attention in the literature on explanation, 
where the explanation is sought from the physicists. At some point in the collapse, 
the force of the gravitational attraction is balanced once more, this time by the 
‘pressure’ of electron degeneracy. (Pressure here is meant in a more general sense 
than that normally encountered when dealing with gases. The scare quotes are used 
as a reminder that it is a contentious issue whether one can understand this sense 
of pressure in a similarly causal manner. As this is a tangential issue to our purposes 
here, I remain agnostic on this question.) The electron degeneracy is an application 
of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP), which states that no two of the star’s electrons 
can be in the same quantum state. This limits the number of electrons that can be at 
any one energy level. As the star collapses, the lower levels get filled up, leaving only 
higher energy levels available for the electrons to move into, thus creating the 
‘pressure’ just mentioned. Given the gravitation attraction and the PEP, there are no 
more possible states for the star to move into and its collapse comes to a halt. 
                                                     
167 The relationship between this example and PI is discussed in French and Saatsi 
(forthcoming). The philosophical implications for explanation were introduced in Lewis 
(1986b) pp. 222-3. See Skow (2014) for criticisms of Lewis’ presentation. 
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The relevance of symmetry principles to this explanation can be found in the appeal 
to the PEP. This principle is really an application of the Permutation Invariance 
introduced earlier in this chapter. As electrons are one of the fermionic particles, 
their behaviour is described by Fermi-Dirac statistics. The reason why only certain 
arrangements of electrons in energy levels are physically possible is ultimately the 
same reason why we cannot have two fermionic balls in the same box. The above 
story does not apply to every kind of star. The Chandrasekhar limit, roughly 
equivalent to 1.44 solar masses, gives the upper limit on the mass of a white dwarf. 
In those with greater masses, the electron degeneracy will not balance out the 
gravitational attraction and the star will continue to collapse. This collapse will only 
be stopped by neutron degeneracy, at which point we can give an analogous 
explanation to the one above: Pauli’s Exclusion Principle implies that the star’s 
neutrons cannot exist in the same quantum state as one another, creating an 
effective pressure to balance the gravitational attraction. This too has an upper limit, 
about 2 to 3 solar masses, after which the collapse cannot be stopped and a black 
hole will be formed. It is a discrete symmetry that underlies all of this explanation of 
the behaviour of collapsing stars: Permutation Invariance. 
It might be tempting to adopt an interpretation of these kinds of explanations where 
the notion of constraint is doing much of the work. This would be the idea that, say, 
two electrons cannot be in the same quantum state because the PEP (and so 
ultimately Permutation Invariance) prevents them from doing so; their behaviour is 
constrained by such principles. However, this is entirely optional. Humeans might 
well want to emphasise the heuristic role that this talk plays when employed by 
physicists. When modelling the evolution of some system, we need to set ‘rules’ for 
that model – if we make no assumptions as to how some system behaves it is 
impossible to model its evolution. In doing so we impose a form of constraint on the 
model. That said, there is nothing metaphysically weighty to this, since it amounts to 
little more than wanting to find out what will happen if we assume that it behaves 
in certain regular ways. A similar story can be told of the way in which symmetry 
principles ‘constrain’. Certainly, if we assume that a certain regularity holds then 
some patterns of behaviour will be ruled out as physically impossible. But physical 
possibility gets a reductive treatment: there are worlds where such prohibited 
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behaviour occurs, they just happen to not share in our laws (and metalaws) of 
physics. By claiming that some symmetry principle holds, we are restricting our 
attention to those worlds where the patterns of events do not violate that principle. 
So while it is true that some behaviour is not possible in a world where Permutation 
Invariance obtains, the necessity here is derivative, brought about by our implicit 
decision to restrict our attention to the physically possible worlds. This is simply to 
treat the relationship between metalaws and necessity in a manner analogous to 
that between laws and necessity. When physicists talk about symmetries 
constraining the space of possibilities, Humeans can interpret this as a way of 
focusing the audience’s attention on a certain subset of possible worlds. 
This narrowing of focus plays an important role in answering ‘What If’ questions (a 
fuller treatment of counterfactuals in this account follows shortly). All such questions 
require some initial assumptions, for without any assumptions of what rules should 
guide our answers there would be no way of giving a sensible response. Consider: if 
there are no assumptions made on the regularities at play then there is an infinite 
number of possible worlds whose possible events could be appealed to in answering 
each question. Indeed, at least one of those assumptions will always be indicated in 
the question itself, as it spells out the way in which we are supposed to imagining 
things being different. By narrowing the worlds under consideration, we can answer 
questions like ‘What would the fate of our sun be if it had twice its actual mass?’. 
Such questions often presuppose that the laws and metalaws still hold, which allows 
us to select the right world to answer the counterfactual: electron degeneracy would 
not be sufficient to stop its collapse, but neutron degeneracy might. This allows 
Humeans to interpret the usual talk of restriction and constraint without thereby 
being committed to any metaphysically objectionable claims. 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that one way Humean laws might be able to 
serve in explanations is by helping us to understand how events fit into a general 
pattern. This fits nicely with the approach to ‘What If’ questions just mentioned. 
When assessing these questions, we must make various contextual background 
assumptions. These will often be law-related, as we are often interested in cases of 
physical possibility. In order to answer these questions accurately, we need to 
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appreciate what events would have to be like if some regularity were to hold. 
Scientific explanations can help to provide information by highlighting when events 
are connected to one another in a pattern. The approach to explanation involving 
metalaws just described is an extension of this treatment. A scientific explanation 
that involves appeal to symmetry principles helps us to understand the relationship 
between relevant events by pointing out ways in which they do not differ. It is only 
once we have this understanding that we are able to pick out the right possible 
worlds to assess the relevant counterfactuals and give the correct answer to What If 
questions.168 
We have already seen mention of counterfactuals when evaluating symmetries and 
explanation. It is time to give them a more thorough look. According to Lewis’ 
treatment, to judge whether a counterfactual conditional is true or not, we must 
consider what occurs in possible worlds where the antecedent obtains.169 But not 
just any world will do, for that would let us turn to worlds quite unlike ours and 
obtain odd results about our counterfactual. Contradictory results, in fact, for not 
restricting the worlds under consideration includes situations where any logically 
possible consequent will be combined with the antecedent. This obviously would 
make a mockery out of attempts to analyse counterfactuals in this way. Rather, we 
must consider what happens at the closest possible world (or worlds, in case of a 
tie). If, at the closest possible world at which the counterfactual antecedent occurs, 
the consequent also occurs, the counterfactual conditional is true. Central to this 
account is closeness of possible worlds, a context-dependent notion. Consider the 
counterfactual ‘Had I dropped this pen and gravity been an inverse cube law, the pen 
would have fallen’. In one context, this counterfactual is clearly true: the pen would 
experience a different force and fall at a different rate to the one it would fall at in 
our world, but the force experienced would be analogous to the one experienced in 
the actual world and would be in the same direction. Yet in another context, the 
                                                     
168 For a metaphysically neutral account of the link between counterfactuals and symmetry 
explanations, see French and Saatsi (forthcoming). The original causal account which they 
work to generalise is Woodward (2003). 
169 Lewis (1973) and Lewis (1979). This is not to say that Humeans must accept Lewis’ 
treatment of counterfactuals, but rather that there is an appropriate treatment of them 
available. 
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counterfactual is much harder to assess. Had gravity been an inverse cube law, 
planetary orbits would have been unstable and our solar system would not have 
formed. In such a scenario there arguably would not have been a pen to drop, nor 
an Earth for it to fall towards.170 
So some context dependence is inevitable on this kind of account. Setting that aside, 
there is a further question of how to assess which world is the closest to our own. 
Lewis suggests that the metric for similarity of worlds is weighted according to the 
following four priorities: 
1. It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of 
law. 
2. It is of the second importance to maximise the spatiotemporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations 
of law. 
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular 
fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.171 
These evidently make no explicit mention of metalaws. Yet an appeal to metalaws is 
implicit even in rather mundane counterfactuals like ‘Had I switched on the kettle, 
the water would have boiled’. A world in which water no longer boils at 100 degrees 
Celsius from the moment I flick the switch onwards is, of course, not very close to 
our own. For this to be the case, there would be a violation of the first priority. If 
only the water in the kettle did not boil, this might be a violation of the third priority, 
for the law violation would be local. But all water having a different boiling point is 
not a localised occurrence. Further, the boiling point of water is not some fact 
independent of the properties of other substances. Should we wish to minimise the 
law violations, a whole swath of properties might well need to change too, and not 
in a very clear way; we might wonder whether the freezing point of water or the 
boiling point of ethanol would also change. This makes conflict with the second 
priority all but inevitable. 
                                                     
170 Ehrenfest (1917). 
171 Lewis (1979) p. 472. 
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Notice the assumption behind all of that. In order for water no longer boiling at the 
same point it does in the actual world to count as a law violation, we must assume 
that it does in fact violate our world’s laws. That is, we expect the laws of our world 
to be constant across time and space. If they could vary, then water failing to boil 
might not be a law violation after all! This silent expectation of spatial and temporal 
invariance is a belief that a particular metalaw holds of our world’s laws. 
However, we should not try to modify the above four priorities so as to 
accommodate this sort of appeal to metalaws in the standard account of 
counterfactuals. To see why, notice that none of the priorities makes any reference 
to the laws that hold at the possible world in question. The laws being violated are 
the laws of the actual world. From the perspective of an inhabitant of one of these 
worlds, their own world does not contain any law violations. This is Lewis’ belief that 
laws are exceptionless regularities at work – even the laws of possible worlds admit 
of no exceptions.172 The laws of those worlds are irrelevant to the analysis of 
counterfactuals. All that matters is the similarity of matters of fact, and whether 
those matters of fact are in accordance with our laws. It similarly makes no 
difference how similar the metalaws of some possible world are to our own. For if 
we do not care what some world’s laws are, there is no reason to care whether they 
are invariant in the way we believe our laws are. 
Nor should we attempt to make some independent requirement in the account that 
when assessing similarity of worlds, we should take certain metalaws to hold of our 
laws. It would, of course, only be certain ones that we might wish to afford this status 
to: permutation invariance and the like do not immediately appear to be related to 
counterfactuals in the same way temporal invariance is. The existence of evidence 
that would make us reject these metalaws may seem unlikely, but not impossible. 
The discovery in the 1950s that the weak interaction violates conservation of parity 
is a case in point. It is possible, after all, to distinguish a mirrored version of our world 
from the actual world. But this discovery did not cause widespread dismay amongst 
philosophers interested in counterfactual conditionals. An account of 
                                                     
172 Ibid. pp. 468-469. 
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counterfactuals ought to not be tied to any particular claim regarding what the 
world’s symmetry principles are. Let that remain an empirical matter.173 
When checking the truth of counterfactuals, we try to hold the laws as fixed as we 
can while still allowing for minor ‘miracles’. These are the localised law violations 
that are required for the antecedent to be true. As an example, recall the example 
of the kettle. Assuming the laws are deterministic and that I did not turn it on, there 
would have to be some kind of law violation to allow my counterpart to flick the 
switch. This is a general point: counterfactuals describe situations that do not occur, 
so they require some divergence from the laws and matters of fact that obtain at the 
actual world. Can we tell a similar story about metalaws? When assessing 
counterlegals – situations where the actual laws do not hold – do we hold metalaws 
as fixed as we can? 
Sometimes. There are cases where this does occur. For instance, take ‘Had gravity 
been an inverse cube force, planetary orbits would have been unstable’. In order to 
assess worlds for similarity relative to this counterlegal claim, we certainly do not 
require avoidance of widespread law violations. Doing so would rule out the very 
worlds at which gravity differs from our world! But we do require the higher-order 
analogue of this: avoidance of widespread metalaw violations. A world at which the 
laws varied across time would be sufficiently different from our own that it does not 
matter whether the consequent is true at them or not. Obedience to the metalaws 
is highly important when checking for closeness of worlds in this case.  
Note however, a difference regarding the third priority. As just mentioned, 
assessment of world closeness for counterfactuals requires that we look at worlds at 
which minor miracles occur. But analogous minor miracles are not required in the 
metalaws when we are trying to decide whether the planetary orbits would be 
unstable. In that context, the most similar worlds will be ones at which the metalaws 
                                                     
173 It might be possible to claim that temporal invariance and perhaps spatial invariance are 
different and are assumptions that we need in place for our concept of a law to make any 
sense. I am not convinced that this would motivate a change in the account of 
counterfactuals in particular though. And there is evidence that at least some physicists are 
willing to suggest we could find results that imply they do not hold at our world. See also the 
discussion of universality and the laws of biology in chapter four. 
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are not violated at all.174 This might be because, as Lange has suggested, the initial 
conditions and metalaws together do not entail the first-order laws.175 Matters of 
particular fact, on the other hand, are entailed by the initial conditions and laws 
taken together. So it is only in the latter case – when we are considering a divergence 
of matters of fact from our world – that we require a miracle. Different initial 
conditions would also do the trick, but at the cost of having the world vary from ours 
in its history, something we wish to avoid when considering most counterfactuals. 
However, there are also cases where we do not try to hold the metalaws fixed. Recall 
the counterfactual ‘Had I dropped this pen and gravity been an inverse cube law, the 
pen would have fallen’. In certain contexts, it is not the instability of the planetary 
orbits that is most relevant when assessing this. As such, a possible world at which 
there is no pen to be dropped would not be counted as the closest. That requires 
there to either be a metalaw violation or a multitude of miracles: gravity cannot have 
been an inverse cube law throughout the world’s history and there still be a pen 
without one of these. The latter is a poor option: it requires there to be continual 
miracles so that a world has both an inverse cube law of gravity and the same history 
as our own. The extreme nature of the miracles required brings this into conflict with 
Lewis’ first priority. So we must require there to be a metalaw violation at this world. 
Prior to my dropping of the pen, the world’s history unfolds according to an inverse 
square law of gravity. At the point of releasing the pen, there is not only a minor 
miracle to allow the counterfactual situation to occur, but a change in which 
exponent is associated with gravity. There are two situations compatible with this 
counterfactual: one in which the pen moves as if gravity dropped off by the inverse 
cube of distance but no other gravitational forces change, the other in which all of 
gravity’s effects from that moment on are inverse cubes. Which is most similar will 
be a vague matter, one which context will greatly impact. 
                                                     
174 Which is not to say that those worlds must have the same metalaws as the actual world. 
Just as in the first-order case, where it is matters of fact not violating our laws rather than 
sharing in the same laws that is important, we require only no violations of our metalaws in 
the second-order case. This distinction becomes relevant at simple toy worlds, which may 
either lack sufficient regularities to have laws like our own or lack the regularities in their 
laws to generate the same metalaws. 
175 Lange (2011) p. 218 
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Regardless of which of those two situations is judged to be closest, they have 
something in common. Both of them require a violation of the metalaw of temporal 
invariance. So there are counterlegal conditionals which require metalaw violations 
in order to be accurately assessed. But it is not a free-for-all. Permitting a single 
violation of one metalaw is not the same as being indifferent to whether the 
metalaws hold at all. So something like the analogues of Lewis’ first and third 
priorities do in fact hold when assessing counterlegals. Miraculous violations of 
metalaws may be required to judge which worlds are closest, but they are to be 
minimised.176 
The roles identified in this section were not intended to form a comprehensive 
overview of every use that laws are put so. As such, there may still be a role for laws 
that has a higher-order analogue which the Humean account of metalaws fails to fill. 
But while this possibility has not been ruled out, the above considerations suggest 
that this extension to metalaws fits well with the already existing BSA. When it comes 
to necessity, inference and being an appropriate scientific aim, metalaws generate 
no new trouble for the Humean. Their support of counterfactuals is somewhat more 
interesting, but as we have just seen metalaws are a presupposition of our ordinary 
counterfactual thinking and have their own distinctive ‘What If’ questions in the form 
of counterlegals. Confirmation and explanation are the most difficult issues for the 
account, although it is worth pointing out that much of this is due to it not being 
entirely clear what ‘the’ standard BSA has to say about these (it is always going to be 
difficult to extend an account if it is not clear what the precise details are to begin 
with). That said, we have seen that there are reasonable moves Humeans can make 
regarding these areas in the first-order case and that these can be plausibly extended 
to the second-order account.177 
 
                                                     
176 I incline to the view that a system of weighted priorities similar to Lewis’ also exists for 
counterlegals, although I have little concrete to offer at this juncture. 
177 This is a slightly more optimistic conclusion than Yudell (2013) reaches. The difference in 
opinion arises because Yudell takes the Humean account to be saying different things about 
confirmation and explanation than I have suggested that it say. 
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3.3 Miracles and exception clauses 
In addition to suggesting the natural way in which to extend Humeanism to cover 
metalaws, Lange also offers two obstacles for Humeans who accept this route to 
overcome.178 The first is concerned with the relationship between metalaws and 
counterfactuals. In the standard Lewisian treatment of counterfactuals, laws play an 
important role. They are particularly resilient under counterfactuals in a way in which 
matters of particular fact are not. This is reflected in Lewis’ list of priorities: avoiding 
widespread law violations is of the highest importance. When assessing 
counterfactuals and determining closeness of possible worlds, we hold the laws as 
fixed as we can. Similarly, when assessing counterlegals we attempt to hold the 
metalaws fixed. If we want to know what planetary orbits would be like in a world 
where the gravitational force was an inverse cube law, we need to assume that 
spatial invariance holds at that world. This only holds true in ordinary contexts, of 
course. There is nothing preventing us from asking what would happen in a world 
with both law and metalaw violations. But in those ordinary contexts metalaws show 
a resilience similar to that shown by laws. 
So laws are resilient under antecedents concerned with differences of particular fact 
and metalaws are resilient under antecedents concerned with differences of laws. 
The problem Lange sees is that metalaws may not be resilient under the former kind 
of antecedents. In other words, ordinary counterfactuals like ‘Had I struck the match 
at spatiotemporal location L, it would have caught fire’ cause problems for this 
Humean treatment of metalaws. To assess this counterfactual we consider worlds at 
which I do strike the match at location L. Those closest to ours will have similar laws 
to ours. Not quite the same, since, from the perspective of our laws, a small miracle 
is required for the match to be struck. What then are the laws of the closest world 
(setting aside ties in closeness for simplicity)? At minimum, they must be 
exceptionless regularities. One suggestion is that they are the laws of our world, but 
with the addition of a clause like ‘… except at spatiotemporal location L, where the 
                                                     
178 Lange (2011). 
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following occurs …’.179 This allows for the ‘miraculous’ striking of the match to occur 
without any of that world’s laws being violated. But while that world’s laws have not 
been violated, that world cannot have the same metalaws as our own. If the laws 
pick out some spatiotemporal locations as special, then they cannot be invariant 
across spacetime. This conclusion is a surprising one, for it means that when 
assessing closeness of possible worlds for ordinary counterfactuals, we do not need 
to be concerned with whether the metalaws are held fixed. That is at odds with the 
conception of metalaws as holding true across a wider range of possibilities than 
laws. 
While Lange takes this to be the issue with the Humean account, he is not insensitive 
to the point that referring to spatiotemporal locations is not the only way in which 
to distinguish events. This gives rise to the alternative route that he offers. Let C refer 
to some combination of natural properties that is present at the striking of the 
match. Now replace the reference to spatiotemporal location L in the clause with a 
reference to combination C. If this were added to our laws, we get a candidate 
system of laws for this close world. The laws of that world would not be violated for 
the same reason as before. Better still, the metalaws of that world would not need 
to differ from our own as no spatiotemporal location is treated differently to any 
other, and we have no reason to think that our metalaws make reference to 
invariance across different natural properties. (This last point is actually stronger 
than that. It is not just that we do not currently think the laws treat all natural 
properties equally, but that the opposite seems obvious. Different dynamical laws 
will be concerned with the evolution of different features of systems. But this is just 
to say that different laws are concerned with different properties.) 
Let us take a moment to deal with the concern that the second kind of clause is 
something of a cheat. That is, a way in which to preserve the letter of spatiotemporal 
invariance while really aiming at introducing violations. However, for all that this way 
of setting up the second kind of clause – adding mention of a combination of natural 
properties – looks like a disguised way of getting at a clause that is concerned with 
                                                     
179 This suggestion, offered by Lange in his (2011), echoes comments made in postscripts to 
Lewis (1979) printed in Lewis (1986a) pp. 54-55. 
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spatiotemporal locations, it may actually be the more natural way. On the standard 
Lewisian account, different worlds are different spacetimes, each completely 
isolated from the others. While properties can exist at different worlds, being 
partially instantiated wherever and whenever one of the members of that property’s 
set of instances is present, individuals cannot. This is the well-known problem of 
accidental intrinsics: if an individual were at multiple worlds, it would have to possess 
incompatible properties.180 As it seems utterly implausible that I could have the 
property of being a philosopher and the property of not being a philosopher, I must 
be a world-bound entity. At this stage a worry might creep in about the 
counterfactuals that a world with the sorts of clause-laws mentioned might be able 
to support. Suppose that someone at miraculous world W was evaluating claims that 
presupposed the match was struck at location L with combination C of natural 
properties. These might well be counterfactual claims, although since the striking of 
the match itself would not be counterfactual from that person’s perspective, the 
counterfactual aspect of the claim must reside elsewhere. Spacetime point L exists 
within the (isolated) spacetime of that world and so does not exist at any other 
world’s spacetimes. The laws of the miraculous world W do not make exceptions for 
the goings on at spacetime points in other spacetimes. So, from the perspective of 
someone at that world, the striking of the match at other worlds would look like a 
miracle as it would violate the laws under consideration. That is a rather odd 
conclusion, since the entire point of modifying the world W’s laws was to ensure that 
the match-striking was no longer counted as a miracle at that world. There is no 
inconsistency in having the similar striking of the match at other worlds still get 
counted as a miracle from that world, but it is not an attractive feature either.  
One might hope that counterfactual theory comes to the rescue here. After all, we 
can assess counterfactual claims that concern particular individuals despite those 
individuals never appearing at the possible worlds so critical for the evaluation of 
those counterfactuals. Applied to the present worry, this would be the suggestion 
that spatiotemporal location L has counterparts in other spacetimes, and it is 
because of these counterparts that the striking of matches at other worlds does not 
                                                     
180 Lewis (1986c) p. 201. 
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appear miraculous from world W. Counterparts of spacetime points have been 
appealed to in order to respond to points in the literature on the hole argument.181 
But this is not entirely straightforward. Whether some individual at a possible world 
is a counterpart of an individual at this world is determined by a relation of similarity: 
the more properties and relations that the two individuals share in, the more similar 
they are. This is deliberately a somewhat vague relation, where the vagueness is 
intended to capture the context-dependence of counterfactuals; we might also 
count a matching of histories as making for similarity.182 The natural properties that 
are instantiated at spacetime points will therefore get counted when determining 
similarity of points. This is awkward: do we wish to say that only those worlds which 
have a match being struck at that point in their histories get to have spacetime points 
that are similar enough to L to count as L’s counterparts? Perhaps so, this may not 
be too large a bullet to be bitten here. Or perhaps not, in which case it may be that 
the context-dependence of similarity could be leant on to suggest that we can ignore 
the majority of natural properties that an individual possesses when checking for 
counterparts. Either way, if one wishes to appeal to spacetime points in laws, one 
needs to be prepared to say more about how their counterparts interact with 
counterfactuals. Given this, it is not unreasonable to think that clauses appealing to 
combinations of natural properties are the more immediate option.183 
These clause-laws might strike some as rather odd. Typically, we do not expect the 
fundamental laws of physics to come with exception clauses. In fact, the fact that 
many special science laws look to be ceteris paribus laws is sometimes appealed to 
as a feature marking them as different from proposed fundamental laws.184 Even 
setting aside the concern Lange has with this solution to the problem, one might 
worry that the peculiar character of these laws is a mark against the Humean 
                                                     
181 For example, Brighouse (1994) and Butterfield (1988). 
182 Lewis (1973) pp. 39-41. 
183 This may be a relief to spacetime relationalists who, while perhaps willing to accept talk 
of spacetime points as a world-building manner of speech, will wish to avoid anything that 
looks like a substantial commitment to there being such entities. For an account that leans 
this way, see Huggett (2006). 
184 Earman and Roberts (1999) goes further, arguing that ceteris paribus laws fail to be 
genuine laws at all. 
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account. But it is worth pointing out that the difference between these laws with 
exception clauses and our own laws of physics is due entirely to the difference 
between this possible world and our own. The world we are considering is 
‘discontinuous’ in a way that ours does not seem to be: it contains what we would 
consider a miracle. Given that the world evolves in an odd way (again, odd from our 
perspective), it is not altogether surprising that the nature of the laws of that world 
differ from those of our own. 
After offering this route to Humeans, Lange goes on to reject it due to an objection 
based on the lack of uniqueness of combination C. Should a possible world have laws 
that include an exception clause mentioning C, then what we would regard as a 
miracle can occur whenever that particular combination of properties is instantiated. 
This will happen at the striking of the match, of course. But properties can be 
instantiated at multiple different times and places. Given the Humean rejection of 
necessary connections, there is nothing to prevent combination C from being 
instantiated more than once at the world. Preventing this requires either some form 
of necessary connection that blocks that combination of properties from being 
repeated, or for the multiple occurrences to be irrelevant due to the exception 
clause making reference to particular times and places. Neither is an option for 
Humeans here. Should C be instantiated more than once at the world, there would 
be multiple miracles at the world. Yet Lewis’ own priorities for closeness of worlds 
requires that miracles be minimised. In short, if the clause mentions only natural 
properties then there is nothing to guarantee that a world whose laws have that 
clause will not have multiple miracles and so be unsuitable for evaluating 
counterfactuals. 
For Humeans who accept Lewis’ treatment of counterfactuals and possible worlds, 
however, the objection misses its target. Lange is right to point out that nothing 
prevents C from being instantiated repeatedly at a world. From a Humean 
perspective, there had better be nothing preventing natural properties from being 
instantiated! It is also true that a world with multiple C-instantiations could have the 
same laws as a world with only a single C-instantiation (there are limits though: a 
system of laws that admits of too many exceptions is unlikely to be counted as the 
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best candidate system). Yet neither of those facts create problems for evaluating 
closeness of worlds. It is not as if evaluation of counterfactuals requires that we first 
decide on the laws that must occur at the closest world and then take a world with 
those laws and treat it as the closest regardless of the events that occur at the world. 
If it were, then Lange’s objection would have some force since merely deciding on 
the laws is not sufficient to pick out worlds with only a single miracle. But this is a 
mistaken picture of Lewis’ account. 
The better way to think of things is to accept that there already are many possible 
worlds – we do not create them by considering counterfactuals.185 These worlds 
differ from one another in that they have different patterns of instantiation of 
natural properties. Combination C will be instantiated once at some of these worlds, 
multiple times at others, and not at all at still more. Some of the worlds where C is 
instantiated a single time will have laws like our own, only with the addition of 
exception clauses as suggested. Some worlds where C is instantiated multiple times 
will have exactly the same laws as single-C worlds. Some worlds where C is 
instantiated will have wildly different laws or perhaps none at all. None of this is 
dependent on counterfactuals in any way. These worlds are not treated equally 
when it comes to counterfactuals. When assessing how close these pre-existing 
worlds are to our own, we turn to the priority list given previously. One of the 
priorities given is to minimise the number of miracles that occur. This minimisation 
is not meant in some creative sense where we influence other worlds, but simply 
that those worlds which happen to have more miracles are less similar to our own 
than worlds with fewer miracles. This is why multiple instantiations of C is not an 
issue. Nothing prevents this from occurring, so there are worlds with multiple 
instantiations. But they are less similar to our world than those with only a single 
instantiation of C. So when assessing counterfactuals like ‘Had I struck the match it 
                                                     
185 Lange may not have considered this as it appears to involve a commitment to modal 
realism. For my part, I am unconcerned by such a commitment; I take the unintuitiveness of 
the view to be largely overstated. But those squeamish about a plurality of concrete worlds 
can offer their own, less committal, interpretations of this claim (perhaps taking the worlds 
in question to be ersatz ones). See Divers (2002) for an overview of the options. 
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would have lit’ we will only look to worlds where the miraculous lighting of the match 
happens a single time. 
 
3.4 The problem of language 
In order to understand Lange’s second objection, we must first note that the 
canonical BSA requires every system to be stated in a language whose predicates 
correspond to perfectly natural properties. The usual reason given for this is that 
without this restriction, the account will misidentify the laws. Consider the predicate 
F which holds of all and only those things in our world. Then the system consisting of 
the single sentence ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 will get counted as the best. It is simple, almost certainly 
simpler than its competitors. It is also maximally strong, for such a system will hold 
at only those worlds indiscernible from our own (should there be any). Yet despite 
being the best system, it does not give us the laws. For this sentence will imply all 
the truths of our world and hence all of the regularities. Consequently, every one of 
the world’s regularities will get counted as a law: an absurd conclusion! Not only 
would this obliterate the distinction between laws and accidental regularities that 
the BSA was supposed to maintain, but it would make a mockery out of scientific 
practice. We would not discover the best system through empirical investigation and 
experiment but through simple armchair reasoning. 
Clearly something must be done to prevent this degenerate system from being 
counted as best. The specific language requirement does exactly that. The predicate 
F does not correspond to a perfectly natural property (to give one reason: it is not 
sparse in the slightest). To state the system consisting of ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 as its only axiom in 
terms of perfectly natural properties would require a very long complicated chain of 
definitions from those natural properties to the property referred to by F. Such a 
chain would cause the system to score very poorly on simplicity and hence no longer 
be counted as the best. 
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But while this reason for stating all systems in Lewis’ favoured language is well-
known, there is another reason.186 Simplicity is a language-dependent notion. A 
single system can differ in how simple it is counted as depending on which language 
we are considering. In the terminology of Cohen and Callander – who credit Quine – 
simplicity is an immanent notion rather than a transcendent one (that is, defined 
relative to a system of basic predicates rather than independently of such a system). 
This is brought out well by an example from Loewer.187 A system containing the 
sentence ‘All emeralds are green’ will get counted as more simple than ‘All emeralds 
are grue’ in a language whose basic predicates include ‘green’ but not ‘grue’. Exactly 
the opposite result occurs if we consider a language whose basic predicates include 
‘grue’. Since simplicity is relative to language, simplicity comparisons of systems 
stated in different languages is impossible. One option when faced with this problem 
is to follow Lewis’ example and demand that all systems be stated in the same 
language. The difficulty then is in specifying what language this is and giving 
motivation for singling it out as special. 
Following Lewis’ choice of language, it is easy to see how these questions are 
intended to be answered. The language is one whose predicates refer to perfectly 
natural properties. That is not to say that we currently have access to this language, 
in fact we most likely do not. It is the business of physics to, amongst other things, 
discover what the perfectly natural properties are. As no-one thinks that our current 
physics has achieved a final theory, it is reasonable to assume that a complete 
inventory of the perfectly natural properties has not yet been completed. But if we 
are optimistic then we might believe that we have come to understand some of what 
the fundamental kinds are.188 As to why we should care about this particular way of 
describing the world, we should note that perfectly natural properties are supposed 
to correspond to objective distinctions in the world. To reuse a well-worn metaphor, 
if we were to carve the beast of reality at the joints, we would be carving it along 
                                                     
186 Cohen and Callander (2009) deserve credit for forcefully reminding metaphysicians of 
this, but we should also credit Lewis whose original discussion of these issues brought up 
exactly this point. 
187 Loewer (1996). 
188 We might compare this to Loewer (2007) where he discusses a property/law package 
deal. It is really not so different to what Lewis seems to have in mind at times. 
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lines demarcated by such properties. This is a suitable language because it respects 
the distinctions that are present in the world’s fundamental character. 
Suppose – for now – that this is the best solution to the issue of selecting a language. 
The best system is the system that has the best balance of theoretical virtues when 
stated in the language whose predicates refer to perfectly natural properties. It is 
natural, then, to extend this to the EBSA. The second-order best system must also be 
stated in a particular language in order to avoid a similarly degenerate choice of 
predicates: if G applies to all and only those sentences in the first-order best system, 
then ∀𝑥 𝐺𝑥 will be the second-order best system. This would be a disaster, for such 
a system would entail all of the first-order laws and so all those laws would also get 
counted as metalaws. This parallels the problem in the first-order case exactly: it gets 
the wrong results and arrives at them through a priori reasoning instead of empirical 
investigation.189 We might hope that by adopting the same language that we did in 
the first case, we might avoid the problem in the same way. 
Unfortunately, this move is not as promising here. It would certainly block predicates 
like G, given that it is no more natural than F was. But, as Lange points out, it blocks 
rather too much. Metalaws are not stated in terms of perfectly natural properties, 
but rather ones like covariance under temporal displacement. There are several 
issues here. First, perfectly natural properties are intrinsic properties of spacetime 
points, whereas the properties of metalaws hold of members of the (first-order) best 
system. Second, properties of metalaws are mathematico-logical properties. Third, 
they are redundant. Suppose that we have a description of the fundamental nature 
of the world in terms of perfectly natural properties. Then a further description of 
the best systemisation of that distribution would not add anything new. 
For these three reasons, the second-order best system will not be stated in terms of 
perfectly natural properties. This is a problem, as we require all systems to be stated 
in a language which takes these to be its basic kinds. A translation of the best system 
into the appropriate language might well be available, but this alone will not resolve 
the issue. Since metalaw properties are not perfectly natural, a translation of them 
                                                     
189 Lange (2011). 
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into perfectly natural ones will, at best, be a blow to the system’s simplicity.190 Less 
optimistically, the required gruesomeness of the resulting sentences might well be 
enough to destroy the chances any system had of being the best. 
I take there to be three distinct ways in which one might respond to Lange’s 
objection. We might bite the bullet, and insist that the EBSA, formulated in Lewis’ 
canonical language, really does get the right metalaws despite this issue. Second, we 
might change the account of perfectly natural properties so that properties of 
metalaws could be natural too. Third, we could take this to be motivation to drop 
this particular language requirement and adopt an alternative proposal. Let us take 
these in order. 
To motivate the first response, recall that we are dealing with the Best System 
Account; we are not dealing with the Great System Account or even the Fairly Good 
System Account. To put the point in a less pithy way, for a system to count as best it 
need only be better than its competitors. It does not need to be considerably better 
than its competitors.191 Nor does it need to score particularly highly on whatever the 
metric for assessing which system best balances strength and simplicity is. A system 
that does not balance these virtues particularly well, but whose competitors are 
even worse, will still count as the best system. With respect to Lange’s objection, a 
Humean inclined towards this line of response might point out that exactly the same 
considerations apply to the EBSA. All that has been shown is that a system consisting 
of our current candidate metalaws will not be particularly simple when stated in 
terms of natural properties. It has not been shown that rival systems will be better 
balanced than this particular system. Perhaps all prospective systems fare poorly 
with regard to simplicity when expressed in Lewis’ language, on account of their 
                                                     
190 This is the more optimistic result as it would still allow for there to be metalaws in the 
envisioned way; they just would not be those that we take actual science to be discussing. 
191 Although we might hope for this. If a system is far and away best, then the regularities 
will match particularly striking patterns in the world and so we would be more inclined to 
accept these ones as laws as opposed to some other regularities. Lewis hopes for the best 
system to be robustly best while considering how objective his metric is, although I do not 
see this as an essential feature of the account. 
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subject matter: patterns found in the first-order laws. Or perhaps those that do not 
lack in simplicity are woefully lacking in strength. 
Indeed, if all competing systems score badly then it may not even make much sense 
to talk of their being bad at all. It would be more accurate to realise that a system 
will only balance strength and simplicity well or poorly relative to other systems. To 
achieve good or bad balance in a non-relative way would require there to be some 
independent metric which all systems are scored according to. But – at least in the 
original BSA – there is no such independent metric.192 On this view, it is entirely 
irrelevant that second-order systems of regularities will not be as simple as we might 
have initially thought. For being simple in a way that is not defined relative to the 
other systems on offer is not merely unimportant, but not something that it makes 
sense to speak of. 
There is a cost to making this response. While Lange has not demonstrated that rivals 
to the system we think gives us the metalaws will achieve a better balance, I have 
also not supplied a reason to think that they will not. It is a weakness of the response 
that it simply leaves the matter open. Worse, there might be some reason to think 
that at least some of these rivals will do better. Suppose that we have a system which 
is simple compared to its competitors when stated in terms of natural properties. 
This will not have regularities that we would recognise as metalaws, given that it is 
using different basic properties. But it might also manage to be reasonably strong in 
the sense that there is only a small range of possible worlds at which it holds. Nothing 
in the way that strength is spelled out (insofar as it is at all) on the BSA prevents such 
a system from ruling out many possible worlds. The existence of such a system would 
prevent the system we want to come out as best from doing so. 
                                                     
192 If there was a metric of this sort, we might expect systems to not only have to be better 
than their competitors but also to achieve some minimum score. This would ensure that the 
regularities it identifies are strikingly strong and simple; that they are not merely the best 
regularities available in a world lacking much order, but also that they are what we would 
be happy to consider laws (supposing that we might not want to admit there are any laws in 
a somewhat – but not excessively – disordered world). Much more would obviously need to 
be said to properly motivate this sort of BSA extension. 
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This argument is rather weak, of course. But the point remains that we have no 
strong evidence one way or the other as to whether a system, stated in terms of 
perfectly natural properties, could capture the second-order regularities better than 
the system, not stated in terms of those properties, that recognises the metalaws 
that science does. There are echoes here of a worry expressed by van Fraassen 
(among others) that the regularities picked out by the BSA as laws will not match up 
with those that our best science takes to be the laws.193 Further argument might 
push us to regard it as more or less likely to think that the EBSA will misidentify the 
metalaws. Currently, however, I take this uncertainty to count against this response. 
The second line of response is to accept that Lange has identified an issue with the 
EBSA, but rather than change the details of this approach to (meta)lawhood, change 
some of the background resources appealed to: specifically, the account of 
naturalness. To see the difficulty in following this approach, consider the following 
list of features the perfectly natural properties are supposed to have.194 
They are supposed to serve as a supervenience base for the world’s less fundamental 
existents. They are independent in the sense that they can be freely recombined to 
form new possible worlds (so there are no necessary connections between any of 
them). Relatedly, they are without redundancy: no perfectly natural property can be 
defined in terms of any other. They underwrite duplication, which can be analysed 
in terms of them, and hence intrinsicality too, which Lewis analyses in terms of 
duplication. They are discovered empirically: this need not be via physics, although 
properties discovered by any other branch of science are likely to be redundant. They 
allow for comparisons of naturalness to be made for all less natural properties (this 
is the chain of definitions idea that Lewis had; the longer the chain of definition 
required to connect a property to the perfectly natural ones, the less natural it is). 
They feature in laws – presumably fundamental ones. They pick out objective 
similarities and differences between objects which possess them. They serve as 
reference magnets in order to avoid Putnam’s Paradox-style worries. The degree of 
this naturalness is not a contingent matter: properties are natural or not in all worlds, 
                                                     
193 van Fraassen (1989) p. 53. 
194 This is taken from Dorr and Hawthorne (2013). Compare with the list in Loewer (2007). 
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rather than their naturalness varying according to the world at which they are 
instantiated. 
This list is not exhaustive, as there are other roles that Lewis appears to be appealing 
to in other articles. For example, spacetime relations, the only kind of perfectly 
natural relation that Lewis acknowledges, function as worldmate relations. That is, 
an object is related by these relations to all and only those objects which it shares a 
world with. But there is no need to identify every last bit of use naturalness is put to. 
The point is presumably clear by now: natural properties play a great many different 
roles. Attempting to modify this account of naturalness so that perfectly natural 
properties can feature in metalaws as well is more likely to cause problems than 
resolve them. Although, as Dorr and Hawthorne argue, there is considerable tension 
within this list as certain combinations of roles are not obviously compatible with 
one another. But perhaps this just adds motivation to respond to Lange by modifying 
naturalness: the account is already broken so we risk nothing by trying to fix it! 
The point can be made in a bit more detail. Recall that Lange identified three 
problems with taking the properties featured in metalaws to be perfectly natural. 
They are properties of regularities rather than spacetime points, they are 
mathematical or logical in nature, and they are redundant. At first glance, the second 
issue is the most promising one. Allowing mathematical properties to be perfectly 
natural does not appear to directly conflict with most of the roles identified above. 
We might wonder what exactly they might serve as a supervenience base for, 
although that is no great issue. The requirement is not that every fundamental 
property be a base for others, but rather that all non-fundamental properties 
supervene on the distribution of perfectly natural ones. That is compatible with 
nothing supervening on certain perfectly natural properties. Similarly, the 
requirement that they be discovered by empirical means is less of an issue than one 
might think. So long as we do not confuse that with the requirement that all perfectly 
natural properties be physically significant in some strong sense, there is no reason 
to think that physics cannot discover that a certain mathematical property is natural. 
That said, the independence requirement is going to be a sticking point. It is one that 
we are going to run into in two ways. First, as Lange has said, once we have one 
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description of the world in terms of perfectly natural properties, any additional 
descriptions of the world are going to be redundant. They cannot be giving any new 
information. If they were, then the distribution of perfectly natural properties that 
was first described cannot be serving as a supervenience base for all of the non-
fundamental properties. Saying that a certain regularity does not vary over time is a 
short, accessible way in which to convey information about it. But it is not the only 
way to convey that information, we could also give the precise distribution of 
physical magnitudes over time (assuming that we had access to this). Such a 
distribution would ground both the fact that a regularity holds and the fact that this 
regularity does not vary over time. The convenience of the first form the information 
took does not impact on the fact that it is, in principle, necessary to state separately. 
The second issue with independence in allowing mathematical properties to be 
natural is necessitation. Truths regarding how some mathematical properties are 
related to others are standardly taken to be necessarily true. Yet natural properties 
have to be nonmodal; they cannot introduce necessary connections! At least, not 
without thereby being incompatible with the entire Humean project that Lewis 
advocates. 
Finally consider the first issue that Lange identifies: properties that metalaws express 
hold of regularities rather than spacetime points. Relaxing this requirement in order 
to allow properties of regularities to be perfectly natural conflicts with the Humean 
Mosaic. No longer would the world fundamentally be a distribution of perfectly 
natural properties across spacetime points. Perhaps this is no great loss. We might 
be willing to sacrifice the mosaic metaphor in order to preserve the spirit of the 
account, as suggested in chapter one. But the issue goes deeper than just that. How 
would we recombine properties of regularities? Presumably not freely, since they 
are dependent on there being appropriate regularities at a world in order to be 
instantiated there. To make matters worse, remember that these regularities are 
regularities in the distribution of natural properties. So instantiation of the 
properties found in metalaws is dependent on certain arrangements of natural 
properties. Classing such properties as perfectly natural as well blatantly violates the 
requirement that perfectly natural properties form a mutually independent 
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supervenience base for all other properties. And this requirement does not look 
negotiable, since this is a (or perhaps even the) central feature of naturalness. If this 
line of response to Lange involves making such a drastic change to the nature of 
naturalness, it seems far more promising to take an alternative line where 
naturalness is no longer connected to laws in the same way. 
This leads us to the third way in which we might respond to the problem of the 
properties in metalaws not being natural. In short: remove the requirement that 
they be natural properties! The immediate worry is that this opens the account up 
to the problems Lewis solved with his choice of language. Would we not just have 
systems with gerrymandered properties –  like the aforementioned F and G – being 
counted as best? That would be a damning result. And how would we respond to the 
worry that there is no way to compare systems stated in different languages?  
A way to resolve these issues has been offered by Callender and Cohen, and Schrenk. 
In chapter four, I lay out the details of this approach and then consider how this 
Humean account of metalaws works in practice. At the present point, however, let 
us note that the changes to be considered shortly have little bearing on the majority 
of this chapter. The final regularity view of symmetry principles treats those 
invariances in the way that has previously been suggested. Hence the discussion in 
section 3.2 of this chapter on the roles played by the second-order account still 
applies. 
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Chapter 4 The Humean account of metalaws 
 
The previous chapter ended on something of a cliffhanger: the Best System Account 
looks to have a natural extension that covers symmetry principles understood as 
metalaws, but Lange has brought out a problem for that extension. As the language 
used by physicists in statements of metalaws does not match the language of 
perfectly natural properties, it looks like the extended BSA will either not recover 
any metalaws or it will give us the wrong ones. Given that this entire manoeuvre was 
motivated by a desire to capture more of scientific practice, that’s a pressing issue. 
Fortunately, there’s a solution available. This chapter turns to the Better Best System 
Account and its loosening of the strict language requirement. We can combine this 
very similar approach to laws with the second-order extension that has already been 
discussed to offer an account of metalaws that does not run into the same problems 
of language. Once this has been set out, I turn to two applications for the account. 
The first can be seen as a challenge to Humeans: either offer an account of the 
relationship between symmetries and particle behaviour or accept a form of 
necessity. The approach that this thesis has been working towards allows Humean 
to take the first route and thereby avoid being forced into a radical 
reconceptualisation of the world. The second application looks ahead more 
speculatively. Much of the science mentioned thus far has been that of physics – be 
it classical or quantum. It is natural to wonder whether there is anything to say about 
metalaws and the special sciences, especially given the connection between the 
Better Best System Account and sciences other than physics. Biology is used as the 
example, and I suggest that there is a mutually beneficial relationship here: as the 
Better Best System Account provides assistance to Humeans seeking to capture 
metalaws, so too does this interpretation of metalaws help Humeans to provide a 
regularity-based interpretation of biology.  
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4.1 Better Best Systems 
As just indicated, there is a model for how we might answer the question of language 
raised in the last chapter: the Better Best System Account (BBSA). As the BBSA is 
concerned with offering an alternative to the usual BSA, it makes no mention of 
symmetries or metalaws. But there is no reason why we could not extend the 
approach so as to include these. The core insight behind the view – that the original 
BSA needs adjustments to properly accommodate special science laws and that 
modifying the vocabulary used is the first step to making these adjustments – has 
been recognised by various philosophers. In what follows I will largely be following 
the presentation of the account favoured by Cohen and Callender, as I take it to be 
the most widely known version (and the source of the account’s name).195 
The central change to the BSA that Cohen and Callender make is to remove the claim 
that any particular choice of basic predicates or properties is picked out by the world 
as objectively special. There is no sense in which any language that we choose to 
formulate systems of laws in is better than any other – at least, that is, no sense that 
does not make appeal to our particular contingent interests or abilities. As an 
example of this, we might compare a language with green and blue to one with bleen 
and grue. The former language might be easier for us to work with (and so is special 
to precisely that extent) or come to mind more immediately, but this does not mean 
that there is anything objectively better about it when it comes to picking a language 
to formulate laws in. 
In their paper, Cohen and Callender associate the BBSA with the adoption of an 
attitude of ‘explosive realism’ concerning natural kinds. Rather than there being one 
objectively privileged way to carve up the world at the joints, there are many 
different carvings, none of which mark out objective joints better than any other. It 
just happens that some of these carvings are more useful to us than others. 
(Compare this to unrestricted mereological composition: the moon and the pennies 
in my pocket might compose an object, but it is not one that we therefore need to 
                                                     
195 For examples of this move, see Roberts (1999), Halpin (2003), Schrenk (2008), Schrenk 
(2014), Cohen and Callender (2009), and Callender and Cohen (2010). 
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pay any special attention to.) This, they argue, is more amenable to empiricism and 
what scientists are doing when they posit new fundamental kinds. Further, it will 
give us an account of lawhood that includes more than just the fundamental laws of 
physics. The standard BSA is unable to incorporate the laws of sciences like biology, 
since the kinds that they appeal to are not fundamental ones. As perfectly natural 
properties correspond to only fundamental kinds, systems of special science laws 
suffer from the same problem Lange identifies for systems of metalaws: they score 
badly on simplicity and so will not be the best.196 But an account of lawhood that is 
not tied to natural properties avoids this worry entirely. 
That said, it is worth mentioning that we do not have to be as thorough-going as 
Cohen and Callender’s rejection of natural properties. All that is required for their 
account of laws is that systems of laws don’t have to be stated in the language of 
natural properties. It’s an entirely separate matter as to whether we reject such 
properties altogether. While we might see no need for them to be as closely tied to 
laws as they are in the BSA, we might think that they do useful work in other areas 
of metaphysics. Recall the extensive list given in the previous chapter of uses that 
Lewis put them to! It might initially seem surprising to have an account where the 
laws are not tied to that kind of fundamental properties while still accepting their 
existence, but it is not incoherent. And if we adopt the view of laws that the BBSA 
urges, the sense of surprise is diminished. 
So to the details of this view. The nature of the laws is still given by the system which 
best balances the competing virtues of strength and simplicity. However, rather than 
having to be stated in a single specific language, systems of laws can be formulated 
in any language. Lawhood, then, becomes a language-relative notion. We might still 
take which regularities are the laws to be an objective matter; we do not get to freely 
choose what the laws are. But this is a rather constrained notion of objectivity, since 
they are objective only relative to a choice of language. Each language has its own 
                                                     
196 That is only half the problem, of course. The BSA also demands regularities be 
exceptionless and so encounters difficulty with ceteris paribus laws. See Schrenk (2014) for 
a suggestion that allows both the BSA and the BBSA cope with such laws. For worries about 
whether the BBSA copes any better than the BSA with ceteris paribus laws, see Backmann 
and Reutlinger (2014). 
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competition for best system, and different languages might (and almost certainly 
will) have different laws. Some languages might not even recognise any laws, should 
they lack the resources to describe the world’s regularities. Other languages, with 
overlap in their basic kinds, might judge the same system to be best and so have the 
same laws. 
This is how the BBSA is able to acknowledge laws of sciences other than physics. 
Pretend for the moment that our current science is complete and that we have 
discovered what the laws are. Then if we pick a language whose basic kinds include 
the kinds used in physics, the best system will be one which recognises the same 
laws that physicists do. So the laws – relative to the kind of language used in physics 
– will be the laws of physics. But we could also pick a language whose basic kinds 
include the kinds used in biology. Then the laws – relative to the kind of language 
used in biology – will be the laws of biology. A systematisation of the laws of physics 
will not be judged best relative to this second language as such a system will not be 
simple in that language. Rather, its properties will appear to be horribly 
gerrymandered. 
We do not need to view the special sciences as fully autonomous from physics in 
order to make use of the BBSA. As an example, recall that Albert and Loewer’s 
advocacy of the Past Hypothesis, the claim that the world started in a low entropy 
state, runs into a snag when combined with the orthodox BSA. Entropy is not a 
fundamental property and so the Past Hypothesis will look wildly disjunctive when 
translated into the language of perfectly natural properties. A move to a form of the 
BBSA could therefore be motivated for them: if we consider the best system for a 
language that includes entropy among its basic predicates, it becomes plausible that 
statements of the Past Hypothesis will be simple as intended. Although Albert and 
Loewer do not appeal to the BBSA, doing so would allow them to avoid the issues 
that are associated with either ignoring the problem or stipulating that the correct 
language for the best system is one that includes entropy. That said, more work 
would need to be done here to get the result they desire: that the special sciences 
end up being derivable from physics. 
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The BBSA does not solve the problem of cross-language comparisons as do those 
who stipulate a favoured language. Rather, it completely rejects the problem. For 
this is only a problem if we think that what the laws really are is independent of 
language. Then it makes sense to look for a single once-and-for-all best system. But 
without such a conception of lawhood, there is no need to compare systems in 
different languages; even if doing so were possible, we would not discover anything 
deeper about the world by making the comparisons. 
Similarly, there is no need at this level to reject languages that include predicates like 
F: predicates true of all and only those things in our world. Languages which include 
predicates like that will have uninteresting best systems. But so what? That system 
has no privileged place above any other. Its disconnection from empirical inquiry is 
clear: science will not discover that ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 is our one and only law because scientists 
do not seek to understand the world through the use of kinds that predicates like F 
pick out. So we can tell from the armchair which systems will be best in certain 
languages, but should not be concerned because we simply lack any non-
philosophical interest in these languages.  
Might the standards for judging which system is best differ across different 
languages? They might, although whether one wants to defend that depends on how 
committed one is to the objectivity of the standards in the first place. Allowing the 
standards to vary sits well with a ‘look to science’ approach. Since there is little a 
priori reason to think that the standards applied in, say, biology are the same as 
those in physics or sociology, there is some reason to want the standards to vary. 
We could then say that the standards are whatever those employed by the relevant 
scientific field are. It is for the scientists to pick their own standards: neither 
philosophy nor the universe nor even any other scientific field forces a choice upon 
them. This respects the autonomy of the various sciences. 
Varying standards bring with them some issues. For one, it makes the laws 
dependent on our choices. This looks worse for the standard BSA than for the BBSA 
of course. With laws relativized to languages, we already get a plethora of laws. That 
they depend on our choice of standards does not change anything deeper about the 
world. Lewis may have been worried by ratbag idealists trying the change the laws 
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by changing their thinking, but the worry loses a lot of its force when laws are 
deprived of a metaphysically active role.197 What does it matter if we pick out some 
descriptions of patterns as more important than others? The distribution of 
fundamental properties doesn’t change according to our choices! Nor is it clear that, 
given such a distribution, there is sufficient variation in the standards that could be 
applied to make the laws come out as anything we want. Making the account doubly 
relative would result in the laws depending on both language and standards choices. 
Perhaps this is pragmatically defensible: some choices of standards would output 
some rather odd laws, just as some choices of language do. But just as we are not 
interested in every one of the languages that law candidates can be formulated in, 
there is no reason to think that we would be interested in every one of judgement 
standards that could be applied. 
There’s more that ought to be said in defence of varied standards, but I think that 
indicates the direction that one ought to look. More problematically, we might worry 
about our access to the standards in question. If we pick the standards, then the 
problem is that there exist languages, and so candidate systems, which no human 
has considered. What standards apply there? If each language has its own objective 
standard, then we lose the sense in which we are letting each science decide how 
best to find its laws. There is no good reason to think that every scientific field will 
chance upon the correct standards. (And how would we know that, for example, the 
geologists are using the objectively correct standards but the cosmologists just can’t 
get it right?) Finally, disagreement. Which standards are in play when a scientific field 
disagrees (explicitly or implicitly) on the standards? Or when the practices of that 
community change? None of this is to say that there is no similar problem for the 
standard BSA. On the contrary, just how objective the BSA standards are is a matter 
of debate, and Lewis’ defence of their objectivity is far from confidence-inspiring. 
This is not the first time that someone has worried about whether scientists are 
discovering what the Humean takes to be laws! I take the upshot of this to be that 
the issue of objectivity of standards in the BBSA is similar to the issue of objectivity 
in the BSA. If one is happy that the balancing of strength and simplicity is not 
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dependent on us, then the language relativism move need not change anything. If 
one started with concerns, then the BBSA provides an opportunity to double down 
on what will look to be an unavoidable relativism of the laws. 
Let us set these unresolved issues to one side. Since the problem that the BSA has 
with metalaws is analogous to the problem it has with special science laws, it should 
be clear how the extension of the BBSA goes. Instead of there being a single non-
relative best system (or tie of a few non-relative best systems) that gives us the 
metalaws, we can make the account of metalaws language-relative. For a given 
system of laws, we can use many different languages to formulate the metalaws of 
those laws. Relative to each of those languages there will be a competition for the 
best second-order system. If we wish to recover the metalaws that physics 
recognises, then we had better not choose a language which has predicates 
corresponding to the basic kinds of economics. That choice might recover some 
striking regularities in the world, but it lacks the resources to pick out the symmetry 
principles that physicists care about. Similarly, we should not choose a language with 
basic predicates only for perfectly natural properties. Such a language will have as 
its best system regularities that physics does not recognise for the reason that Lange 
identified. But since there is no requirement to choose that language, no sense in 
which it is objectively better than the other choices, there is no problem with this. 
The problem that Lange discovered with this approach to incorporating symmetries 
into our account of laws simply does not occur. 
It is theoretically possible to preserve the original BSA when we are dealing with 
laws, but use this Extended Better Best System Account (EBBSA) to deal with 
metalaws. But such an account is not an appealing one. Doing this would mean 
claiming that the laws which pick out striking regularities in the Mosaic are 
independent of us and our choice of languages, but that the metalaws which pick 
out striking regularities in the patterns in the Mosaic are language-dependent. That 
is a major asymmetry and one that is hard to motivate: nothing like that seems 
evident in the practice of physics. Such a hybrid account is vulnerable to the 
(accurate) accusation that it is simply an ad hoc move made to escape Lange’s 
objection. Language-relativity would be better motivated if it were embraced more 
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thoroughly. That is, accept Cohen and Callender’s arguments for the BBSA and then 
incorporate symmetries as metalaws by extending their account of laws in the 
natural way. 
 
4.2 Symmetry principles and necessary connections 
With the structure of a Humean treatment of symmetry principles now in place, we 
can look for places to apply the account. Given the claims that Humeanism pays 
insufficient attention to modern science, deploying the EBBSA to further engage with 
scientific practice would be ideal. McKenzie has provided an opportunity to do just 
that.198 
Look to particle physics and make the assumption that a law associated with some 
particles exhibits a symmetry. Since all of the fundamental interactions that we know 
of are connected to symmetries, this is an entirely reasonable assumption to make; 
it is hardly a special case. In such cases, we find multiplets as indicated in the previous 
chapter: a family of particles which share in their determinable properties. As has 
already been discussed, there is considerable heuristic importance attached to the 
holding of symmetry principles. For one thing, they figure in the prediction of 
particles that have not yet been observed, with the prediction of the omega minus 
particle via the Eightfold Way being one of the most famous. With the prevalence of 
symmetries in our fundamental theories, we should expect the world to have a 
number of these multiplets. 
The problem for Humeanism, McKenzie goes on to say, appears when we consider 
otherworldly duplicates of actual particles. The mathematics of our theoretical 
understanding of these multiplets proceeds via semi-simple Lie algebras and a 
consequence of their treatment in this way is that a multiplet will correspond to one 
algebra only. Hence if we examine a world with particle duplicates: 
[I]f we understand the laws operative there along quantum-mechanical 
lines it follows that those laws must possess the symmetry of the laws of the 
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actual world. But that represents a hugely informative and non-trivial 
constraint on the laws that any such set of duplicates can accord with … 
information about symmetry is highly non-trivial information from an 
empirical point of view.199 
Humeanism – particularly in the style of Lewis – is built upon a foundation of 
categorical properties, those that do not impose any constraints upon the laws that 
they enter into. For example, there are worlds where Coulomb’s law for charged 
particles is an inverse cube law as opposed to an inverse square law, and other 
worlds where there is a change of sign so that like charges attract rather than repel. 
Whether there are any limitations on the form that a law for charged particles can 
take remains an open question; McKenzie points out that the writings of various 
metaphysicians seem to indicate that there are no non-trivial limitations 
whatsoever. This ties in with the contingent status of laws: since there are worlds 
with duplicates of charged particles that do not obey Coulomb’s law, that law cannot 
be necessary. At least, not in an unrestricted sense, although there is still room in 
the view for it to be physically necessary. If the form that the laws for particle 
duplicates can take is limited by symmetries, then those particles cannot only 
possess categorical properties. If they possess non-categorical properties, then there 
are associated laws which are not contingent in the way Humean laws are normally 
taken to be. This is no mere cosmetic change: the package of contingent laws and 
categorical properties is tied into the denial of necessary connections. But if there 
are constraints on how things can behave, the central Humean commitment is in 
trouble. 
The laws for duplicates will not in general be uniquely determined by the holding of 
these symmetries. McKenzie considers renormalizable local gauge theories as a 
candidate for our best theory of fundamental laws, and here the laws will be almost 
uniquely specified by the relevant symmetries. But this makes little real difference 
to the Humean position. The problem is that taking symmetries to impose 
constraints introduces necessary connections. How tight those constraints are is very 
much a secondary issue, since it is their very presence that causes difficulties. (As 
McKenzie’s goal is to rework the Humean – anti-Humean debate, she also thinks the 
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Humean’s opponents are in trouble and that this does not indicate a triumph of one 
side over the other. I ignore the issues for dispositionalists here as tangential to this 
project.200) 
Before turning to the reply that I favour, it is worth considering McKenzie’s 
suggestion for how Humeans ought to respond. The main idea is that the position 
may need updating, but that something resembling it is still a live option. Humeans, 
after all, do not have to reject all necessity. Their denial is generally taken to be a 
denial of necessity in nature, of there being necessary connections between distinct 
existents. Mathematical or logical necessity, on the other hand, is not usually treated 
with the same suspicion. Since McKenzie’s problem gets going because the relevant 
mathematics associates a multiplet with only one symmetry principle, if this is a 
mathematical necessity then it does not need to be treated as having anti-Humean 
implications: 
is it not at bottom a mathematical fact that a set of particles, defined by a 
given set of determinate values, cannot participate in laws of quantum-
theoretic form with arbitrary symmetry structure? It seems to me that it is; 
and as such, it seems to me that the mere fact that the laws describing a 
given set of particles may be unique and in that sense necessary, it is not a 
necessity that Hume himself need have felt particularly troubled by.201 
The upshot is that Humeans can deal with necessary laws, and not just in the 
standard reductive way. The usual belief that they cannot arises from an outdated 
debate, and had the participants in that debate paid more attention to the relevant 
physics, we would not be burdened with such misconceptions. There is a further 
consequence too: since Humeans end up with a necessitarian position, a stance 
typically adopted by anti-Humeans, the latter group must come up with a new way 
of characterising their position. 
In addition to being interesting, McKenzie’s suggested modified Humeanism gets 
right to the core of what forms of necessity are acceptably un-mysterious. However, 
I think it would be a mistake for Humeans to accept her offer. The issue is not that 
                                                     
200 But see French (forthcoming a) and French (forthcoming b) which bring out the tension 
between modern physics and disposition-based accounts. 
201 McKenzie (2014) p. 59, italics in original. 
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the lines of the debate become less clear: if anti-Humeans do not find this new 
Humean account acceptable, then it is up to them to set out an alternative. That said, 
I suspect that many would be more sympathetic to it. If necessity is back on the table, 
exactly what part of the account would they consider to be lacking? Nor is 
acceptance of mathematical necessity the problem. (I sympathise with the cry that 
distinct existents being ‘forced’ to go together is mysterious. I have very little grasp 
on the analogous claim that there is no reason why two and two should not make 
five.) 
My worry is that the introduction of necessity is treated as acceptable when we take 
the particles in question to be defined by the mathematical values assigned to them 
by quantum theory. No part of that manoeuvre is specific to the theory being a 
quantum one. The same move appears to work in the classical context too: as long 
as we define the entities in question by the mathematical values that some theory 
assigns to them, we can then claim that there are unmysterious necessary 
connections between them of a mathematical nature. But if we can get necessity in 
the world whenever properties can be represented mathematically, then the 
floodgates have truly been opened. The ‘unreasonable’ effectiveness of 
mathematics in the sciences is no secret; its very indispensability is a key feature in 
attempts by philosophers to give an account of the subject. 
We might want to point out that this particle definition could be meant in two ways. 
In one way, the particles are physical entities with the usual sorts of properties. 
Mathematics comes in as a representational tool, but nothing more: there is a reality 
whose nature is not essentially mathematical. If this is McKenzie’s meaning, then I 
think the concern just expressed above is relevant. Representations often have 
features that their represented targets do not, and vice versa (‘surplus structure’ is 
a case in point). Justifications of mathematical necessity in the representation are 
not by themselves sufficient to justify necessity in the world. The sense of mystery, I 
think, is undiminished. 
The other sense of the definition might be that the nature of the particles is tied to 
the mathematics. We might get at this by saying there is nothing more to the 
particles than their mathematical treatment in the theory. I am less sure what this 
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sort of talk is supposed to mean. Perhaps that we have no understanding of the 
particles beyond our mathematical treatment. If so, then that is granted. But this 
form of ignorance does not mean that we must conceptually revise what we take to 
be the nature of the particles involved. That our theory does not say anything more 
than its mathematical content does not mean that we must think there is nothing 
more. That sort of claim seems to make more sense if we adopt a kind of 
anthropocentric arrogance in our epistemology, but I see little reason to believe that 
we ought to be able to understand all of reality in a non-mathematical way. 
Alternatively, perhaps this is the stronger claim that the world is mathematical in an 
ontological sense. That would not be unprecedented, but such a result requires a 
massive shift in our accounts of the fundamental. For just one example of this, 
consider what becomes of causation when mathematical entities are often 
characterised as abstract and so non-causal.202 
In short, I am sceptical that accepting the necessity suggested by McKenzie’s 
considerations is harmless. Even if we were to grant for argument’s sake that it might 
preserve the letter of the Humean account, there is considerable unresolved tension 
with the spirit. If there were no other line of response, then that might simply be a 
bullet that Humeans would have to bite. Fortunately, there is an alternative 
response: we can deploy the EBBSA. The main move here might already be obvious, 
in that it is a denial of necessity. McKenzie’s challenge arises because of the claim 
that duplicates of actual particles must behave in ways that are ultimately captured 
by appropriate symmetry principles. On the face of it, that is a similar claim to the 
usual ones involving laws. Two like-charged particles, for example, must accelerate 
away from one another in the absence of any other forces. Since the laws are 
necessary, duplicates of those particles in similar conditions must also accelerate 
away from one another. But for all this talk of the connection between laws and 
necessity, Humeans have a standard line of response. That particles always behave 
in ways described by the appropriate law. This is not because the law makes them 
                                                     
202 Tegmark (2006) is a good example of someone who takes seriously the claim that the 
world is fundamentally mathematical. For a different approach to a mathematical ontology, 
see Dipert (1997). For clarity’s sake, I should note that I do not think that McKenzie is 
advocating for this radical a conclusion. 
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do so, it is because the law is an accurate description of their behaviour. That we 
expect duplicates to behave similarly is understood as a restriction of possible 
worlds: among those worlds with the same physical laws (that is, the same 
descriptions of particle behaviour), particles behave in the same way. But that is no 
great surprise! 
As for laws, so for metalaws. If we understand the relevant symmetries through the 
lens of the EBBSA, they end up as higher-order descriptions of the mosaic, including 
the particles and their behaviour. So, that actual particles behave in ways described 
by the symmetries is because those symmetries are accurate descriptions of what 
happens (albeit somewhat indirect descriptions; the metalaws are more directly 
concerned with the laws). As before, the related necessity is reduced away to 
restricted quantification over worlds. Among those worlds with the same metalaws 
as ours, particles behave in the same broad ways – although if multiple first-order 
laws are compatible with the same set of metalaws, there is some more room for 
variation in behaviour than there was in the previous case. Providing something like 
the EBBSA is important for the same reason that the original BSA is important to 
Humean views. It is all well and good denying that there is any necessity in the world, 
but this negative claim alone is not sufficient. The onus is on Humeans to provide a 
positive account that says what is going on if not necessary connections. The account 
that I have indicated in this thesis provides the resources to not just deny that 
symmetries impose anti-Humean constraints, but also to offer an alternative 
metaphysical interpretation of them. This conclusion might be somewhat 
disappointing for those who share McKenzie’s desire to reconceptualise the debate, 
since it amounts to the claim that Humeanism in its current form possesses the 
resources to make sense of this aspect of physics. But this is also an unsurprising 
result, as it is notoriously difficult to read metaphysics off physical theory. In lacking 
empirical consequences, metaphysical accounts are especially resilient when 
confronted with the findings of empirical science. Compare with the debate around 
spacetime substantivalism and relationalism. Despite the replacement of the 
Newtonian background against which it was originally conceived with the theory of 
General Relativity, the philosophical argument over the nature of that spacetime is 
still a lively one! 
- 160 - 
That said, while McKenzie does not consider the EBBSA – for obvious reasons – she 
does anticipate the more general denial of the necessity involved. Three reasons are 
offered against this. First, against the claim there could be worlds with classical, 
rather than quantum, physics, it is complained that it is not clear that there could be 
a classical world studied by physics.203 Perhaps not. Ultimately, it makes little 
difference to Humeans whether our actual science of physics could make sense of a 
fundamentally classical world. There are, after all, physically impossible worlds with 
different physics to us. Some of those worlds will have observers broadly like us who 
systematise their knowledge of the world into empirical sciences. Some of those 
worlds with scientists may have theories that we would be happy to regard as an 
equivalent to our physics. But even if it turns out that non-quantum worlds fail to 
have any observers like us (perhaps because of consciousness being essentially tied 
to quantum states or some such), that would be no argument against the existence 
of non-quantum worlds. The Humean denial of necessity appeals to the plurality of 
worlds, but does not require that there be something like our science of physics 
practised at each or that our actual physics have the resources to make sense of 
every world. 
Second, there is the more substantive question of why this response is being made 
now and not much earlier in the debate. Grant to Humeans that there are worlds 
whose laws that cannot be described in a quantum theoretic way. Why then is the 
existence of such worlds not an argument against anti-Humeans who think that the 
laws are necessary? It would cut a lot of unnecessary work out of justifying the 
Humean position if we could simply point to the existence of worlds with other 
physics and conclude immediately that the laws are not unrestrictedly necessary. 
Well a good reason not to try this approach is that no anti-Humean is going to look 
impressed! The reason why this response to McKenzie is not utilised in the canonical 
debate is that the difference between Humeanism and anti-Humeanism comes 
down to a difference in presuppositions. If one starts out with a commitment to 
there being worlds with wildly different physics, then the usual anti-Humean 
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the resources of modal realism in my response, I see little reason why the usual modal 
alternatives could not also be applied. 
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accounts are going to look unsatisfactory. If one lacks that commitment, Humeanism 
looks to be appealing to a very questionable plurality. Insistence by either camp that 
they have the right account is not sufficient to sway the other side because it does 
nothing to change the presuppositions in question. We do not have to remain silent, 
of course. One side can still remind the other of the costs inherent in their 
presuppositions. Humeans adopting the Lewisian package of views must bear the 
cost of accepting the lack of quantitative parsimony that comes with the plurality of 
worlds. But, presumably, if one is such a Humean then that does not look like a great 
cost at all! The price is outweighed by the account’s advantages, such as not having 
to accept an unexplained necessity. 
One way to engage in this sort of debate has just been indicated: remind the other 
camp that their presuppositions come at a price. This might sway those still on the 
fence, but is unlikely to make a difference to the more committed adherents. The 
other way is to find a problem for the opposing account on its own terms. That is, 
find a problem that the opposing side will also view as a problem and not just part 
and parcel of the view. Outright inconsistency is one such problem, albeit a rare one. 
Tension with scientific practice is often another, assuming that the account is not 
explicitly a revisionary one. This is why the defence against McKenzie is not also a 
weapon to use against anti-Humeans. Views that take the laws to be necessary lack 
the basic presupposition that there are worlds with different laws and so will not 
regard this claim as offering a problem from the anti-Humean perspective. Since 
Humeans start with this commitment, there is little point in objecting that one is 
unsure of the existence of those worlds: that simply reminds Humeans of what is 
involved in accepting their views, it does not provide a problem in Humean terms. 
Third, if we are discussing duplicates of entities, we first need to settle what those 
entities are. If we agree that they are quantum entities (be they particles or fields), 
then we must use laws of a quantum template to describe them. Necessity, 
therefore, is back on the menu. However, I see little way to make this response clear 
without having it beg the question. What is it for an entity to be a quantum entity? 
The most obvious response is that it is the sort of entity described in a quantum 
theoretic way. But if this implies that duplicates of that entity are also quantum 
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entities and so must be described in a quantum theoretic way too, then it 
straightforwardly begs the question. If calling an entity quantum at the outset 
enforces a limitation of its otherworldly behaviour, then of course we must use 
quantum theory to describe it. But that necessity was introduced by calling the entity 
a quantum one. On the other hand, if an entity’s being quantum does not impose 
any such limitation, then I fail to see what point there is in attaching the label. This 
settling of the nature of the entity before we start is either toothless or question 
begging. Similar comments apply to settling which sort of structural templates 
should count as laws. If this is meant to restrict our attention to the form that our 
quantum theoretic laws take, then it assumes that the laws must the quantum ones 
which is not an assumption that Humeans need grant. If it is taken as a request for a 
list of all the possible forms that laws can take, then it is an entirely unreasonable 
request. According to the Humean view, to do that requires knowing the goings on 
at every possible world, including those with fundamental properties that are not 
instantiated at our world. That is an epistemological nightmare! 
The upshot of this discussion is that the use of symmetry principles in physics does 
not obviously motivate a rework of the entire Humean position. There do need to be 
some changes, so that Humeans are not left flatly denying necessary connections 
while being unable to explain just what they think is going on with symmetries. This 
is the function of the EBBSA, to provide the details of a positive Humean account 
that retains the spirit of the original motivation. 
 
4.3 The special sciences 
Let us turn to a somewhat more speculative use of the EBBSA. Recall that one of the 
original main motivations for the language-relative BBSA was the desire to cover the 
laws of the special sciences. The standard BSA permitted both axioms and theorems 
to be classed as laws and so allowed for special science laws in a derivative sense: 
those regularities that can be derived from the axioms of the best system are also 
laws. Immediate issues of reducibility arise. If one does not think that the entities 
studied by the special sciences are ontologically reducible to those studied by 
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physics, then there is no reason to think that those higher-level laws will be derivable 
from lower-level ones. That is the opposite result one would be hoping for if the 
sciences are ontologically independent from one another, since it means that there 
are no high-level laws. Supposing that one is willing to grant an ontological reduction, 
it might still be the case that there is no in-principle reduction of the special science 
laws; perhaps there is no good way to translate the language of economics into that 
of physics. Of course, if we recall the doctrine of Humean Supervenience, we might 
note that the BSA was not designed for cases like these. It fits much better with 
Lewis’ motivating picture of the world if the special sciences are reducible, both in 
the sense of their entities being nothing more than distributions of fundamental 
properties and in the sense of their vocabularies being translatable.204 But even then, 
we still might end up with no special science laws. Perhaps the behaviour of macro-
entities would require such long and disjunctive descriptions in a language of 
perfectly natural properties that no system with an eye for simplicity would include 
them among its consequences. 
While the BSA agrees that there can be laws of the special sciences, this agreement 
is quite weak. The turn to the BBSA resolves all of the relevant language issues; a 
geological regularity stated in the language used by geology would not need to be 
very complicated at all. We have already seen that the resources provided by the 
BBSA are of use to Humeans looking to incorporate symmetry principles into their 
account of laws. The question that I turn to in this section is to what extent the help 
goes in the opposite direction. In other words, can the move to higher-order systems 
offer anything to Humeans with an interest in the special sciences? Laying my cards 
on the table, I think it has something to offer. Precisely how much it offers depends 
heavily on how one thinks of the laws of the science in question. To make things 
more concrete, I will use biology as my example. This, I hope, sidesteps the question 
of whether we want to count the like of economics or psychology as genuine sciences 
– although I hope that the structure of this example carries over to these more 
controversial cases even if the specifics do not. 
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Some might worry that biology is an unpromising area to begin a search for metalaws 
given that there is not even a consensus that biology has any laws! This is nicely 
illustrated by Beatty: 
All generalizations about the living world: (a) are just mathematical, 
physical, or chemical generalizations (or deductive consequences of 
mathematical, physical, or chemical generalizations plus initial conditions) 
or (b) are distinctively biological, in which case they describe contingent 
outcomes of evolution.205 
Although it is not mentioned by name, we might note that the first disjunct 
corresponds closely to the treatment of biological regularities offer by the standard 
BSA. This presents a difficulty to the present work, since if there are no biological 
laws then we can hardly expect there to be any metalaws concerned with biological 
laws. Option (a) is intended to capture the way in which the likes of Newton’s laws 
of motion are applicable to more than just point particles. Cats and dogs also 
accelerate when acted on by forces. But no part of that is due to their biological 
nature, it is entirely due to their being composed out of physical matter. So (a) blocks 
the laws of physics (or chemistry for that matter) from sneaking into the ‘biological 
law’ category merely because biological entities will also possess physical properties. 
Laws shouldn’t be double counted in this way.  
The other possibility mentioned in (a) is that biological ‘laws’ are really just 
mathematical generalisations. The problem this raises is the lack of empirical 
content. Mathematical truths can be discovered a priori, and so do not require us to 
interact with the world. But the laws of science are supposed to be empirically 
discovered. If a regularity can be discovered without us needing to consult the 
outside world, we might worry that the regularity is not directly concerned with the 
world after all. 
Option (b) is intended to be no more attractive. As has been mentioned previously, 
the laws are supposed to be accompanied by a sense of necessity. This comes out 
clearly in efforts to distinguish them from the merely accidental regularities. The pen 
had to fall to the ground, but it is merely a (happy?) accident that everyone in the 
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room was a philosopher. If the biological regularities are contingent then they fail to 
possess a core attribute of laws. 
I do not wish to get drawn too far astray by this debate, but it is reasonable to 
indicate how a response to this dilemma might look. First note that there are 
examples of law candidates in biology which are arguably not merely mathematical, 
physical or chemical regularities. One such example of Kleiber’s law, which relates 
an animal’s metabolic rate R to its mass M: 
𝑅 = 𝑀
3
4⁄  
Approximately, that is, but let us set aside the complications raised by approximate 
laws. It is important to note that while the exponent is 3/4 for animals, it is taken to 
be closer to 1 for small multicellular plants. Is this a mere mathematical tautology? 
The short answer is ‘no’. Early approaches might have suggested something like that 
since they associated metabolic rates with heat dissipation, and this latter value is 
dependent on an organism’s surface area. In line with this, initial proposals for the 
value of the exponent put it at 2/3, a value suggested through the mathematical 
comparison of surface area to volume. In 1932, Kleiber observed that the value of 
3/4 fit the empirical data more closely for animals.206 If Kleiber’s law was a purely 
mathematical theorem, there would have been no need to examine the empirical 
data; armchair considerations would have sufficed. After all, one does not arrive at 
Pythagoras’ theorem by observing large numbers of right angled triangles! Since 
empirical data was (and still is) relevant to determining the value of the exponent, 
Kleiber’s law is not distinctively mathematical in a way that prevents it from having 
empirical content. Is the law a physical one masquerading as a biological one? This 
is somewhat less clear since to give an answer, we would first need to decide on 
what the criteria are for a generalisation to be distinctively physical as opposed to 
biological. There is some support for the negative answer though: the laws of physics 
do not typically trade in biological terms like ‘metabolism’ and ‘animal’. Given the 
explicit usage of distinctively biological vocabulary, I am inclined to take Kleiber’s law 
to be a biological law candidate. A rough and ready test: would we expect Kleiber’s 
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law to earn its way into an orthodox best system? Presumably not. It doesn’t refer 
to perfectly natural properties and we have already seen the issues that creates! So 
Kleiber’s law is not a candidate for fundamental lawhood. 
Turning to the second horn of Beatty’s dilemma, we should say something about the 
contingency of biological regularities. The worry here is that law candidates are 
supposed to hold necessarily and are invariant under a large range of changes of 
contingent fact. Biological laws fail to share in this feature and so are unfit to be 
called laws. Their contingency is nicely illustrated by Rosenberg: 
Consider what was until recently thought to be the most invariant of 
biological regularities: all genes are composed of DNA. For a long time this 
regularity was subject to no exception. But because it remained invariant 
over a very long period, its operation provided an environment that would 
allow for the selection for any new biological system that could take 
advantage of the fact that all genes are composed of DNA. Such a system 
eventually came into existence – the RNA viruses, whose genes are made 
of RNA and which parasitize the machinery of DNA replication (the HIV virus 
is the most notable example of these viruses). Thus the regularity that all 
genes are made of DNA gives way to the regularity that they are all made of 
nucleic acids (either RNA or DNA). But we can be sure that the arms race of 
evolutionary competition will eventually undermine this new invariant 
regularity, by producing an alternative means of genetic transmission that 
exploits the regularity.207 
If this was the most well-established regularity, then all other biological regularities 
will be more restricted in the spatiotemporal regions which they hold in. This is a 
rather different picture to the one we get from physics where (concerns about the 
period immediately following the Big Bang aside) the regularities are taken to hold 
across the entirety of spacetime. Biological regularities are restricted because of the 
selection pressures involved in natural selection. Should an environment change, 
different traits will be better adapted and so rise in prominence. Interaction with 
other species is often even more ruthless and the relevant regularities can change 
very rapidly indeed. Antibiotic resistance is a clear example due to the short lifecycles 
of the organisms involved: the rate of change is such that there is a constant need to 
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develop new forms of antibiotics to deal with the changing characteristics of the 
unwelcome bacteria. 
Will the Humean class such restricted regularities as laws? A hard-liner might well 
reply in the negative, and point to their failure to be exactly true as further evidence 
of their unsuitable character. Fair enough, it has always been possible to dismiss 
special science laws and focus entirely on fundamental laws. But suppose that we 
wish to allow for special science laws. We will need to relax the strict requirement 
on truth, since candidates like Kleiber’s law are only approximately true. This is just 
an instance of a more general point: finding the curve that best fits the data will often 
result in a formula that is not precisely true. Assume that this can be done. Then we 
might say that biological laws will deserve entry into a best system for biology, for 
they describe particularly striking patterns in the world. We might not want to let all 
of the candidates in, perhaps some hold of such a small range of organisms or over 
such a short span of time that they fail to be notable enough to be laws. That is no 
issue, since the BBSA already has the resources for dealing with those cases. 
Regularities that fail to contribute enough strength to justify their cost in simplicity 
do not make it into the best system. 
The difference in necessity can also be accommodated in a natural fashion, simply 
by extending the treatment of physical possibility. There is space between the 
necessity of the physical laws and the accidental nature of today’s weather in which 
we might locate biological laws. Under the standard Humean account, claiming that 
a law of physics is necessary is not to claim that it holds in every possible world. 
Rather, it is a restricted claim. The laws of physics together mark out a set of possible 
worlds as being physically possible (which is just to say that the histories of those 
worlds are consistent with our laws of physics). Ontologically, there is nothing special 
about such worlds, there are many other worlds whose histories mark them out as 
not being physically possible. It is in this way that physical possibility is a restricted 
form of possibility more generally. A similar treatment of biological laws can be 
made, where a set of possible worlds can be marked out by taking the biological laws 
and picking out every world consistent with those laws. The set of worlds so selected 
will be distinct from the set associated with physical possibility (the laws of physics 
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can hold at worlds at which there is no life). But this sphere of ‘biological possibility’ 
is no less a kind of possibility for that fact. Compare: physical possibility is a 
subspecies of logical possibility, but that is not to the detriment of physical 
possibility. Since laws having a kind of necessity reduces to their being consistent 
with a restricted subset of the plurality of possible worlds, Humeans have no 
problem with taking biological laws to be less necessary physical ones. 
One might worry that this does not fully answer the problem. Perhaps necessity was 
not the real issue with these laws, but rather their failure to be universal. A regularity 
that fails to hold across all of spacetime is no law. I suspect that this captures the 
objection more accurately, but we should note that it is also an opportunity. This is 
where the marriage of the BBSA and Humean metalaws can be put to work. Recall 
that the fact that the laws of physics hold for every spacetime region is captured by 
invariance principles: the laws remain the same despite spatial and temporal 
translations. To claim that the (first-order) laws are universal in this way is to make 
a claim about the content of the best system of metalaws: it is to claim that there 
are metalaws corresponding to this spatiotemporal invariance. Seen in this light, the 
requirement that a regularity be universal in order to be a law of physics is entirely 
dependent upon the appropriate regularities being in the second-order best system. 
To emphasise, it is not a part of the first-order best system, at least not directly. 
Restricted regularities provide less information about the world and so contribute 
less to system strength. A regularity’s being restricted might therefore prevent it 
from being in the best system, but this an indirect barring that comes down from the 
balancing competition rather than coming from a direct prohibition. 
The application of this treatment of invariance in the biological case is simple 
enough. If there is no rule that directly prevents restricted regularities from entering 
into candidate systems, the fact that biological law candidates fail to be universal 
does not prevent them from being laws. Given the current evidence from biology, 
we should expect the best biological system to contain such non-universal laws. This 
has higher-level consequences: a second-order systematisation of the regularities in 
the biological laws will not include invariance under spatial or temporal translations. 
That is an interesting result, since it indicates that an oft-quoted difference between 
- 169 - 
the laws of physics and biology comes out as a difference in second-order 
regularities. The contingency of biological laws is therefore a difference in degree 
(and metalaws), rather than a difference in kind.208 
So we can use the EBBSA in a negative way, by making a claim about the sorts of 
regularities that do not hold over the laws of biology. But we can also wield it in a 
more positive way, by suggesting what might enter into the second-order best 
system. Here is perhaps the best candidate for a higher-order regularity: natural 
selection. Why is it that the usual biological law candidates are sometimes claimed 
to not be genuine laws? It is their contingent status, and the fact that each holds for 
only a restricted length of time. Why is it that they change so readily? The answer to 
this is nicely brought out in the earlier quotation from Rosenberg. The fact that all 
genes were composed from DNA provided an opportunity for biological systems to 
take advantage of that regularity, an opportunity that was seized by the RNA viruses. 
Every regularity will have properties that different biological systems will be better 
or worse adapted to. Those better adapted have the opportunity to flourish while 
the regularity holds and, in their flourishing, change the regularity itself. Since every 
stable environment allows for certain systems to prosper, no environment remains 
stable indefinitely. We attribute this ‘arms race’ for better adaptations to natural 
selection. It is because of the process of natural selection that no local equilibrium 
between different species remains that way forever: if the equilibrium can be broken 
to some advantage, then it will be. 
Natural selection, then, acts on the biological regularities that get assigned lawhood. 
Those lower-level regularities fail to be universal because of the selection pressure 
imposed by natural selection. Of course, Humeans can deploy the EBBSA to offer a 
palatable translation of this talk of imposition. Biological systems exhibit regularities. 
These regularities differ in the regions of spacetime they hold over, with some being 
longer-lived or more wide-spread than others. Yet none are truly universal. Those 
regularities that make it into the best system for biology are the biological laws. 
Because of these facts, the best systematisation of the biological regularities itself 
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exhibits (second-order) regularities. While it has no regularities corresponding to 
spatiotemporal invariance, it does contain the principle of natural selection, 
capturing the pattern created by the variation among the first-order regularities. This 
appears to be globally invariant, in the manner of the metalaws that we have already 
encountered. The metaphysical picture here is still bottom-up, just as it is in the case 
of physics. 
While it is not clear that there are any biological symmetry principles as there are 
physical ones, we can still find evidence of high-level features being put to similar 
uses. Metalaws are used to explain laws in a manner like the explanation of 
phenomena by laws. The most famous example of this is the claim that the 
conservation laws hold because of invariance principles. Earlier we mentioned 
Kleiber’s law, which relates an animal’s metabolism to its body mass. There is a 
notable attempt to explain why Kleiber’s law holds, advanced by West, Brown and 
Enquist (the WBE model).209 Organisms effectively have a transportation problem to 
solve: their cells need a supply of materials, but the cells may be located far from the 
materials that the organism takes in. The organism, therefore, needs a 
transportation system to ensure the cells get the supplies that they need. WBE make 
three assumptions about the transportation systems that beings like mammals have, 
and from these assumptions derive the quarter power law. First, to supply the entire 
organism, a space-filling pattern is required. Second, the final branch (or capillary) of 
that system is a ‘size-invariant unit’. Third, the energy required to distribute 
resources is minimised (the evolutionary advantages of this last assumption should 
be obvious). Optimisation of the energy transportation system results in a tree-like 
fractal branching. The regularity observed in animals – that their metabolic rates and 
masses are related in this way – falls out of the branching structure that they all have 
in common. This structure in turn is a consequence of the deeper ‘requirement’ that 
energy costs be minimised. The authors take the same kind of reasoning to explain 
the other allometric power laws.210 
                                                     
209 West, Brown and Enquist (1997). See Dorato (2012) for an overview. 
210 The WBE model is not uncontroversial. See Dodds, Rothman and Weitz (2001) for a 
representative critique. The key point as far as this work is concerned is not whether the 
WBE model is successful, but that this kind of attempt to explain biological laws by appeal 
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In summary, I think that biology is a promising area to put the EBBSA to work. To 
what extent its resources will be used depends on what one thinks about the status 
of biological laws. If there are no laws, then giving a philosophical account of laws in 
biology becomes a trivial matter. That is to the good: it is an empirical matter 
whether there are any and so the responsibility for determining their existence falls 
upon working scientists rather than armchair philosophers. Supposing that there are 
regularities we are willing to call laws, we can not only offer a best system account 
of those laws, but also capture the way in which they differ from the universal laws 
of fundamental physics. Deployment of the EBBSA here lets us say something about 
the relationship between natural selection and the usual law candidates. It also 
draws a parallel between attempts to derive Kleiber’s law from underlying principles 
and similar work in physics, where the laws are sometimes thought to ‘drop out’ of 
underlying invariance principles. I leave as an open question the extent to which the 
other special sciences are amenable to this treatment. 
 
 
                                                     
to more fundamental principles has been made. Notice that the paper by Dodds et al. 
questions the actual mathematical derivation presented, but not whether the entire WBE 
model is a misconceived project. Seen through the lens of the EBBSA, Humeans might view 
this as a debate over whether we have reason to think that energy minimisation is a 
biological metalaw.  
- 172 - 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This thesis began with two main aims. The first was to investigate the status of a 
Humean approach to laws given the difficulties that have been raised for it. Some of 
these problems are often stressed by metaphysicians, such as the challenge of 
showing how mere patterns in the mosaic are capable of explaining that mosaic. 
Others are typically brought up by philosophers of science, such as the challenge of 
fitting initial conditions into the account. Due to the prevalence of these issues in the 
literature, I took my first task to be showing how Humeans can respond without 
losing sight of the spirit of the account. In doing so, I believed that the act of setting 
out the options would go some way towards accomplishing a second, broader aim. 
Metaphysics and the philosophy of science do not currently enjoy a peaceful 
coexistence. We do not have to look too far to find specialists in both camps walling 
themselves off from the supposedly irrelevant work of the other discipline. While 
this is sometimes evident in published work, it is even more common to find it in 
conversations and conference discussions. This state of affairs is distressing to those 
of us who see no sharp boundary between the subject areas but rather an area of 
promising overlap. By examining accounts of laws, a topic that I believe resides 
within this overlap, and drawing upon considerations from both sides, I have helped 
to demonstrate the benefits of working within this space. 
In the first chapter, I examined the standard Best System Account. Of course, calling 
it ‘standard’ might be a bit of a misnomer, as we immediately run into questions of 
precisely what the theoretical standards for judging candidate systems are and how 
they should be understood. This remains an unresolved area, although plausibly one 
in which progress can be made by examining the practices of scientists. However, 
looking at some of those practices leads to a topic that the chapter did examine in 
more detail: the question of how we might integrate initial conditions into the 
account. While I noted that it is sometimes forgotten that David Lewis’ presentation 
of the account does leave room for initial conditions in the best system, this does 
not do full justice to the way they are appealed to in physics. This provides the 
motivation to adopt Ned Hall’s suggestion that we partition candidate systems into 
their Dynamic Hypothesis and their Initial Conditions Hypothesis. With this 
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distinction in place, we can give a fuller account of how the theoretical virtues are 
applied in the competition for best system. Namely that systems are better when 
their DH is strong but their ICH is weak. I closed this chapter by showing why, by 
Humean lights, scientists ought to care about the resulting laws. I argued that science 
is not merely concerned with the accumulation of nonmodal information, but also 
with the construction of explanations. 
The second chapter took up the issue of explanation in more depth. The long-
standing question of how it is that Humean laws can explain the world has been a 
topic of recent interest, largely due to Marc Lange’s focus on the principle of 
transitivity involved in the anti-Humean objections. After introducing Barry Loewer’s 
distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations, I showed how this 
merely sharpens the objection against Humeanism rather than defeating it. 
Ultimately, this leads to three routes of response open to Humeans. First, they might 
deny that regularities are grounded in the mosaic, and then either make the 
moderate claim that there are no relevant grounding relations or the more radical 
claim that the mosaic is grounded in the regularities. There cannot be a circle of 
explanation if the explanation involved is only one-way. This comes at a price, 
however, since a contrarian Humean is no longer entitled to say that every truth 
about the world holds in virtue of the mosaic. Second, Humeans can express 
dissatisfaction with the motivation supplied for the transitivity principle. The 
examples of it are reliant on scientifically studied entities explaining other 
scientifically studied entities. But Humean explanations involve a distinctively 
metaphysical entity, the mosaic, which is not clearly analogous to the motivating 
examples. Third, Humeans can bring into question the kind of explanation being 
appealed to here. If the demand is for something to be identified as responsible for 
the mosaic, then the laws will not suffice. But on the Humean view, nothing is 
responsible for the mosaic and so we should not be expecting laws to function as the 
explanans in that kind of explanation. I argued that Humeans might instead appeal 
to a kind of explanatory pluralism, where laws can be involved in explanations if by 
doing so they help to increase understanding. 
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The third chapter introduced symmetries and explained some aspects of their role 
in modern physics. Yet for all their importance, surprisingly little work has been done 
on the metaphysics of symmetry principles. Lange has been the main contributor to 
the project of conceiving of them as second-order laws that hold of other laws, and 
I drew upon his interpretation to extend the BSA to cover metalaws. This secures a 
philosophically promising place for them since the regularities of the second-order 
best system are suited to play roles similar to those of the first-order best system. 
Explanation and counterfactuals are particularly interesting here. The former 
because the approach to explanation suggested at the end of the second chapter 
allows symmetry principles to function in scientific explanations without there being 
a need to make questionable appeals to Noether’s Theorem to justify their 
explanatory role. The latter because treating invariances more explicitly allows us to 
see the role they play both in ordinary counterfactuals and in counterlegals. In 
response to the charge that the close worlds we need to supply truth values for 
counterfactuals will either have different metalaws or multiple miracles, I have 
argued that this rests on a mistaken conception of the Humean world-view. 
According to modal realism, possible worlds are not human constructions and so 
there is no reason to think that close worlds will suffer from either of these flaws. 
Yet a problem for the extension of the BSA remained: symmetry principles do not 
look to be stated in terms of perfectly natural properties, and so, when translated 
into the canonical language, a system of the actual symmetries used by physicists 
looks unlikely to win the competition for best system. 
While the third chapter ended on an obstacle, the fourth chapter began on a 
solution. Since the problem arises from the restricted nature of the vocabulary 
available to express candidate systems in, a suggestive line of response is to weaken 
that restriction. Here I appealed to the resources of the Better Best System Account 
and followed it in embracing a language-relative view of laws. With the problem of 
language avoided, this account was extended in the way previously indicated to 
arrive at what I take to be the strongest contender for a Humean account of 
symmetry principles. I then indicated two applications for this account. The first was 
to show why the structure imposed by symmetries does not represent a problematic 
constraint on the behaviour of particles. Far from merely banging the table and once 
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more denying the existence of necessary connections, Humeans can give a positive 
account of what is involved in talk of multiplet structure. For the second use, I turned 
to biology as a representative member of the special sciences. Assuming that we are 
willing to grant that there are biological laws, the Extended Better Best System 
Account lets us say how these laws differ in their universality from physical laws: this 
drops out as a difference in the metalaws of the second-order best system for 
biology. It also provides a way to distinguish stronger principles like natural selection 
from the weaker laws that they apply to. 
Where might we go from here? Given the central role that Humeanism plays in 
contemporary metaphysics, there are many related questions that this thesis has not 
resolved. However, I will highlight two main questions that I take to be particularly 
interesting prospects for future academic engagement with this field of research. 
First, there is still work to do in giving a Humean presentation of biology and its laws. 
The regularities here, in addition to being contingent, are often thought to span a 
range of necessity. Some appear to hold for very brief lengths of time and across very 
restricted areas. These are easily disrupted and we might say that they are not as 
invariant as some of their more stable brethren. I have indicated one way in which 
biological regularities can be more or less necessary: by differing in whether they 
enter the first or second-order best system. The system of metalaws holds over a 
wider range of possible worlds and so its members can be intelligibly said to be more 
necessary. But this allows only for differences in necessity for entire systems, it does 
not single out members of one order of system as being more necessary than other 
members of that system. It would be interesting to develop a means for Humeans to 
do this. Additionally, when combined with the reduction of ‘universality’ into the 
holding of particular metalaws, I think that it would remove one of the primary 
obstacles to taking there to be any laws in biology at all. If laws do not need to hold 
unrestrictedly and can differ in how stable we take them to be, I see little reason not 
to say that the regularities of biology are not laws. 
Second, the approach to symmetry principles developed here might be integrated 
with different forms of Humeanism. As I indicated at the outset, I have tended to 
appeal to the standard Humean project developed by Lewis when responding to 
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objections. But the specifics of his treatment of modality, ontology and the roles of 
laws are not shared by all Humeans. We have already encountered one major 
deviation in chapter two, where we met the contrarian. Such a Humean might be 
willing to claim that the world supervenes on the mosaic, but is not willing to claim 
that it is grounded in that mosaic. One might push this further: if the core of 
Humeanism is a rejection of necessary connections, then one requires only that 
everything fundamental in the world be categorical. But this need not be partnered 
with any kind of mosaic metaphor – perhaps the introduction of the entanglement 
relations that Darby has examined is a first step on this road. Even more 
speculatively, the grounding of physical objects in their regularities suggested by the 
more radical contrarian carries broad similarities with the claims made by ontic 
structural realists: both advocate for a diminished role for objects at the 
fundamental level while favouring some wider structure. A world where objects are 
grounded in laws (understood as regularities), which are in turn grounded in 
symmetries (understood as higher-order regularities) might well turn out to be a 
structuralist world – albeit one where the structure involved is categorical rather 
than modal. 
There is still much work to be done here in developing Humeanism of the style that 
I have adopted. But I hope that this thesis indicates the manner in which that work 
can be fruitfully approached: through sensitivity to the concerns of philosophers of 
science without losing out on metaphysical robustness. 
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